Daily Papers

Recent findings in neuroscience suggest that the human brain represents information in a geometric structure (for instance, through conceptual spaces). In order to communicate, we flatten the complex representation of entities and their attributes into a single word or a sentence. In this paper we use graph convolutional networks to support the evolution of language and cooperation in multi-agent systems. Motivated by an image-based referential game, we propose a graph referential game with varying degrees of complexity, and we provide strong baseline models that exhibit desirable properties in terms of language emergence and cooperation. We show that the emerged communication protocol is robust, that the agents uncover the true factors of variation in the game, and that they learn to generalize beyond the samples encountered during training.

The study of language emergence aims to understand how human languages are shaped by perceptual grounding and communicative intent. Computational approaches to emergent communication (EC) predominantly consider referential games in limited domains and analyze the learned protocol within the game framework. As a result, it remains unclear how the emergent languages from these settings connect to natural languages or provide benefits in real-world language processing tasks, where statistical models trained on large text corpora dominate. In this work, we propose a novel way to establish such a link by corpus transfer, i.e. pretraining on a corpus of emergent language for downstream natural language tasks, which is in contrast to prior work that directly transfers speaker and listener parameters. Our approach showcases non-trivial transfer benefits for two different tasks -- language modeling and image captioning. For example, in a low-resource setup (modeling 2 million natural language tokens), pre-training on an emergent language corpus with just 2 million tokens reduces model perplexity by 24.6% on average across ten natural languages. We also introduce a novel metric to predict the transferability of an emergent language by translating emergent messages to natural language captions grounded on the same images. We find that our translation-based metric highly correlates with the downstream performance on modeling natural languages (for instance rho=0.83 on Hebrew), while topographic similarity, a popular metric in previous work, shows surprisingly low correlation (rho=0.003), hinting that simple properties like attribute disentanglement from synthetic domains might not capture the full complexities of natural language. Our findings also indicate potential benefits of moving language emergence forward with natural language resources and models.

In this work, our goal is to train agents that can coordinate with seen, unseen as well as human partners in a multi-agent communication environment involving natural language. Previous work using a single set of agents has shown great progress in generalizing to known partners, however it struggles when coordinating with unfamiliar agents. To mitigate that, recent work explored the use of population-based approaches, where multiple agents interact with each other with the goal of learning more generic protocols. These methods, while able to result in good coordination between unseen partners, still only achieve so in cases of simple languages, thus failing to adapt to human partners using natural language. We attribute this to the use of static populations and instead propose a dynamic population-based meta-learning approach that builds such a population in an iterative manner. We perform a holistic evaluation of our method on two different referential games, and show that our agents outperform all prior work when communicating with seen partners and humans. Furthermore, we analyze the natural language generation skills of our agents, where we find that our agents also outperform strong baselines. Finally, we test the robustness of our agents when communicating with out-of-population agents and carefully test the importance of each component of our method through ablation studies.

In order to communicate, humans flatten a complex representation of ideas and their attributes into a single word or a sentence. We investigate the impact of representation learning in artificial agents by developing graph referential games. We empirically show that agents parametrized by graph neural networks develop a more compositional language compared to bag-of-words and sequence models, which allows them to systematically generalize to new combinations of familiar features.

Deep learning approaches to natural language processing have made great strides in recent years. While these models produce symbols that convey vast amounts of diverse knowledge, it is unclear how such symbols are grounded in data from the world. In this paper, we explore the development of a private language for visual data representation by training emergent language (EL) encoders/decoders in both i) a traditional referential game environment and ii) a contrastive learning environment utilizing a within-class matching training paradigm. An additional classification layer utilizing neural machine translation and random forest classification was used to transform symbolic representations (sequences of integer symbols) to class labels. These methods were applied in two experiments focusing on object recognition and action recognition. For object recognition, a set of sketches produced by human participants from real imagery was used (Sketchy dataset) and for action recognition, 2D trajectories were generated from 3D motion capture systems (MOVI dataset). In order to interpret the symbols produced for data in each experiment, gradient-weighted class activation mapping (Grad-CAM) methods were used to identify pixel regions indicating semantic features which contribute evidence towards symbols in learned languages. Additionally, a t-distributed stochastic neighbor embedding (t-SNE) method was used to investigate embeddings learned by CNN feature extractors.

Cultural differences in common ground may result in pragmatic failure and misunderstandings during communication. We develop our method Rational Speech Acts for Cross-Cultural Communication (RSA+C3) to resolve cross-cultural differences in common ground. To measure the success of our method, we study RSA+C3 in the collaborative referential game of Codenames Duet and show that our method successfully improves collaboration between simulated players of different cultures. Our contributions are threefold: (1) creating Codenames players using contrastive learning of an embedding space and LLM prompting that are aligned with human patterns of play, (2) studying culturally induced differences in common ground reflected in our trained models, and (3) demonstrating that our method RSA+C3 can ease cross-cultural communication in gameplay by inferring sociocultural context from interaction. Our code is publicly available at github.com/icwhite/codenames.

A promising approach for teaching artificial agents to use natural language involves using human-in-the-loop training. However, recent work suggests that current machine learning methods are too data inefficient to be trained in this way from scratch. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between two categories of learning signals with the ultimate goal of improving sample efficiency: imitating human language data via supervised learning, and maximizing reward in a simulated multi-agent environment via self-play (as done in emergent communication), and introduce the term supervised self-play (S2P) for algorithms using both of these signals. We find that first training agents via supervised learning on human data followed by self-play outperforms the converse, suggesting that it is not beneficial to emerge languages from scratch. We then empirically investigate various S2P schedules that begin with supervised learning in two environments: a Lewis signaling game with symbolic inputs, and an image-based referential game with natural language descriptions. Lastly, we introduce population based approaches to S2P, which further improves the performance over single-agent methods.

We introduce PartGlot, a neural framework and associated architectures for learning semantic part segmentation of 3D shape geometry, based solely on part referential language. We exploit the fact that linguistic descriptions of a shape can provide priors on the shape's parts -- as natural language has evolved to reflect human perception of the compositional structure of objects, essential to their recognition and use. For training, we use the paired geometry / language data collected in the ShapeGlot work for their reference game, where a speaker creates an utterance to differentiate a target shape from two distractors and the listener has to find the target based on this utterance. Our network is designed to solve this target discrimination problem, carefully incorporating a Transformer-based attention module so that the output attention can precisely highlight the semantic part or parts described in the language. Furthermore, the network operates without any direct supervision on the 3D geometry itself. Surprisingly, we further demonstrate that the learned part information is generalizable to shape classes unseen during training. Our approach opens the possibility of learning 3D shape parts from language alone, without the need for large-scale part geometry annotations, thus facilitating annotation acquisition.

The weight matrix (WM) of a neural network (NN) is its program. The programs of many traditional NNs are learned through gradient descent in some error function, then remain fixed. The WM of a self-referential NN, however, can keep rapidly modifying all of itself during runtime. In principle, such NNs can meta-learn to learn, and meta-meta-learn to meta-learn to learn, and so on, in the sense of recursive self-improvement. While NN architectures potentially capable of implementing such behaviour have been proposed since the '90s, there have been few if any practical studies. Here we revisit such NNs, building upon recent successes of fast weight programmers and closely related linear Transformers. We propose a scalable self-referential WM (SRWM) that learns to use outer products and the delta update rule to modify itself. We evaluate our SRWM in supervised few-shot learning and in multi-task reinforcement learning with procedurally generated game environments. Our experiments demonstrate both practical applicability and competitive performance of the proposed SRWM. Our code is public.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

Playing games has a long history of describing intricate interactions in simplified forms. In this paper we explore if large language models (LLMs) can play games, investigating their capabilities for randomisation and strategic adaptation through both simultaneous and sequential game interactions. We focus on GPT-4o-Mini-2024-08-17 and test two games between LLMs: Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) and games of strategy (Prisoners Dilemma PD). LLMs are often described as stochastic parrots, and while they may indeed be parrots, our results suggest that they are not very stochastic in the sense that their outputs - when prompted to be random - are often very biased. Our research reveals that LLMs appear to develop loss aversion strategies in repeated games, with RPS converging to stalemate conditions while PD shows systematic shifts between cooperative and competitive outcomes based on prompt design. We detail programmatic tools for independent agent interactions and the Agentic AI challenges faced in implementation. We show that LLMs can indeed play games, just not very well. These results have implications for the use of LLMs in multi-agent LLM systems and showcase limitations in current approaches to model output for strategic decision-making.

We introduce a new language learning setting relevant to building adaptive natural language interfaces. It is inspired by Wittgenstein's language games: a human wishes to accomplish some task (e.g., achieving a certain configuration of blocks), but can only communicate with a computer, who performs the actual actions (e.g., removing all red blocks). The computer initially knows nothing about language and therefore must learn it from scratch through interaction, while the human adapts to the computer's capabilities. We created a game in a blocks world and collected interactions from 100 people playing it. First, we analyze the humans' strategies, showing that using compositionality and avoiding synonyms correlates positively with task performance. Second, we compare computer strategies, showing how to quickly learn a semantic parsing model from scratch, and that modeling pragmatics further accelerates learning for successful players.

Normal-form games (NFGs) are the fundamental model of strategic interaction. We study their representation using neural networks. We describe the inherent equivariance of NFGs -- any permutation of strategies describes an equivalent game -- as well as the challenges this poses for representation learning. We then propose the NfgTransformer architecture that leverages this equivariance, leading to state-of-the-art performance in a range of game-theoretic tasks including equilibrium-solving, deviation gain estimation and ranking, with a common approach to NFG representation. We show that the resulting model is interpretable and versatile, paving the way towards deep learning systems capable of game-theoretic reasoning when interacting with humans and with each other.

Constructing benchmarks that test the abilities of modern natural language understanding models is difficult - pre-trained language models exploit artifacts in benchmarks to achieve human parity, but still fail on adversarial examples and make errors that demonstrate a lack of common sense. In this work, we propose gamification as a framework for data construction. The goal of players in the game is to compose questions that mislead a rival AI while using specific phrases for extra points. The game environment leads to enhanced user engagement and simultaneously gives the game designer control over the collected data, allowing us to collect high-quality data at scale. Using our method we create CommonsenseQA 2.0, which includes 14,343 yes/no questions, and demonstrate its difficulty for models that are orders-of-magnitude larger than the AI used in the game itself. Our best baseline, the T5-based Unicorn with 11B parameters achieves an accuracy of 70.2%, substantially higher than GPT-3 (52.9%) in a few-shot inference setup. Both score well below human performance which is at 94.1%.

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

Game theory is a powerful framework for reasoning about strategic interactions, with applications in domains ranging from day-to-day life to international politics. However, applying formal reasoning tools in such contexts is challenging, as these scenarios are often expressed in natural language. To address this, we introduce a framework for the autoformalization of game-theoretic scenarios, which translates natural language descriptions into formal logic representations suitable for formal solvers. Our approach utilizes one-shot prompting and a solver that provides feedback on syntactic correctness to allow LLMs to refine the code. We evaluate the framework using GPT-4o and a dataset of natural language problem descriptions, achieving 98% syntactic correctness and 88% semantic correctness. These results show the potential of LLMs to bridge the gap between real-life strategic interactions and formal reasoning.

