Daily Papers

We investigate the potential of large language models (LLMs) to distill text: to remove the textual traces of an undesired forbidden variable. We employ a range of LLMs with varying architectures and training approaches to distill text by identifying and removing information about the target variable while preserving other relevant signals. Our findings shed light on the strengths and limitations of LLMs in addressing the distillation and provide insights into the strategies for leveraging these models in computational social science investigations involving text data. In particular, we show that in the strong test of removing sentiment, the statistical association between the processed text and sentiment is still clearly detectable to machine learning classifiers post-LLM-distillation. Furthermore, we find that human annotators also struggle to distill sentiment while preserving other semantic content. This suggests there may be limited separability between concept variables in some text contexts, highlighting limitations of methods relying on text-level transformations and also raising questions about the robustness of distillation methods that achieve statistical independence in representation space if this is difficult for human coders operating on raw text to attain.

We consider the classic supervised learning problem, where a continuous non-negative random label Y (i.e. a random duration) is to be predicted based upon observing a random vector X valued in R^d with dgeq 1 by means of a regression rule with minimum least square error. In various applications, ranging from industrial quality control to public health through credit risk analysis for instance, training observations can be right censored, meaning that, rather than on independent copies of (X,Y), statistical learning relies on a collection of ngeq 1 independent realizations of the triplet (X, ; min{Y,; C},; δ), where C is a nonnegative r.v. with unknown distribution, modeling censorship and δ=I{Yleq C} indicates whether the duration is right censored or not. As ignoring censorship in the risk computation may clearly lead to a severe underestimation of the target duration and jeopardize prediction, we propose to consider a plug-in estimate of the true risk based on a Kaplan-Meier estimator of the conditional survival function of the censorship C given X, referred to as Kaplan-Meier risk, in order to perform empirical risk minimization. It is established, under mild conditions, that the learning rate of minimizers of this biased/weighted empirical risk functional is of order O_{P}(log(n)/n) when ignoring model bias issues inherent to plug-in estimation, as can be attained in absence of censorship. Beyond theoretical results, numerical experiments are presented in order to illustrate the relevance of the approach developed.

Large language models (LLMs) have transformed the way we access information. These models are often tuned to refuse to comply with requests that are considered harmful and to produce responses that better align with the preferences of those who control the models. To understand how this "censorship" works. We use representation engineering techniques to study open-weights safety-tuned models. We present a method for finding a refusal--compliance vector that detects and controls the level of censorship in model outputs. We also analyze recent reasoning LLMs, distilled from DeepSeek-R1, and uncover an additional dimension of censorship through "thought suppression". We show a similar approach can be used to find a vector that suppresses the model's reasoning process, allowing us to remove censorship by applying the negative multiples of this vector

LLMs are trained to refuse harmful instructions, but do they truly understand harmfulness beyond just refusing? Prior work has shown that LLMs' refusal behaviors can be mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, i.e., a refusal direction. In this work, we identify a new dimension to analyze safety mechanisms in LLMs, i.e., harmfulness, which is encoded internally as a separate concept from refusal. There exists a harmfulness direction that is distinct from the refusal direction. As causal evidence, steering along the harmfulness direction can lead LLMs to interpret harmless instructions as harmful, but steering along the refusal direction tends to elicit refusal responses directly without reversing the model's judgment on harmfulness. Furthermore, using our identified harmfulness concept, we find that certain jailbreak methods work by reducing the refusal signals without reversing the model's internal belief of harmfulness. We also find that adversarially finetuning models to accept harmful instructions has minimal impact on the model's internal belief of harmfulness. These insights lead to a practical safety application: The model's latent harmfulness representation can serve as an intrinsic safeguard (Latent Guard) for detecting unsafe inputs and reducing over-refusals that is robust to finetuning attacks. For instance, our Latent Guard achieves performance comparable to or better than Llama Guard 3 8B, a dedicated finetuned safeguard model, across different jailbreak methods. Our findings suggest that LLMs' internal understanding of harmfulness is more robust than their refusal decision to diverse input instructions, offering a new perspective to study AI safety

We consider a resource-aware variant of the classical multi-armed bandit problem: In each round, the learner selects an arm and determines a resource limit. It then observes a corresponding (random) reward, provided the (random) amount of consumed resources remains below the limit. Otherwise, the observation is censored, i.e., no reward is obtained. For this problem setting, we introduce a measure of regret, which incorporates the actual amount of allocated resources of each learning round as well as the optimality of realizable rewards. Thus, to minimize regret, the learner needs to set a resource limit and choose an arm in such a way that the chance to realize a high reward within the predefined resource limit is high, while the resource limit itself should be kept as low as possible. We propose a UCB-inspired online learning algorithm, which we analyze theoretically in terms of its regret upper bound. In a simulation study, we show that our learning algorithm outperforms straightforward extensions of standard multi-armed bandit algorithms.