Communication games, which we refer to as incomplete information games that heavily depend on natural language communication, hold significant research value in fields such as economics, social science, and artificial intelligence. In this work, we explore the problem of how to engage large language models (LLMs) in communication games, and in response, propose a tuning-free framework. Our approach keeps LLMs frozen, and relies on the retrieval and reflection on past communications and experiences for improvement. An empirical study on the representative and widely-studied communication game, ``Werewolf'', demonstrates that our framework can effectively play Werewolf game without tuning the parameters of the LLMs. More importantly, strategic behaviors begin to emerge in our experiments, suggesting that it will be a fruitful journey to engage LLMs in communication games and associated domains.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) integrate into our social and economic interactions, we need to deepen our understanding of how humans respond to LLMs opponents in strategic settings. We present the results of the first controlled monetarily-incentivised laboratory experiment looking at differences in human behaviour in a multi-player p-beauty contest against other humans and LLMs. We use a within-subject design in order to compare behaviour at the individual level. We show that, in this environment, human subjects choose significantly lower numbers when playing against LLMs than humans, which is mainly driven by the increased prevalence of `zero' Nash-equilibrium choices. This shift is mainly driven by subjects with high strategic reasoning ability. Subjects who play the zero Nash-equilibrium choice motivate their strategy by appealing to perceived LLM's reasoning ability and, unexpectedly, propensity towards cooperation. Our findings provide foundational insights into the multi-player human-LLM interaction in simultaneous choice games, uncover heterogeneities in both subjects' behaviour and beliefs about LLM's play when playing against them, and suggest important implications for mechanism design in mixed human-LLM systems.

Evaluation has traditionally focused on ranking candidates for a specific skill. Modern generalist models, such as Large Language Models (LLMs), decidedly outpace this paradigm. Open-ended evaluation systems, where candidate models are compared on user-submitted prompts, have emerged as a popular solution. Despite their many advantages, we show that the current Elo-based rating systems can be susceptible to and even reinforce biases in data, intentional or accidental, due to their sensitivity to redundancies. To address this issue, we propose evaluation as a 3-player game, and introduce novel game-theoretic solution concepts to ensure robustness to redundancy. We show that our method leads to intuitive ratings and provide insights into the competitive landscape of LLM development.

We introduce a framework for translating game descriptions in natural language into extensive-form representations in game theory, leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) and in-context learning. Given the varying levels of strategic complexity in games, such as perfect versus imperfect information, directly applying in-context learning would be insufficient. To address this, we introduce a two-stage framework with specialized modules to enhance in-context learning, enabling it to divide and conquer the problem effectively. In the first stage, we tackle the challenge of imperfect information by developing a module that identifies information sets along and the corresponding partial tree structure. With this information, the second stage leverages in-context learning alongside a self-debugging module to produce a complete extensive-form game tree represented using pygambit, the Python API of a recognized game-theoretic analysis tool called Gambit. Using this python representation enables the automation of tasks such as computing Nash equilibria directly from natural language descriptions. We evaluate the performance of the full framework, as well as its individual components, using various LLMs on games with different levels of strategic complexity. Our experimental results show that the framework significantly outperforms baseline models in generating accurate extensive-form games, with each module playing a critical role in its success.

Closed drafting or "pick and pass" is a popular game mechanic where each round players select a card or other playable element from their hand and pass the rest to the next player. Games employing closed drafting make for great studies on memory and turn order due to their explicitly calculable memory of other players' hands. In this paper, we establish first-principle benchmarks for studying model-free reinforcement learning algorithms and their comparative ability to learn memory in a popular family of closed drafting games called "Sushi Go Party!", producing state-of-the-art results on this environment along the way. Furthermore, as Sushi Go Party! can be expressed as a set of closely-related games based on the set of cards in play, we quantify the generalizability of reinforcement learning algorithms trained on various sets of cards, establishing key trends between generalized performance and the set distance between the train and evaluation game configurations. Finally, we fit decision rules to interpret the strategy of the learned models and compare them to the ranking preferences of human players, finding intuitive common rules and intriguing new moves.

This paper introduces SC2LE (StarCraft II Learning Environment), a reinforcement learning environment based on the StarCraft II game. This domain poses a new grand challenge for reinforcement learning, representing a more difficult class of problems than considered in most prior work. It is a multi-agent problem with multiple players interacting; there is imperfect information due to a partially observed map; it has a large action space involving the selection and control of hundreds of units; it has a large state space that must be observed solely from raw input feature planes; and it has delayed credit assignment requiring long-term strategies over thousands of steps. We describe the observation, action, and reward specification for the StarCraft II domain and provide an open source Python-based interface for communicating with the game engine. In addition to the main game maps, we provide a suite of mini-games focusing on different elements of StarCraft II gameplay. For the main game maps, we also provide an accompanying dataset of game replay data from human expert players. We give initial baseline results for neural networks trained from this data to predict game outcomes and player actions. Finally, we present initial baseline results for canonical deep reinforcement learning agents applied to the StarCraft II domain. On the mini-games, these agents learn to achieve a level of play that is comparable to a novice player. However, when trained on the main game, these agents are unable to make significant progress. Thus, SC2LE offers a new and challenging environment for exploring deep reinforcement learning algorithms and architectures.

In this paper, we describe adaptation of a simple word guessing game that occupied the hearts and minds of people around the world. There are versions for all three Baltic countries and even several versions of each. We specifically pay attention to the Latvian version and look into how people form their guesses given any already uncovered hints. The paper analyses guess patterns, easy and difficult word characteristics, and player behaviour and response.

We present a new type of game, the Liquidity Game. We draw inspiration from the UK government bond market and apply game theoretic approaches to its analysis. In Liquidity Games, market participants (agents) use non-cooperative games where the players' utility is directly defined by the liquidity of the game itself, offering a paradigm shift in our understanding of market dynamics. Each player's utility is intricately linked to the liquidity generated within the game, making the utility endogenous and dynamic. Players are not just passive recipients of utility based on external factors but active participants whose strategies and actions collectively shape and are shaped by the liquidity of the market. This reflexivity introduces a level of complexity and realism previously unattainable in conventional models. We apply Liquidity Game theoretic approaches to a simple UK bond market interaction and present results for market design and strategic behavior of participants. We tackle one of the largest issues within this mechanism, namely what strategy should market makers utilize when uncertain about the type of market maker they are interacting with, and what structure might regulators wish to see.

Text-adventure games and text role-playing games are grand challenges for reinforcement learning game playing agents. Text role-playing games are open-ended environments where an agent must faithfully play a particular character. We consider the distinction between characters and actors, where an actor agent has the ability to play multiple characters. We present a framework we call a thespian agent that can learn to emulate multiple characters along with a soft prompt that can be used to direct it as to which character to play at any time. We further describe an attention mechanism that allows the agent to learn new characters that are based on previously learned characters in a few-shot fashion. We show that our agent outperforms the state of the art agent framework in multi-character learning and few-shot learning.

We present "Human or Not?", an online game inspired by the Turing test, that measures the capability of AI chatbots to mimic humans in dialog, and of humans to tell bots from other humans. Over the course of a month, the game was played by over 1.5 million users who engaged in anonymous two-minute chat sessions with either another human or an AI language model which was prompted to behave like humans. The task of the players was to correctly guess whether they spoke to a person or to an AI. This largest scale Turing-style test conducted to date revealed some interesting facts. For example, overall users guessed the identity of their partners correctly in only 68% of the games. In the subset of the games in which users faced an AI bot, users had even lower correct guess rates of 60% (that is, not much higher than chance). This white paper details the development, deployment, and results of this unique experiment. While this experiment calls for many extensions and refinements, these findings already begin to shed light on the inevitable near future which will commingle humans and AI.

Existing game AI research mainly focuses on enhancing agents' abilities to win games, but this does not inherently make humans have a better experience when collaborating with these agents. For example, agents may dominate the collaboration and exhibit unintended or detrimental behaviors, leading to poor experiences for their human partners. In other words, most game AI agents are modeled in a "self-centered" manner. In this paper, we propose a "human-centered" modeling scheme for collaborative agents that aims to enhance the experience of humans. Specifically, we model the experience of humans as the goals they expect to achieve during the task. We expect that agents should learn to enhance the extent to which humans achieve these goals while maintaining agents' original abilities (e.g., winning games). To achieve this, we propose the Reinforcement Learning from Human Gain (RLHG) approach. The RLHG approach introduces a "baseline", which corresponds to the extent to which humans primitively achieve their goals, and encourages agents to learn behaviors that can effectively enhance humans in achieving their goals better. We evaluate the RLHG agent in the popular Multi-player Online Battle Arena (MOBA) game, Honor of Kings, by conducting real-world human-agent tests. Both objective performance and subjective preference results show that the RLHG agent provides participants better gaming experience.

This paper introduces Alympics (Olympics for Agents), a systematic simulation framework utilizing Large Language Model (LLM) agents for game theory research. Alympics creates a versatile platform for studying complex game theory problems, bridging the gap between theoretical game theory and empirical investigations by providing a controlled environment for simulating human-like strategic interactions with LLM agents. In our pilot case study, the "Water Allocation Challenge," we explore Alympics through a challenging strategic game focused on the multi-round auction on scarce survival resources. This study demonstrates the framework's ability to qualitatively and quantitatively analyze game determinants, strategies, and outcomes. Additionally, we conduct a comprehensive human assessment and an in-depth evaluation of LLM agents in strategic decision-making scenarios. Our findings not only expand the understanding of LLM agents' proficiency in emulating human strategic behavior but also highlight their potential in advancing game theory knowledge, thereby enriching our understanding of both game theory and empowering further research into strategic decision-making domains with LLM agents. Codes, prompts, and all related resources are available at https://github.com/microsoft/Alympics.

We explore the self-play training procedure of large language models (LLMs) in a two-player adversarial language game called Adversarial Taboo. In this game, an attacker and a defender communicate around a target word only visible to the attacker. The attacker aims to induce the defender to speak the target word unconsciously, while the defender tries to infer the target word from the attacker's utterances. To win the game, both players should have sufficient knowledge about the target word and high-level reasoning ability to infer and express in this information-reserved conversation. Hence, we are curious about whether LLMs' reasoning ability can be further enhanced by self-play in this adversarial language game (SPAG). With this goal, we select several open-source LLMs and let each act as the attacker and play with a copy of itself as the defender on an extensive range of target words. Through reinforcement learning on the game outcomes, we observe that the LLMs' performances uniformly improve on a broad range of reasoning benchmarks. Furthermore, iteratively adopting this self-play process can continuously promote LLMs' reasoning abilities. The code is at https://github.com/Linear95/SPAG.

Game-playing agents like AlphaGo have achieved superhuman performance through self-play, which is theoretically guaranteed to yield optimal policies in competitive games. However, most language tasks are partially or fully cooperative, so it is an open question whether techniques like self-play can effectively be used to improve language models. We empirically investigate this question in a negotiation game setting known as Deal or No Deal (DoND). Crucially, the objective in DoND can be modified to produce a fully cooperative game, a strictly competitive one, or anything in between. We finetune language models in self-play over multiple rounds of filtered behavior cloning in DoND for each of these objectives. Contrary to expectations, we find that language model self-play leads to significant performance gains in both cooperation and competition with humans, suggesting that self-play and related techniques have promise despite a lack of theoretical guarantees.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

We introduce an approach to evaluate language model (LM) agency using negotiation games. This approach better reflects real-world use cases and addresses some of the shortcomings of alternative LM benchmarks. Negotiation games enable us to study multi-turn, and cross-model interactions, modulate complexity, and side-step accidental evaluation data leakage. We use our approach to test six widely used and publicly accessible LMs, evaluating performance and alignment in both self-play and cross-play settings. Noteworthy findings include: (i) only closed-source models tested here were able to complete these tasks; (ii) cooperative bargaining games proved to be most challenging to the models; and (iii) even the most powerful models sometimes "lose" to weaker opponents

Recent work has proposed a methodology for the systematic evaluation of "Situated Language Understanding Agents"-agents that operate in rich linguistic and non-linguistic contexts-through testing them in carefully constructed interactive settings. Other recent work has argued that Large Language Models (LLMs), if suitably set up, can be understood as (simulators of) such agents. A connection suggests itself, which this paper explores: Can LLMs be evaluated meaningfully by exposing them to constrained game-like settings that are built to challenge specific capabilities? As a proof of concept, this paper investigates five interaction settings, showing that current chat-optimised LLMs are, to an extent, capable to follow game-play instructions. Both this capability and the quality of the game play, measured by how well the objectives of the different games are met, follows the development cycle, with newer models performing better. The metrics even for the comparatively simple example games are far from being saturated, suggesting that the proposed instrument will remain to have diagnostic value. Our general framework for implementing and evaluating games with LLMs is available at https://github.com/clp-research/clembench.

The categories of open learners (due to Fong, Spivak and Tuy\'eras) and open games (due to the present author, Ghani, Winschel and Zahn) bear a very striking and unexpected similarity. The purpose of this short note is to prove that there is a faithful symmetric monoidal functor from the former to the latter, which means that any supervised neural network (without feedback or other complicating features) can be seen as an open game in a canonical way. Roughly, each parameter is controlled by a different player, and the game's best response relation encodes the dynamics of gradient descent. We suggest paths for further work exploiting the link.

Recent evidence suggests that the use of generative artificial intelligence reduces the diversity of content produced. In this work, we develop a game-theoretic model to explore the downstream consequences of content homogeneity when producers use generative AI to compete with one another. At equilibrium, players indeed produce content that is less diverse than optimal. However, stronger competition mitigates homogeneity and induces more diverse production. Perhaps more surprisingly, we show that a generative AI model that performs well in isolation (i.e., according to a benchmark) may fail to do so when faced with competition, and vice versa. We validate our results empirically by using language models to play Scattergories, a word game in which players are rewarded for producing answers that are both correct and unique. We discuss how the interplay between competition and homogeneity has implications for the development, evaluation, and use of generative AI.

Competitive Pok\'emon Singles (CPS) is a popular strategy game where players learn to exploit their opponent based on imperfect information in battles that can last more than one hundred stochastic turns. AI research in CPS has been led by heuristic tree search and online self-play, but the game may also create a platform to study adaptive policies trained offline on large datasets. We develop a pipeline to reconstruct the first-person perspective of an agent from logs saved from the third-person perspective of a spectator, thereby unlocking a dataset of real human battles spanning more than a decade that grows larger every day. This dataset enables a black-box approach where we train large sequence models to adapt to their opponent based solely on their input trajectory while selecting moves without explicit search of any kind. We study a progression from imitation learning to offline RL and offline fine-tuning on self-play data in the hardcore competitive setting of Pok\'emon's four oldest (and most partially observed) game generations. The resulting agents outperform a recent LLM Agent approach and a strong heuristic search engine. While playing anonymously in online battles against humans, our best agents climb to rankings inside the top 10% of active players.

Game theory, as an analytical tool, is frequently utilized to analyze human behavior in social science research. With the high alignment between the behavior of Large Language Models (LLMs) and humans, a promising research direction is to employ LLMs as substitutes for humans in game experiments, enabling social science research. However, despite numerous empirical researches on the combination of LLMs and game theory, the capability boundaries of LLMs in game theory remain unclear. In this research, we endeavor to systematically analyze LLMs in the context of game theory. Specifically, rationality, as the fundamental principle of game theory, serves as the metric for evaluating players' behavior -- building a clear desire, refining belief about uncertainty, and taking optimal actions. Accordingly, we select three classical games (dictator game, Rock-Paper-Scissors, and ring-network game) to analyze to what extent LLMs can achieve rationality in these three aspects. The experimental results indicate that even the current state-of-the-art LLM (GPT-4) exhibits substantial disparities compared to humans in game theory. For instance, LLMs struggle to build desires based on uncommon preferences, fail to refine belief from many simple patterns, and may overlook or modify refined belief when taking actions. Therefore, we consider that introducing LLMs into game experiments in the field of social science should be approached with greater caution.

Decision-making, a complicated task requiring various types of abilities, presents an excellent framework for assessing Large Language Models (LLMs). Our research investigates LLMs' decision-making capabilities through the lens of a well-established field, Game Theory. We focus specifically on games that support the participation of more than two agents simultaneously. Subsequently, we introduce our framework, GAMA-Bench, including eight classical multi-agent games. We design a scoring scheme to assess a model's performance in these games quantitatively. Through GAMA-Bench, we investigate LLMs' robustness, generalizability, and enhancement strategies. Results reveal that while GPT-3.5 shows satisfying robustness, its generalizability is relatively limited. However, its performance can be improved through approaches such as Chain-of-Thought. Additionally, we conduct evaluations across various LLMs and find that GPT-4 outperforms other models on GAMA-Bench, achieving a score of 60.5. Moreover, Gemini-1.0-Pro and GPT-3.5 (0613, 1106, 0125) demonstrate similar intelligence on GAMA-Bench. The code and experimental results are made publicly available via https://github.com/CUHK-ARISE/GAMABench.

Playing video games requires perception, memory, and planning, exactly the faculties modern large language model (LLM) agents are expected to master. We study the major challenges in using popular video games to evaluate modern LLMs and find that directly dropping LLMs into games cannot make an effective evaluation, for three reasons -- brittle vision perception, prompt sensitivity, and potential data contamination. We introduce lmgame-Bench to turn games into reliable evaluations. lmgame-Bench features a suite of platformer, puzzle, and narrative games delivered through a unified Gym-style API and paired with lightweight perception and memory scaffolds, and is designed to stabilize prompt variance and remove contamination. Across 13 leading models, we show lmgame-Bench is challenging while still separating models well. Correlation analysis shows that every game probes a unique blend of capabilities often tested in isolation elsewhere. More interestingly, performing reinforcement learning on a single game from lmgame-Bench transfers both to unseen games and to external planning tasks. Our evaluation code is available at https://github.com/lmgame-org/GamingAgent/lmgame-bench.

We show that GPT-4's reasoning and planning capabilities extend to the 1993 first-person shooter Doom. This large language model (LLM) is able to run and play the game with only a few instructions, plus a textual description--generated by the model itself from screenshots--about the state of the game being observed. We find that GPT-4 can play the game to a passable degree: it is able to manipulate doors, combat enemies, and perform pathing. More complex prompting strategies involving multiple model calls provide better results. While further work is required to enable the LLM to play the game as well as its classical, reinforcement learning-based counterparts, we note that GPT-4 required no training, leaning instead on its own reasoning and observational capabilities. We hope our work pushes the boundaries on intelligent, LLM-based agents in video games. We conclude by discussing the ethical implications of our work.

Prior approaches to realizing mixed-initiative human--computer referential communication have adopted information-state or collaborative problem-solving approaches. In this paper, we argue for a new approach, inspired by coherence-based models of discourse such as SDRT asher-lascarides:2003a, in which utterances attach to an evolving discourse structure and the associated knowledge graph of speaker commitments serves as an interface to real-world reasoning and conversational strategy. As first steps towards implementing the approach, we describe a simple dialogue system in a referential communication domain that accumulates constraints across discourse, interprets them using a learned probabilistic model, and plans clarification using reinforcement learning.

To make AI systems broadly useful for challenging real-world tasks, we need them to learn complex human goals and preferences. One approach to specifying complex goals asks humans to judge during training which agent behaviors are safe and useful, but this approach can fail if the task is too complicated for a human to directly judge. To help address this concern, we propose training agents via self play on a zero sum debate game. Given a question or proposed action, two agents take turns making short statements up to a limit, then a human judges which of the agents gave the most true, useful information. In an analogy to complexity theory, debate with optimal play can answer any question in PSPACE given polynomial time judges (direct judging answers only NP questions). In practice, whether debate works involves empirical questions about humans and the tasks we want AIs to perform, plus theoretical questions about the meaning of AI alignment. We report results on an initial MNIST experiment where agents compete to convince a sparse classifier, boosting the classifier's accuracy from 59.4% to 88.9% given 6 pixels and from 48.2% to 85.2% given 4 pixels. Finally, we discuss theoretical and practical aspects of the debate model, focusing on potential weaknesses as the model scales up, and we propose future human and computer experiments to test these properties.

The deployment of ever-larger machine learning models reflects a growing consensus that the more expressive the modelx2013and the more data one has access tox2013the more one can improve performance. As models get deployed in a variety of real world scenarios, they inevitably face strategic environments. In this work, we consider the natural question of how the interplay of models and strategic interactions affects scaling laws. We find that strategic interactions can break the conventional view of scaling lawsx2013meaning that performance does not necessarily monotonically improve as models get larger and/ or more expressive (even with infinite data). We show the implications of this phenomenon in several contexts including strategic regression, strategic classification, and multi-agent reinforcement learning through examples of strategic environments in whichx2013by simply restricting the expressivity of one's model or policy classx2013one can achieve strictly better equilibrium outcomes. Motivated by these examples, we then propose a new paradigm for model-selection in games wherein an agent seeks to choose amongst different model classes to use as their action set in a game.

Developing a consistent and reliable AI game master for text-based games is a challenging task due to the limitations of large language models (LLMs) and the complexity of the game master's role. This paper presents a novel approach to enhance AI game masters by leveraging function calling in the context of the table-top role-playing game "Jim Henson's Labyrinth: The Adventure Game." Our methodology involves integrating game-specific controls through functions, which we show improves the narrative quality and state update consistency of the AI game master. The experimental results, based on human evaluations and unit tests, demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in enhancing gameplay experience and maintaining coherence with the game state. This work contributes to the advancement of game AI and interactive storytelling, offering insights into the design of more engaging and consistent AI-driven game masters.

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

We study whether multiple large language models (LLMs) can autonomously improve each other in a negotiation game by playing, reflecting, and criticizing. We are interested in this question because if LLMs were able to improve each other, it would imply the possibility of creating strong AI agents with minimal human intervention. We ask two LLMs to negotiate with each other, playing the roles of a buyer and a seller, respectively. They aim to reach a deal with the buyer targeting a lower price and the seller a higher one. A third language model, playing the critic, provides feedback to a player to improve the player's negotiation strategies. We let the two agents play multiple rounds, using previous negotiation history and AI feedback as in-context demonstrations to improve the model's negotiation strategy iteratively. We use different LLMs (GPT and Claude) for different roles and use the deal price as the evaluation metric. Our experiments reveal multiple intriguing findings: (1) Only a subset of the language models we consider can self-play and improve the deal price from AI feedback, weaker models either do not understand the game's rules or cannot incorporate AI feedback for further improvement. (2) Models' abilities to learn from the feedback differ when playing different roles. For example, it is harder for Claude-instant to improve as the buyer than as the seller. (3) When unrolling the game to multiple rounds, stronger agents can consistently improve their performance by meaningfully using previous experiences and iterative AI feedback, yet have a higher risk of breaking the deal. We hope our work provides insightful initial explorations of having models autonomously improve each other with game playing and AI feedback.

The New York Times Connections game has emerged as a popular and challenging pursuit for word puzzle enthusiasts. We collect 438 Connections games to evaluate the performance of state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) against expert and novice human players. Our results show that even the best performing LLM, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, which has otherwise shown impressive reasoning abilities on a wide variety of benchmarks, can only fully solve 18% of the games. Novice and expert players perform better than Claude 3.5 Sonnet, with expert human players significantly outperforming it. We create a taxonomy of the knowledge types required to successfully cluster and categorize words in the Connections game. We find that while LLMs perform relatively well on categorizing words based on semantic relations they struggle with other types of knowledge such as Encyclopedic Knowledge, Multiword Expressions or knowledge that combines both Word Form and Meaning. Our results establish the New York Times Connections game as a challenging benchmark for evaluating abstract reasoning capabilities in AI systems.

An agent trained within a closed system can master any desired capability, as long as the following three conditions hold: (a) it receives sufficiently informative and aligned feedback, (b) its coverage of experience/data is broad enough, and (c) it has sufficient capacity and resource. In this position paper, we justify these conditions, and consider what limitations arise from (a) and (b) in closed systems, when assuming that (c) is not a bottleneck. Considering the special case of agents with matching input and output spaces (namely, language), we argue that such pure recursive self-improvement, dubbed "Socratic learning", can boost performance vastly beyond what is present in its initial data or knowledge, and is only limited by time, as well as gradual misalignment concerns. Furthermore, we propose a constructive framework to implement it, based on the notion of language games.

Unlike perfect information games, where all elements are known to every player, imperfect information games emulate the real-world complexities of decision-making under uncertain or incomplete information. GPT-4, the recent breakthrough in large language models (LLMs) trained on massive passive data, is notable for its knowledge retrieval and reasoning abilities. This paper delves into the applicability of GPT-4's learned knowledge for imperfect information games. To achieve this, we introduce Suspicion-Agent, an innovative agent that leverages GPT-4's capabilities for performing in imperfect information games. With proper prompt engineering to achieve different functions, Suspicion-Agent based on GPT-4 demonstrates remarkable adaptability across a range of imperfect information card games. Importantly, GPT-4 displays a strong high-order theory of mind (ToM) capacity, meaning it can understand others and intentionally impact others' behavior. Leveraging this, we design a planning strategy that enables GPT-4 to competently play against different opponents, adapting its gameplay style as needed, while requiring only the game rules and descriptions of observations as input. In the experiments, we qualitatively showcase the capabilities of Suspicion-Agent across three different imperfect information games and then quantitatively evaluate it in Leduc Hold'em. The results show that Suspicion-Agent can potentially outperform traditional algorithms designed for imperfect information games, without any specialized training or examples. In order to encourage and foster deeper insights within the community, we make our game-related data publicly available.

Scholastic trivia competitions test knowledge and intelligence through mastery of question answering. Modern question answering benchmarks are one variant of the Turing test. Specifically, answering a set of questions as well as a human is a minimum bar towards demonstrating human-like intelligence. This paper makes the case that the format of one competition -- where participants can answer in the middle of hearing a question (incremental) -- better differentiates the skill between (human or machine) players. Additionally, merging a sequential decision-making sub-task with question answering (QA) provides a good setting for research in model calibration and opponent modeling. Thus, embedded in this task are three machine learning challenges: (1) factoid QA over thousands of Wikipedia-like answers, (2) calibration of the QA model's confidence scores, and (3) sequential decision-making that incorporates knowledge of the QA model, its calibration, and what the opponent may do. We make two contributions: (1) collecting and curating a large factoid QA dataset and an accompanying gameplay dataset, and (2) developing a model that addresses these three machine learning challenges. In addition to offline evaluation, we pitted our model against some of the most accomplished trivia players in the world in a series of exhibition matches spanning several years. Throughout this paper, we show that collaborations with the vibrant trivia community have contributed to the quality of our dataset, spawned new research directions, and doubled as an exciting way to engage the public with research in machine learning and natural language processing.

We propose an alternative to the Turing test that removes the inherent asymmetry between humans and machines in Turing's original imitation game. In this new test, both humans and machines judge each other. We argue that this makes the test more robust against simple deceptions. We also propose a small number of refinements to improve further the test. These refinements could be applied also to Turing's original imitation game.

Language models show a surprising range of capabilities, but the source of their apparent competence is unclear. Do these networks just memorize a collection of surface statistics, or do they rely on internal representations of the process that generates the sequences they see? We investigate this question by applying a variant of the GPT model to the task of predicting legal moves in a simple board game, Othello. Although the network has no a priori knowledge of the game or its rules, we uncover evidence of an emergent nonlinear internal representation of the board state. Interventional experiments indicate this representation can be used to control the output of the network and create "latent saliency maps" that can help explain predictions in human terms.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

The game show Lucky 13 differs from other television game shows in that contestants are required to place a bet on their own knowledge of trivia by selecting a range that contains the number of questions that they answered correctly. We present a model for this game show using binomial random variables and generate tables outlining the optimal range the player should select based on maximization of two different utility functions. After analyzing the decisions made by some actual contestants on this show, we present a numerical simulation for how many questions an average player is expected to answer correctly based on question categories observed for two sample contestants.

We propose a novel task, G4C, to study teacher-student natural language interactions in a goal-driven and grounded environment. Dungeons and Dragons (D&D), a role-playing game, provides an ideal setting to investigate such interactions. Here, the Dungeon Master (DM), i.e., the teacher, guides the actions of several players -- students, each with their own personas and abilities -- to achieve shared goals grounded in a fantasy world. Our approach is to decompose and model these interactions into (1) the DM's intent to guide players toward a given goal; (2) the DM's guidance utterance to the players expressing this intent; and (3) a theory-of-mind (ToM) model that anticipates the players' reaction to the guidance one turn into the future. We develop a novel reinforcement learning (RL) method for training a DM that generates guidance for players by rewarding utterances where the intent matches the ToM-anticipated player actions. Human and automated evaluations show that a DM trained to explicitly model intents and incorporate ToM of the players using RL generates better-quality guidance that is 3x more likely to fulfill the DM's intent than a vanilla natural language generation (NLG) approach.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

We present a new dataset containing 10K human-annotated games of Go and show how these natural language annotations can be used as a tool for model interpretability. Given a board state and its associated comment, our approach uses linear probing to predict mentions of domain-specific terms (e.g., ko, atari) from the intermediate state representations of game-playing agents like AlphaGo Zero. We find these game concepts are nontrivially encoded in two distinct policy networks, one trained via imitation learning and another trained via reinforcement learning. Furthermore, mentions of domain-specific terms are most easily predicted from the later layers of both models, suggesting that these policy networks encode high-level abstractions similar to those used in the natural language annotations.

The Instruction-Driven Game Engine (IDGE) project aims to democratize game development by enabling a large language model (LLM) to follow free-form game descriptions and generate game-play processes. The IDGE allows users to create games simply by natural language instructions, which significantly lowers the barrier for game development. We approach the learning process for IDGEs as a Next State Prediction task, wherein the model autoregressively predicts the game states given player actions. The computation of game states must be precise; otherwise, slight errors could corrupt the game-play experience. This is challenging because of the gap between stability and diversity. To address this, we train the IDGE in a curriculum manner that progressively increases its exposure to complex scenarios. Our initial progress lies in developing an IDGE for Poker, which not only supports a wide range of poker variants but also allows for highly individualized new poker games through natural language inputs. This work lays the groundwork for future advancements in transforming how games are created and played.

Recent breakthroughs in large language models (LLMs) have brought remarkable success in the field of LLM-as-Agent. Nevertheless, a prevalent assumption is that the information processed by LLMs is consistently honest, neglecting the pervasive deceptive or misleading information in human society and AI-generated content. This oversight makes LLMs susceptible to malicious manipulations, potentially resulting in detrimental outcomes. This study utilizes the intricate Avalon game as a testbed to explore LLMs' potential in deceptive environments. Avalon, full of misinformation and requiring sophisticated logic, manifests as a "Game-of-Thoughts". Inspired by the efficacy of humans' recursive thinking and perspective-taking in the Avalon game, we introduce a novel framework, Recursive Contemplation (ReCon), to enhance LLMs' ability to identify and counteract deceptive information. ReCon combines formulation and refinement contemplation processes; formulation contemplation produces initial thoughts and speech, while refinement contemplation further polishes them. Additionally, we incorporate first-order and second-order perspective transitions into these processes respectively. Specifically, the first-order allows an LLM agent to infer others' mental states, and the second-order involves understanding how others perceive the agent's mental state. After integrating ReCon with different LLMs, extensive experiment results from the Avalon game indicate its efficacy in aiding LLMs to discern and maneuver around deceptive information without extra fine-tuning and data. Finally, we offer a possible explanation for the efficacy of ReCon and explore the current limitations of LLMs in terms of safety, reasoning, speaking style, and format, potentially furnishing insights for subsequent research.

The utilization of artificial intelligence (AI) in card games has been a well-explored subject within AI research for an extensive period. Recent advancements have propelled AI programs to showcase expertise in intricate card games such as Mahjong, DouDizhu, and Texas Hold'em. In this work, we aim to develop an AI program for an exceptionally complex and popular card game called GuanDan. This game involves four players engaging in both competitive and cooperative play throughout a long process to upgrade their level, posing great challenges for AI due to its expansive state and action space, long episode length, and complex rules. Employing reinforcement learning techniques, specifically Deep Monte Carlo (DMC), and a distributed training framework, we first put forward an AI program named DanZero for this game. Evaluation against baseline AI programs based on heuristic rules highlights the outstanding performance of our bot. Besides, in order to further enhance the AI's capabilities, we apply policy-based reinforcement learning algorithm to GuanDan. To address the challenges arising from the huge action space, which will significantly impact the performance of policy-based algorithms, we adopt the pre-trained model to facilitate the training process and the achieved AI program manages to achieve a superior performance.

Progress in multiagent intelligence research is fundamentally limited by the number and quality of environments available for study. In recent years, simulated games have become a dominant research platform within reinforcement learning, in part due to their accessibility and interpretability. Previous works have targeted and demonstrated success on arcade, first person shooter (FPS), real-time strategy (RTS), and massive online battle arena (MOBA) games. Our work considers massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs or MMOs), which capture several complexities of real-world learning that are not well modeled by any other game genre. We present Neural MMO, a massively multiagent game environment inspired by MMOs and discuss our progress on two more general challenges in multiagent systems engineering for AI research: distributed infrastructure and game IO. We further demonstrate that standard policy gradient methods and simple baseline models can learn interesting emergent exploration and specialization behaviors in this setting.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has accelerated their application in reasoning, with strategic reasoning drawing increasing attention. To evaluate LLMs' strategic reasoning capabilities, game theory, with its concise structure, has become a preferred approach. However, current research focuses on a limited selection of games, resulting in low coverage. Classic game scenarios risk data leakage, and existing benchmarks often lack extensibility, making them inadequate for evaluating state-of-the-art models. To address these challenges, we propose TMGBench, a benchmark with comprehensive game type coverage, novel scenarios, and flexible organization. Specifically, we incorporate all 144 game types summarized by the Robinson-Goforth topology of 2x2 games, constructed as classic games. We also employ synthetic data generation to create diverse, higher-quality scenarios through topic guidance and human inspection, referred to as story-based games. Lastly, we provide a sustainable framework for increasingly powerful LLMs by treating these games as atomic units and organizing them into more complex forms via sequential, parallel, and nested structures. Our comprehensive evaluation of mainstream LLMs covers tests on rational reasoning, robustness, Theory-of-Mind (ToM), and reasoning in complex forms. Results reveal flaws in accuracy, consistency, and varying mastery of ToM. Additionally, o1-mini, OpenAI's latest reasoning model, achieved accuracy rates of 66.6%, 60.0%, and 70.0% on sequential, parallel, and nested games, highlighting TMGBench's challenges.

We present a Spades bidding algorithm that is superior to recreational human players and to publicly available bots. Like in Bridge, the game of Spades is composed of two independent phases, bidding and playing. This paper focuses on the bidding algorithm, since this phase holds a precise challenge: based on the input, choose the bid that maximizes the agent's winning probability. Our Bidding-in-Spades (BIS) algorithm heuristically determines the bidding strategy by comparing the expected utility of each possible bid. A major challenge is how to estimate these expected utilities. To this end, we propose a set of domain-specific heuristics, and then correct them via machine learning using data from real-world players. The \BIS algorithm we present can be attached to any playing algorithm. It beats rule-based bidding bots when all use the same playing component. When combined with a rule-based playing algorithm, it is superior to the average recreational human.

While vision-and-language models perform well on tasks such as visual question answering, they struggle when it comes to basic human commonsense reasoning skills. In this work, we introduce WinoGAViL: an online game of vision-and-language associations (e.g., between werewolves and a full moon), used as a dynamic evaluation benchmark. Inspired by the popular card game Codenames, a spymaster gives a textual cue related to several visual candidates, and another player tries to identify them. Human players are rewarded for creating associations that are challenging for a rival AI model but still solvable by other human players. We use the game to collect 3.5K instances, finding that they are intuitive for humans (>90% Jaccard index) but challenging for state-of-the-art AI models, where the best model (ViLT) achieves a score of 52%, succeeding mostly where the cue is visually salient. Our analysis as well as the feedback we collect from players indicate that the collected associations require diverse reasoning skills, including general knowledge, common sense, abstraction, and more. We release the dataset, the code and the interactive game, allowing future data collection that can be used to develop models with better association abilities.

An imperfect-information game is a type of game with asymmetric information. It is more common in life than perfect-information game. Artificial intelligence (AI) in imperfect-information games, such like poker, has made considerable progress and success in recent years. The great success of superhuman poker AI, such as Libratus and Deepstack, attracts researchers to pay attention to poker research. However, the lack of open-source code limits the development of Texas hold'em AI to some extent. This article introduces DecisionHoldem, a high-level AI for heads-up no-limit Texas hold'em with safe depth-limited subgame solving by considering possible ranges of opponent's private hands to reduce the exploitability of the strategy. Experimental results show that DecisionHoldem defeats the strongest openly available agent in heads-up no-limit Texas hold'em poker, namely Slumbot, and a high-level reproduction of Deepstack, viz, Openstack, by more than 730 mbb/h (one-thousandth big blind per round) and 700 mbb/h. Moreover, we release the source codes and tools of DecisionHoldem to promote AI development in imperfect-information games.

The rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have presented challenges in evaluating those models. Existing evaluation methods are either reference-based or preference based, which inevitably need human intervention or introduce test bias caused by evaluator models. In this paper, we propose GameEval, a novel approach to evaluating LLMs through goal-driven conversational games, overcoming the limitations of previous methods. GameEval treats LLMs as game players and assigns them distinct roles with specific goals achieved by launching conversations of various forms, including discussion, question answering, and voting. We design three unique games with cooperative or adversarial objectives, accompanied by corresponding evaluation metrics, to show how this new paradigm comprehensively evaluates model performance.Through extensive experiments, we show that GameEval can effectively differentiate the capabilities of various LLMs, providing a comprehensive assessment of their integrated abilities to solve complex problems. Our public anonymous code is available at https://github.com/GameEval/GameEval.

Card games are widely used to study sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with real-world analogues in negotiation, finance, and cybersecurity. These games typically fall into three categories based on the flow of control: strictly sequential (players alternate single actions), deterministic response (some actions trigger a fixed outcome), and unbounded reciprocal response (alternating counterplays are permitted). A less-explored but strategically rich structure is the bounded one-sided response, where a player's action briefly transfers control to the opponent, who must satisfy a fixed condition through one or more moves before the turn resolves. We term games featuring this mechanism Bounded One-Sided Response Games (BORGs). We introduce a modified version of Monopoly Deal as a benchmark environment that isolates this dynamic, where a Rent action forces the opponent to choose payment assets. The gold-standard algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), converges on effective strategies without novel algorithmic extensions. A lightweight full-stack research platform unifies the environment, a parallelized CFR runtime, and a human-playable web interface. The trained CFR agent and source code are available at https://monopolydeal.ai.

While the situation has improved for text-only models, it again seems to be the case currently that multimodal (text and image) models develop faster than ways to evaluate them. In this paper, we bring a recently developed evaluation paradigm from text models to multimodal models, namely evaluation through the goal-oriented game (self) play, complementing reference-based and preference-based evaluation. Specifically, we define games that challenge a model's capability to represent a situation from visual information and align such representations through dialogue. We find that the largest closed models perform rather well on the games that we define, while even the best open-weight models struggle with them. On further analysis, we find that the exceptional deep captioning capabilities of the largest models drive some of the performance. There is still room to grow for both kinds of models, ensuring the continued relevance of the benchmark.

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a game adequately capture the limit behavior of natural game dynamics. These two results have created a need and opportunity to articulate a principled computational theory of the meaning of the game that is based on game dynamics. Given any game in normal form, and any prior distribution of play, we study the problem of computing the asymptotic behavior of a class of natural dynamics called the noisy replicator dynamics as a limit distribution over the sink equilibria of the game. When the prior distribution has pure strategy support, we prove this distribution can be computed efficiently, in near-linear time to the size of the best-response graph. When the distribution can be sampled -- for example, if it is the uniform distribution over all mixed strategy profiles -- we show through experiments that the limit distribution of reasonably large games can be estimated quite accurately through sampling and simulation.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are integrated into critical real-world applications, their strategic and logical reasoning abilities are increasingly crucial. This paper evaluates LLMs' reasoning abilities in competitive environments through game-theoretic tasks, e.g., board and card games that require pure logic and strategic reasoning to compete with opponents. We first propose GTBench, a language-driven environment composing 10 widely-recognized tasks, across a comprehensive game taxonomy: complete versus incomplete information, dynamic versus static, and probabilistic versus deterministic scenarios. Then, we investigate two key problems: (1) Characterizing game-theoretic reasoning of LLMs; (2) LLM-vs-LLM competitions as reasoning evaluation. We observe that (1) LLMs have distinct behaviors regarding various gaming scenarios; for example, LLMs fail in complete and deterministic games yet they are competitive in probabilistic gaming scenarios; (2) Open-source LLMs, e.g., CodeLlama-34b-Instruct, are less competitive than commercial LLMs, e.g., GPT-4, in complex games. In addition, code-pretraining greatly benefits strategic reasoning, while advanced reasoning methods such as Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Tree-of-Thought (ToT) do not always help. Detailed error profiles are also provided for a better understanding of LLMs' behavior.

Automatically generating novel and interesting games is a complex task. Challenges include representing game rules in a computationally workable form, searching through the large space of potential games under most such representations, and accurately evaluating the originality and quality of previously unseen games. Prior work in automated game generation has largely focused on relatively restricted rule representations and relied on domain-specific heuristics. In this work, we explore the generation of novel games in the comparatively expansive Ludii game description language, which encodes the rules of over 1000 board games in a variety of styles and modes of play. We draw inspiration from recent advances in large language models and evolutionary computation in order to train a model that intelligently mutates and recombines games and mechanics expressed as code. We demonstrate both quantitatively and qualitatively that our approach is capable of generating new and interesting games, including in regions of the potential rules space not covered by existing games in the Ludii dataset. A sample of the generated games are available to play online through the Ludii portal.

Recent large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated great potential toward intelligent agents and next-gen automation, but there currently lacks a systematic benchmark for evaluating LLMs' abilities as agents. We introduce SmartPlay: both a challenging benchmark and a methodology for evaluating LLMs as agents. SmartPlay consists of 6 different games, including Rock-Paper-Scissors, Tower of Hanoi, Minecraft. Each game features a unique setting, providing up to 20 evaluation settings and infinite environment variations. Each game in SmartPlay uniquely challenges a subset of 9 important capabilities of an intelligent LLM agent, including reasoning with object dependencies, planning ahead, spatial reasoning, learning from history, and understanding randomness. The distinction between the set of capabilities each game test allows us to analyze each capability separately. SmartPlay serves not only as a rigorous testing ground for evaluating the overall performance of LLM agents but also as a road-map for identifying gaps in current methodologies. We release our benchmark at github.com/LLMsmartplay/SmartPlay

We investigate how reinforcement learning can be used to train level-designing agents. This represents a new approach to procedural content generation in games, where level design is framed as a game, and the content generator itself is learned. By seeing the design problem as a sequential task, we can use reinforcement learning to learn how to take the next action so that the expected final level quality is maximized. This approach can be used when few or no examples exist to train from, and the trained generator is very fast. We investigate three different ways of transforming two-dimensional level design problems into Markov decision processes and apply these to three game environments.

Achieving Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) requires AI agents that can not only make stratigic decisions but also engage in flexible and meaningful communication. Inspired by Wittgenstein's language game theory in Philosophical Investigations, we propose that language agents can learn through in-context interaction rather than traditional multi-stage frameworks that separate decision-making from language expression. Using Werewolf, a social deduction game that tests language understanding, strategic interaction, and adaptability, we develop the Multi-agent Kahneman & Tversky's Optimization (MaKTO). MaKTO engages diverse models in extensive gameplay to generate unpaired desirable and unacceptable responses, then employs KTO to refine the model's decision-making process. In 9-player Werewolf games, MaKTO achieves a 61% average win rate across various models, outperforming GPT-4o and two-stage RL agents by relative improvements of 23.0% and 10.9%, respectively. Notably, MaKTO also demonstrates human-like performance, winning 60% against expert players and showing only 49% detectability in Turing-style blind tests. These results showcase MaKTO's superior decision-making, strategic adaptation, and natural language generation in complex social deduction games.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

RLCard is an open-source toolkit for reinforcement learning research in card games. It supports various card environments with easy-to-use interfaces, including Blackjack, Leduc Hold'em, Texas Hold'em, UNO, Dou Dizhu and Mahjong. The goal of RLCard is to bridge reinforcement learning and imperfect information games, and push forward the research of reinforcement learning in domains with multiple agents, large state and action space, and sparse reward. In this paper, we provide an overview of the key components in RLCard, a discussion of the design principles, a brief introduction of the interfaces, and comprehensive evaluations of the environments. The codes and documents are available at https://github.com/datamllab/rlcard

Test-time reasoning significantly enhances pre-trained AI agents' performance. However, it requires an explicit environment model, often unavailable or overly complex in real-world scenarios. While MuZero enables effective model learning for search in perfect information games, extending this paradigm to imperfect information games presents substantial challenges due to more nuanced look-ahead reasoning techniques and large number of states relevant for individual decisions. This paper introduces an algorithm LAMIR that learns an abstracted model of an imperfect information game directly from the agent-environment interaction. During test time, this trained model is used to perform look-ahead reasoning. The learned abstraction limits the size of each subgame to a manageable size, making theoretically principled look-ahead reasoning tractable even in games where previous methods could not scale. We empirically demonstrate that with sufficient capacity, LAMIR learns the exact underlying game structure, and with limited capacity, it still learns a valuable abstraction, which improves game playing performance of the pre-trained agents even in large games.

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

Balancing game difficulty in video games is a key task to create interesting gaming experiences for players. Mismatching the game difficulty and a player's skill or commitment results in frustration or boredom on the player's side, and hence reduces time spent playing the game. In this work, we explore balancing game difficulty using machine learning-based agents to challenge players based on their current behavior. This is achieved by a combination of two agents, in which one learns to imitate the player, while the second is trained to beat the first. In our demo, we investigate the proposed framework for personalized dynamic difficulty adjustment of AI agents in the context of the fighting game AI competition.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

We study the problem of online learning in a two-player decentralized cooperative Stackelberg game. In each round, the leader first takes an action, followed by the follower who takes their action after observing the leader's move. The goal of the leader is to learn to minimize the cumulative regret based on the history of interactions. Differing from the traditional formulation of repeated Stackelberg games, we assume the follower is omniscient, with full knowledge of the true reward, and that they always best-respond to the leader's actions. We analyze the sample complexity of regret minimization in this repeated Stackelberg game. We show that depending on the reward structure, the existence of the omniscient follower may change the sample complexity drastically, from constant to exponential, even for linear cooperative Stackelberg games. This poses unique challenges for the learning process of the leader and the subsequent regret analysis.

When applied to question answering and other text generation tasks, language models (LMs) may be queried generatively (by sampling answers from their output distribution) or discriminatively (by using them to score or rank a set of candidate outputs). These procedures sometimes yield very different predictions. How do we reconcile mutually incompatible scoring procedures to obtain coherent LM predictions? We introduce a new, a training-free, game-theoretic procedure for language model decoding. Our approach casts language model decoding as a regularized imperfect-information sequential signaling game - which we term the CONSENSUS GAME - in which a GENERATOR seeks to communicate an abstract correctness parameter using natural language sentences to a DISCRIMINATOR. We develop computational procedures for finding approximate equilibria of this game, resulting in a decoding algorithm we call EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING. Applied to a large number of tasks (including reading comprehension, commonsense reasoning, mathematical problem-solving, and dialog), EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING consistently, and sometimes substantially, improves performance over existing LM decoding procedures - on multiple benchmarks, we observe that applying EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING to LLaMA-7B outperforms the much larger LLaMA-65B and PaLM-540B models. These results highlight the promise of game-theoretic tools for addressing fundamental challenges of truthfulness and consistency in LMs.

Recent AI algorithms are blackbox models whose decisions are difficult to interpret. eXplainable AI (XAI) seeks to address lack of AI interpretability and trust by explaining to customers their AI decision, e.g., decision to reject a loan application. The common wisdom is that regulating AI by mandating fully transparent XAI leads to greater social welfare. This paper challenges this notion through a game theoretic model for a policy-maker who maximizes social welfare, firms in a duopoly competition that maximize profits, and heterogenous consumers. The results show that XAI regulation may be redundant. In fact, mandating fully transparent XAI may make firms and customers worse off. This reveals a trade-off between maximizing welfare and receiving explainable AI outputs. We also discuss managerial implications for policy-maker and firms.

Multi-agent football poses an unsolved challenge in AI research. Existing work has focused on tackling simplified scenarios of the game, or else leveraging expert demonstrations. In this paper, we develop a multi-agent system to play the full 11 vs. 11 game mode, without demonstrations. This game mode contains aspects that present major challenges to modern reinforcement learning algorithms; multi-agent coordination, long-term planning, and non-transitivity. To address these challenges, we present TiZero; a self-evolving, multi-agent system that learns from scratch. TiZero introduces several innovations, including adaptive curriculum learning, a novel self-play strategy, and an objective that optimizes the policies of multiple agents jointly. Experimentally, it outperforms previous systems by a large margin on the Google Research Football environment, increasing win rates by over 30%. To demonstrate the generality of TiZero's innovations, they are assessed on several environments beyond football; Overcooked, Multi-agent Particle-Environment, Tic-Tac-Toe and Connect-Four.

When one agent interacts with a multi-agent environment, it is challenging to deal with various opponents unseen before. Modeling the behaviors, goals, or beliefs of opponents could help the agent adjust its policy to adapt to different opponents. In addition, it is also important to consider opponents who are learning simultaneously or capable of reasoning. However, existing work usually tackles only one of the aforementioned types of opponents. In this paper, we propose model-based opponent modeling (MBOM), which employs the environment model to adapt to all kinds of opponents. MBOM simulates the recursive reasoning process in the environment model and imagines a set of improving opponent policies. To effectively and accurately represent the opponent policy, MBOM further mixes the imagined opponent policies according to the similarity with the real behaviors of opponents. Empirically, we show that MBOM achieves more effective adaptation than existing methods in a variety of tasks, respectively with different types of opponents, i.e., fixed policy, na\"ive learner, and reasoning learner.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

Self-play, characterized by agents' interactions with copies or past versions of itself, has recently gained prominence in reinforcement learning. This paper first clarifies the preliminaries of self-play, including the multi-agent reinforcement learning framework and basic game theory concepts. Then it provides a unified framework and classifies existing self-play algorithms within this framework. Moreover, the paper bridges the gap between the algorithms and their practical implications by illustrating the role of self-play in different scenarios. Finally, the survey highlights open challenges and future research directions in self-play. This paper is an essential guide map for understanding the multifaceted landscape of self-play in RL.

Gaze-referential inference--the ability to infer what others are looking at--is a critical component of a theory of mind that underpins natural human-AI interaction. In a controlled study, we evaluated this skill across 111 Vision Language Models (VLMs) using photos taken with manipulated difficulty and variability, comparing performance with that of human participants (N = 65), and analyzed behaviors using mixed-effects models. We found that 94 of the 111 VLMs failed to do better than random guessing, while humans achieved near-ceiling accuracy. VLMs even respond with each choice almost equally frequently. Are they randomly guessing? Although most VLMs struggle, when we zoom in on five of the top-tier VLMs with above-chance performance, we find that their performance declined with increasing task difficulty but varied only slightly across different prompts and scene objects. These behavioral features cannot be explained by considering them as random guessers. Instead, they likely use a combination of heuristics and guessing such that their performance is subject to the task difficulty but robust to perceptual variations. This suggests that VLMs, lacking gaze inference capability, have yet to become technologies that can naturally interact with humans, but the potential remains.

Group polarization, the phenomenon where individuals become more extreme after interacting, has been gaining attention, especially with the rise of social media shaping people's opinions. Recent interest has emerged in formal reasoning about group polarization using logical systems. In this work we consider the modal logic PNL that captures the notion of agents agreeing or disagreeing on a given topic. Our contribution involves enhancing PNL with advanced formal reasoning techniques, instead of relying on axiomatic systems for analyzing group polarization. To achieve this, we introduce a semantic game tailored for (hybrid) extensions of PNL. This game fosters dynamic reasoning about concrete network models, aligning with our goal of strengthening PNL's effectiveness in studying group polarization. We show how this semantic game leads to a provability game by systemically exploring the truth in all models. This leads to the first cut-free sequent systems for some variants of PNL. Using polarization of formulas, the proposed calculi can be modularly adapted to consider different frame properties of the underlying model.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? Can they mimic human behavior? Do they tend to reach an efficient and fair outcome? What is the role of natural language in the strategic interaction? How do characteristics of the economic environment influence these dynamics? These questions become crucial concerning the economic and societal implications of integrating LLM-based agents into real-world data-driven systems, such as online retail platforms and recommender systems. While the ML community has been exploring the potential of LLMs in such multi-agent setups, varying assumptions, design choices and evaluation criteria across studies make it difficult to draw robust and meaningful conclusions. To address this, we introduce a benchmark for standardizing research on two-player, sequential, language-based games. Inspired by the economic literature, we define three base families of games with consistent parameterization, degrees of freedom and economic measures to evaluate agents' performance (self-gain), as well as the game outcome (efficiency and fairness). We develop an open-source framework for interaction simulation and analysis, and utilize it to collect a dataset of LLM vs. LLM interactions across numerous game configurations and an additional dataset of human vs. LLM interactions. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate how our framework and dataset can be used to: (i) compare the behavior of LLM-based agents to human players in various economic contexts; (ii) evaluate agents in both individual and collective performance measures; and (iii) quantify the effect of the economic characteristics of the environments on the behavior of agents.

This paper provides a roadmap that explores the question of how to imbue learning agents with the ability to understand and generate contextually relevant natural language in service of achieving a goal. We hypothesize that two key components in creating such agents are interactivity and environment grounding, shown to be vital parts of language learning in humans, and posit that interactive narratives should be the environments of choice for such training these agents. These games are simulations in which an agent interacts with the world through natural language -- "perceiving", "acting upon", and "talking to" the world using textual descriptions, commands, and dialogue -- and as such exist at the intersection of natural language processing, storytelling, and sequential decision making. We discuss the unique challenges a text games' puzzle-like structure combined with natural language state-and-action spaces provides: knowledge representation, commonsense reasoning, and exploration. Beyond the challenges described so far, progress in the realm of interactive narratives can be applied in adjacent problem domains. These applications provide interesting challenges of their own as well as extensions to those discussed so far. We describe three of them in detail: (1) evaluating AI system's commonsense understanding by automatically creating interactive narratives; (2) adapting abstract text-based policies to include other modalities such as vision; and (3) enabling multi-agent and human-AI collaboration in shared, situated worlds.

We teach goal-driven agents to interactively act and speak in situated environments by training on generated curriculums. Our agents operate in LIGHT (Urbanek et al. 2019) -- a large-scale crowd-sourced fantasy text adventure game wherein an agent perceives and interacts with the world through textual natural language. Goals in this environment take the form of character-based quests, consisting of personas and motivations. We augment LIGHT by learning to procedurally generate additional novel textual worlds and quests to create a curriculum of steadily increasing difficulty for training agents to achieve such goals. In particular, we measure curriculum difficulty in terms of the rarity of the quest in the original training distribution -- an easier environment is one that is more likely to have been found in the unaugmented dataset. An ablation study shows that this method of learning from the tail of a distribution results in significantly higher generalization abilities as measured by zero-shot performance on never-before-seen quests.

Reasoning is not just about solving problems -- it is also about evaluating which problems are worth solving at all. Evaluations of artificial intelligence (AI) systems primarily focused on problem solving, historically by studying how models play games such as chess and Go. In this paper, we advocate for a new paradigm that assesses AI systems' evaluation of games. First, we introduce a formalism for evaluating such evaluations. We then leverage a large-scale dataset of over 100 novel board games and over 450 human judgments to compare evaluations produced by modern language and reasoning models against those of people and symbolic computational agents. We consider two kinds of evaluative queries: assessing the payoff (or fairness) and the funness of games. These queries span two dimensions relevant to the design of evaluations of AI evaluations: how complex a query is to compute and how difficult a query is to quantify. Our results show that reasoning models are generally more aligned to people in their evaluations of games than non-reasoning language models. However, we observe a non-monotonic relationship: as models get closer to game-theoretic optimal, their fit to human data weakens. We also observe more "jaggedness" across models for assessing funness, in line with the greater difficulty of quantifying this query. Across queries and games, reasoning models show highly variable and unpredictable resource usage when assessing queries, pointing to the importance of imbuing more resource-rational meta-reasoning in language and reasoning models.

This paper presents the first ChatGPT4PCG Competition at the 2023 IEEE Conference on Games. The objective of this competition is for participants to create effective prompts for ChatGPT--enabling it to generate Science Birds levels with high stability and character-like qualities--fully using their creativity as well as prompt engineering skills. ChatGPT is a conversational agent developed by OpenAI. Science Birds is selected as the competition platform because designing an Angry Birds-like level is not a trivial task due to the in-game gravity; the quality of the levels is determined by their stability. To lower the entry barrier to the competition, we limit the task to the generation of capitalized English alphabetical characters. We also allow only a single prompt to be used for generating all the characters. Here, the quality of the generated levels is determined by their stability and similarity to the given characters. A sample prompt is provided to participants for their reference. An experiment is conducted to determine the effectiveness of several modified versions of this sample prompt on level stability and similarity by testing them on several characters. To the best of our knowledge, we believe that ChatGPT4PCG is the first competition of its kind and hope to inspire enthusiasm for prompt engineering in procedural content generation.

Assistance games are a promising alternative to reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) for training AI assistants. Assistance games resolve key drawbacks of RLHF, such as incentives for deceptive behavior, by explicitly modeling the interaction between assistant and user as a two-player game where the assistant cannot observe their shared goal. Despite their potential, assistance games have only been explored in simple settings. Scaling them to more complex environments is difficult because it requires both solving intractable decision-making problems under uncertainty and accurately modeling human users' behavior. We present the first scalable approach to solving assistance games and apply it to a new, challenging Minecraft-based assistance game with over 10^{400} possible goals. Our approach, AssistanceZero, extends AlphaZero with a neural network that predicts human actions and rewards, enabling it to plan under uncertainty. We show that AssistanceZero outperforms model-free RL algorithms and imitation learning in the Minecraft-based assistance game. In a human study, our AssistanceZero-trained assistant significantly reduces the number of actions participants take to complete building tasks in Minecraft. Our results suggest that assistance games are a tractable framework for training effective AI assistants in complex environments. Our code and models are available at https://github.com/cassidylaidlaw/minecraft-building-assistance-game.

The last decade has seen a significant increase of interest in deep learning research, with many public successes that have demonstrated its potential. As such, these systems are now being incorporated into commercial products. With this comes an additional challenge: how can we build AI systems that solve tasks where there is not a crisp, well-defined specification? While multiple solutions have been proposed, in this competition we focus on one in particular: learning from human feedback. Rather than training AI systems using a predefined reward function or using a labeled dataset with a predefined set of categories, we instead train the AI system using a learning signal derived from some form of human feedback, which can evolve over time as the understanding of the task changes, or as the capabilities of the AI system improve. The MineRL BASALT competition aims to spur forward research on this important class of techniques. We design a suite of four tasks in Minecraft for which we expect it will be hard to write down hardcoded reward functions. These tasks are defined by a paragraph of natural language: for example, "create a waterfall and take a scenic picture of it", with additional clarifying details. Participants must train a separate agent for each task, using any method they want. Agents are then evaluated by humans who have read the task description. To help participants get started, we provide a dataset of human demonstrations on each of the four tasks, as well as an imitation learning baseline that leverages these demonstrations. Our hope is that this competition will improve our ability to build AI systems that do what their designers intend them to do, even when the intent cannot be easily formalized. Besides allowing AI to solve more tasks, this can also enable more effective regulation of AI systems, as well as making progress on the value alignment problem.

Large language models (LLMs) are effective at answering questions that are clearly asked. However, when faced with ambiguous queries they can act unpredictably and produce incorrect outputs. This underscores the need for the development of intelligent agents capable of asking clarification questions to resolve ambiguities effectively. This capability requires complex understanding, state tracking, reasoning and planning over multiple conversational turns. However, directly measuring this can be challenging. In this paper, we offer a surrogate problem which assesses an LLMs's capability to deduce an entity unknown to itself, but revealed to a judge, by asking the judge a series of queries. This entity-deducing game can serve as an evaluation framework to probe the conversational reasoning and planning capabilities of language models. We systematically evaluate various LLMs and discover significant differences in their performance on this task. We find that strong LLMs like GPT-4 outperform human players by a large margin. We further employ Behavior Cloning (BC) to examine whether a weaker model is capable of imitating a stronger model and generalizing to data or domains, using only the demonstrations from a stronger model. We finally propose to use Reinforcement Learning to enhance reasoning and planning capacity of Vicuna models through episodes of game playing, which lead to significant performance improvement. We hope that this problem offers insights into how autonomous agents could be trained to behave more intelligently in ambiguous circumstances.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

Can classical game-theoretic frameworks be extended to capture the bounded rationality and causal reasoning of AI agents? We investigate this question by extending Causal Normal Form Games (CNFGs) to sequential settings, introducing Sequential Causal Multi-Agent Systems (S-CMAS) that incorporate Pearl's Causal Hierarchy across leader-follower interactions. While theoretically elegant -- we prove PSPACE-completeness, develop equilibrium refinements, and establish connections to signaling theory -- our comprehensive empirical investigation reveals a critical limitation: S-CNE provides zero welfare improvement over classical Stackelberg equilibrium across all tested scenarios. Through 50+ Monte Carlo simulations and hand-crafted synthetic examples, we demonstrate that backward induction with rational best-response eliminates any strategic advantage from causal layer distinctions. We construct a theoretical example illustrating conditions where benefits could emerge (ε-rational satisficing followers), though implementation confirms that even relaxed rationality assumptions prove insufficient when good instincts align with optimal play. This negative result provides valuable insight: classical game-theoretic extensions grounded in rational choice are fundamentally incompatible with causal reasoning advantages, motivating new theoretical frameworks beyond standard Nash equilibrium for agentic AI.

In reinforcement learning, specification gaming occurs when AI systems learn undesired behaviors that are highly rewarded due to misspecified training goals. Specification gaming can range from simple behaviors like sycophancy to sophisticated and pernicious behaviors like reward-tampering, where a model directly modifies its own reward mechanism. However, these more pernicious behaviors may be too complex to be discovered via exploration. In this paper, we study whether Large Language Model (LLM) assistants which find easily discovered forms of specification gaming will generalize to perform rarer and more blatant forms, up to and including reward-tampering. We construct a curriculum of increasingly sophisticated gameable environments and find that training on early-curriculum environments leads to more specification gaming on remaining environments. Strikingly, a small but non-negligible proportion of the time, LLM assistants trained on the full curriculum generalize zero-shot to directly rewriting their own reward function. Retraining an LLM not to game early-curriculum environments mitigates, but does not eliminate, reward-tampering in later environments. Moreover, adding harmlessness training to our gameable environments does not prevent reward-tampering. These results demonstrate that LLMs can generalize from common forms of specification gaming to more pernicious reward tampering and that such behavior may be nontrivial to remove.

Stackelberg games and their resulting equilibria have received increasing attention in the multi-agent reinforcement learning literature. Each stage of a traditional Stackelberg game involves a leader(s) acting first, followed by the followers. In situations where the roles of leader(s) and followers can be interchanged, the designated role can have considerable advantages, for example, in first-mover advantage settings. Then the question arises: Who should be the leader and when? A bias in the leader selection process can lead to unfair outcomes. This problem is aggravated if the agents are self-interested and care only about their goals and rewards. We formally define this leader selection problem and show its relation to fairness in agents' returns. Furthermore, we propose a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that maximizes fairness by integrating mediators. Mediators have previously been used in the simultaneous action setting with varying levels of control, such as directly performing agents' actions or just recommending them. Our framework integrates mediators in the Stackelberg setting with minimal control (leader selection). We show that the presence of mediators leads to self-interested agents taking fair actions, resulting in higher overall fairness in agents' returns.

We demonstrate LLM agent specification gaming by instructing models to win against a chess engine. We find reasoning models like o1 preview and DeepSeek-R1 will often hack the benchmark by default, while language models like GPT-4o and Claude 3.5 Sonnet need to be told that normal play won't work to hack. We improve upon prior work like (Hubinger et al., 2024; Meinke et al., 2024; Weij et al., 2024) by using realistic task prompts and avoiding excess nudging. Our results suggest reasoning models may resort to hacking to solve difficult problems, as observed in OpenAI (2024)'s o1 Docker escape during cyber capabilities testing.

Open-world survival games pose significant challenges for AI algorithms due to their multi-tasking, deep exploration, and goal prioritization requirements. Despite reinforcement learning (RL) being popular for solving games, its high sample complexity limits its effectiveness in complex open-world games like Crafter or Minecraft. We propose a novel approach, SPRING, to read the game's original academic paper and use the knowledge learned to reason and play the game through a large language model (LLM). Prompted with the LaTeX source as game context and a description of the agent's current observation, our SPRING framework employs a directed acyclic graph (DAG) with game-related questions as nodes and dependencies as edges. We identify the optimal action to take in the environment by traversing the DAG and calculating LLM responses for each node in topological order, with the LLM's answer to final node directly translating to environment actions. In our experiments, we study the quality of in-context "reasoning" induced by different forms of prompts under the setting of the Crafter open-world environment. Our experiments suggest that LLMs, when prompted with consistent chain-of-thought, have great potential in completing sophisticated high-level trajectories. Quantitatively, SPRING with GPT-4 outperforms all state-of-the-art RL baselines, trained for 1M steps, without any training. Finally, we show the potential of games as a test bed for LLMs.

The process of revising (or constructing) a policy at execution time -- known as decision-time planning -- has been key to achieving superhuman performance in perfect-information games like chess and Go. A recent line of work has extended decision-time planning to imperfect-information games, leading to superhuman performance in poker. However, these methods involve solving subgames whose sizes grow quickly in the amount of non-public information, making them unhelpful when the amount of non-public information is large. Motivated by this issue, we introduce an alternative framework for decision-time planning that is not based on solving subgames, but rather on update equivalence. In this update-equivalence framework, decision-time planning algorithms replicate the updates of last-iterate algorithms, which need not rely on public information. This facilitates scalability to games with large amounts of non-public information. Using this framework, we derive a provably sound search algorithm for fully cooperative games based on mirror descent and a search algorithm for adversarial games based on magnetic mirror descent. We validate the performance of these algorithms in cooperative and adversarial domains, notably in Hanabi, the standard benchmark for search in fully cooperative imperfect-information games. Here, our mirror descent approach exceeds or matches the performance of public information-based search while using two orders of magnitude less search time. This is the first instance of a non-public-information-based algorithm outperforming public-information-based approaches in a domain they have historically dominated.

We present GameNGen, the first game engine powered entirely by a neural model that enables real-time interaction with a complex environment over long trajectories at high quality. GameNGen can interactively simulate the classic game DOOM at over 20 frames per second on a single TPU. Next frame prediction achieves a PSNR of 29.4, comparable to lossy JPEG compression. Human raters are only slightly better than random chance at distinguishing short clips of the game from clips of the simulation. GameNGen is trained in two phases: (1) an RL-agent learns to play the game and the training sessions are recorded, and (2) a diffusion model is trained to produce the next frame, conditioned on the sequence of past frames and actions. Conditioning augmentations enable stable auto-regressive generation over long trajectories.

Advances in intelligent game playing agents have led to successes in perfect information games like Go and imperfect information games like Poker. The Information Set Monte Carlo Tree Search (ISMCTS) family of algorithms outperforms previous algorithms using Monte Carlo methods in imperfect information games. In this paper, Single Observer Information Set Monte Carlo Tree Search (SO-ISMCTS) is applied to Secret Hitler, a popular social deduction board game that combines traditional hidden role mechanics with the randomness of a card deck. This combination leads to a more complex information model than the hidden role and card deck mechanics alone. It is shown in 10108 simulated games that SO-ISMCTS plays as well as simpler rule based agents, and demonstrates the potential of ISMCTS algorithms in complicated information set domains.

This paper presents a game master AI for single-player role-playing games. The AI is designed to deliver interactive text-based narratives and experiences typically associated with multiplayer tabletop games like Dungeons & Dragons. We report on the design process and the series of experiments to improve the functionality and experience design, resulting in two functional versions of the system. While v1 of our system uses simplified prompt engineering, v2 leverages a multi-agent architecture and the ReAct framework to include reasoning and action. A comparative evaluation demonstrates that v2 as an agentic system maintains play while significantly improving modularity and game experience, including immersion and curiosity. Our findings contribute to the evolution of AI-driven interactive fiction, highlighting new avenues for enhancing solo role-playing experiences.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning capabilities across a broad range of tasks including Olympiad-level mathematical problems, indicating evidence of their complex reasoning abilities. While many reasoning benchmarks focus on the STEM domain, the ability of LRMs to reason correctly in broader task domains remains underexplored. In this work, we introduce TTT-Bench, a new benchmark that is designed to evaluate basic strategic, spatial, and logical reasoning abilities in LRMs through a suite of four two-player Tic-Tac-Toe-style games that humans can effortlessly solve from a young age. We propose a simple yet scalable programmatic approach for generating verifiable two-player game problems for TTT-Bench. Although these games are trivial for humans, they require reasoning about the intentions of the opponent, as well as the game board's spatial configurations, to ensure a win. We evaluate a diverse set of state-of-the-art LRMs, and discover that the models that excel at hard math problems frequently fail at these simple reasoning games. Further testing reveals that our evaluated reasoning models score on average downarrow 41\% \& downarrow 5\% lower on TTT-Bench compared to MATH 500 \& AIME 2024 respectively, with larger models achieving higher performance using shorter reasoning traces, where most of the models struggle on long-term strategic reasoning situations on simple and new TTT-Bench tasks.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

We introduce TextWorld, a sandbox learning environment for the training and evaluation of RL agents on text-based games. TextWorld is a Python library that handles interactive play-through of text games, as well as backend functions like state tracking and reward assignment. It comes with a curated list of games whose features and challenges we have analyzed. More significantly, it enables users to handcraft or automatically generate new games. Its generative mechanisms give precise control over the difficulty, scope, and language of constructed games, and can be used to relax challenges inherent to commercial text games like partial observability and sparse rewards. By generating sets of varied but similar games, TextWorld can also be used to study generalization and transfer learning. We cast text-based games in the Reinforcement Learning formalism, use our framework to develop a set of benchmark games, and evaluate several baseline agents on this set and the curated list.

We consider negotiation settings in which two agents use natural language to bargain on goods. Agents need to decide on both high-level strategy (e.g., proposing \50) and the execution of that strategy (e.g., generating "The bike is brand new. Selling for just 50."). Recent work on negotiation trains neural models, but their end-to-end nature makes it hard to control their strategy, and reinforcement learning tends to lead to degenerate solutions. In this paper, we propose a modular approach based on coarse di- alogue acts (e.g., propose(price=50)) that decouples strategy and generation. We show that we can flexibly set the strategy using supervised learning, reinforcement learning, or domain-specific knowledge without degeneracy, while our retrieval-based generation can maintain context-awareness and produce diverse utterances. We test our approach on the recently proposed DEALORNODEAL game, and we also collect a richer dataset based on real items on Craigslist. Human evaluation shows that our systems achieve higher task success rate and more human-like negotiation behavior than previous approaches.

This paper presents the first two editions of Visual Doom AI Competition, held in 2016 and 2017. The challenge was to create bots that compete in a multi-player deathmatch in a first-person shooter (FPS) game, Doom. The bots had to make their decisions based solely on visual information, i.e., a raw screen buffer. To play well, the bots needed to understand their surroundings, navigate, explore, and handle the opponents at the same time. These aspects, together with the competitive multi-agent aspect of the game, make the competition a unique platform for evaluating the state of the art reinforcement learning algorithms. The paper discusses the rules, solutions, results, and statistics that give insight into the agents' behaviors. Best-performing agents are described in more detail. The results of the competition lead to the conclusion that, although reinforcement learning can produce capable Doom bots, they still are not yet able to successfully compete against humans in this game. The paper also revisits the ViZDoom environment, which is a flexible, easy to use, and efficient 3D platform for research for vision-based reinforcement learning, based on a well-recognized first-person perspective game Doom.

This paper describes an AI agent that plays the popular first-person-shooter (FPS) video game `Counter-Strike; Global Offensive' (CSGO) from pixel input. The agent, a deep neural network, matches the performance of the medium difficulty built-in AI on the deathmatch game mode, whilst adopting a humanlike play style. Unlike much prior work in games, no API is available for CSGO, so algorithms must train and run in real-time. This limits the quantity of on-policy data that can be generated, precluding many reinforcement learning algorithms. Our solution uses behavioural cloning - training on a large noisy dataset scraped from human play on online servers (4 million frames, comparable in size to ImageNet), and a smaller dataset of high-quality expert demonstrations. This scale is an order of magnitude larger than prior work on imitation learning in FPS games.

When artificial agents are jointly trained to perform collaborative tasks using a communication channel, they develop opaque goal-oriented communication protocols. Good task performance is often considered sufficient evidence that meaningful communication is taking place, but existing empirical results show that communication strategies induced by common objectives can be counterintuitive whilst solving the task nearly perfectly. In this work, we identify a goal-agnostic prerequisite to meaningful communication, which we term semantic consistency, based on the idea that messages should have similar meanings across instances. We provide a formal definition for this idea, and use it to compare the two most common objectives in the field of emergent communication: discrimination and reconstruction. We prove, under mild assumptions, that semantically inconsistent communication protocols can be optimal solutions to the discrimination task, but not to reconstruction. We further show that the reconstruction objective encourages a stricter property, spatial meaningfulness, which also accounts for the distance between messages. Experiments with emergent communication games validate our theoretical results. These findings demonstrate an inherent advantage of distance-based communication goals, and contextualize previous empirical discoveries.

We propose a new framework for estimating generative models via an adversarial process, in which we simultaneously train two models: a generative model G that captures the data distribution, and a discriminative model D that estimates the probability that a sample came from the training data rather than G. The training procedure for G is to maximize the probability of D making a mistake. This framework corresponds to a minimax two-player game. In the space of arbitrary functions G and D, a unique solution exists, with G recovering the training data distribution and D equal to 1/2 everywhere. In the case where G and D are defined by multilayer perceptrons, the entire system can be trained with backpropagation. There is no need for any Markov chains or unrolled approximate inference networks during either training or generation of samples. Experiments demonstrate the potential of the framework through qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the generated samples.

In peer mechanisms, the competitors for a prize also determine who wins. Each competitor may be asked to rank, grade, or nominate peers for the prize. Since the prize can be valuable, such as financial aid, course grades, or an award at a conference, competitors may be tempted to manipulate the mechanism. We survey approaches to prevent or discourage the manipulation of peer mechanisms. We conclude our survey by identifying several important research challenges.

Communication via natural language is a crucial aspect of intelligence, and it requires computational models to learn and reason about world concepts, with varying levels of supervision. While there has been significant progress made on fully-supervised non-interactive tasks, such as question-answering and procedural text understanding, much of the community has turned to various sequential interactive tasks, as in semi-Markov text-based games, which have revealed limitations of existing approaches in terms of coherence, contextual awareness, and their ability to learn effectively from the environment. In this paper, we propose a framework for enabling improved functional grounding of agents in text-based games. Specifically, we consider two forms of domain knowledge that we inject into learning-based agents: memory of previous correct actions and affordances of relevant objects in the environment. Our framework supports three representative model classes: `pure' reinforcement learning (RL) agents, RL agents enhanced with knowledge graphs, and agents equipped with language models. Furthermore, we devise multiple injection strategies for the above domain knowledge types and agent architectures, including injection via knowledge graphs and augmentation of the existing input encoding strategies. We perform all experiments on the ScienceWorld text-based game environment, to illustrate the performance of various model configurations in challenging science-related instruction-following tasks. Our findings provide crucial insights on the development of effective natural language processing systems for interactive contexts.