Daily Papers

We increase overhead for applications that rely on reasoning LLMs-we force models to spend an amplified number of reasoning tokens, i.e., "overthink", to respond to the user query while providing contextually correct answers. The adversary performs an OVERTHINK attack by injecting decoy reasoning problems into the public content that is used by the reasoning LLM (e.g., for RAG applications) during inference time. Due to the nature of our decoy problems (e.g., a Markov Decision Process), modified texts do not violate safety guardrails. We evaluated our attack across closed-(OpenAI o1, o1-mini, o3-mini) and open-(DeepSeek R1) weights reasoning models on the FreshQA and SQuAD datasets. Our results show up to 18x slowdown on FreshQA dataset and 46x slowdown on SQuAD dataset. The attack also shows high transferability across models. To protect applications, we discuss and implement defenses leveraging LLM-based and system design approaches. Finally, we discuss societal, financial, and energy impacts of OVERTHINK attack which could amplify the costs for third-party applications operating reasoning models.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have achieved impressive performance in complex tasks, often outperforming conventional large language models (LLMs). However, the prevalent issue of overthinking severely limits their computational efficiency. Overthinking occurs when models generate excessive and redundant tokens that contribute little to accurate outcomes, especially in simple tasks, resulting in a significant waste of computational resources. To systematically investigate this issue, we introduce Think-Bench, a benchmark designed to evaluate the reasoning efficiency of LRMs. We also propose novel efficiency metrics and conduct a comprehensive evaluation of various LRMs across multiple dimensions, including the reasoning process, outcome quality, and chain-of-thought (CoT) characteristics. Our analysis reveals that most LRMs exhibit overthinking in handling easy questions, generating unnecessarily lengthy reasoning chains. While many LRMs demonstrate high CoT quality, several suffer from low efficiency. We hope that Think-Bench can serve as a robust foundation for advancing research into LRMs.

Large reasoning models (LRMs), such as OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek-R1, have significantly enhanced their reasoning capabilities by generating longer chains of thought, demonstrating outstanding performance across a variety of tasks. However, this performance gain comes at the cost of a substantial increase in redundant reasoning during the generation process, leading to high computational overhead and exacerbating the issue of overthinking. Although numerous existing approaches aim to address the problem of overthinking, they often rely on external interventions. In this paper, we propose a novel framework, Self-Braking Tuning (SBT), which tackles overthinking from the perspective of allowing the model to regulate its own reasoning process, thus eliminating the reliance on external control mechanisms. We construct a set of overthinking identification metrics based on standard answers and design a systematic method to detect redundant reasoning. This method accurately identifies unnecessary steps within the reasoning trajectory and generates training signals for learning self-regulation behaviors. Building on this foundation, we develop a complete strategy for constructing data with adaptive reasoning lengths and introduce an innovative braking prompt mechanism that enables the model to naturally learn when to terminate reasoning at an appropriate point. Experiments across mathematical benchmarks (AIME, AMC, MATH500, GSM8K) demonstrate that our method reduces token consumption by up to 60% while maintaining comparable accuracy to unconstrained models.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) represent a breakthrough in AI problem-solving capabilities, but their effectiveness in interactive environments can be limited. This paper introduces and analyzes overthinking in LRMs. A phenomenon where models favor extended internal reasoning chains over environmental interaction. Through experiments on software engineering tasks using SWE Bench Verified, we observe three recurring patterns: Analysis Paralysis, Rogue Actions, and Premature Disengagement. We propose a framework to study these behaviors, which correlates with human expert assessments, and analyze 4018 trajectories. We observe that higher overthinking scores correlate with decreased performance, with reasoning models exhibiting stronger tendencies toward overthinking compared to non-reasoning models. Our analysis reveals that simple efforts to mitigate overthinking in agentic environments, such as selecting the solution with the lower overthinking score, can improve model performance by almost 30% while reducing computational costs by 43%. These results suggest that mitigating overthinking has strong practical implications. We suggest that by leveraging native function-calling capabilities and selective reinforcement learning overthinking tendencies could be mitigated. We also open-source our evaluation framework and dataset to facilitate research in this direction at https://github.com/AlexCuadron/Overthinking.

Modern language models can imitate complex patterns through few-shot learning, enabling them to complete challenging tasks without fine-tuning. However, imitation can also lead models to reproduce inaccuracies or harmful content if present in the context. We study harmful imitation through the lens of a model's internal representations, and identify two related phenomena: "overthinking" and "false induction heads". The first phenomenon, overthinking, appears when we decode predictions from intermediate layers, given correct vs. incorrect few-shot demonstrations. At early layers, both demonstrations induce similar model behavior, but the behavior diverges sharply at some "critical layer", after which the accuracy given incorrect demonstrations progressively decreases. The second phenomenon, false induction heads, are a possible mechanistic cause of overthinking: these are heads in late layers that attend to and copy false information from previous demonstrations, and whose ablation reduces overthinking. Beyond scientific understanding, our results suggest that studying intermediate model computations could be a promising avenue for understanding and guarding against harmful model behaviors.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained via Reinforcement Learning (RL) have recently achieved impressive results on reasoning benchmarks. Yet, growing evidence shows that these models often generate longer but ineffective chains of thought (CoTs), calling into question whether benchmark gains reflect real reasoning improvements. We present new evidence of overthinking, where models disregard correct solutions even when explicitly provided, instead continuing to generate unnecessary reasoning steps that often lead to incorrect conclusions. Experiments on three state-of-the-art models using the AIME2024 math benchmark reveal critical limitations in these models ability to integrate corrective information, posing new challenges for achieving robust and interpretable reasoning.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently achieved significant progress in complex reasoning tasks, aided by reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards. However, LRMs often suffer from overthinking, expending excessive computation on simple problems and reducing efficiency. Existing efficient reasoning methods typically require accurate task assessment to preset token budgets or select reasoning modes, which limits their flexibility and reliability. In this work, we revisit the essence of overthinking and identify that encouraging effective steps while penalizing ineffective ones is key to its solution. To this end, we propose a novel rule-based verifiable stepwise reward mechanism (VSRM), which assigns rewards based on the performance of intermediate states in the reasoning trajectory. This approach is intuitive and naturally fits the step-by-step nature of reasoning tasks. We conduct extensive experiments on standard mathematical reasoning benchmarks, including AIME24 and AIME25, by integrating VSRM with PPO and Reinforce++. Results show that our method achieves substantial output length reduction while maintaining original reasoning performance, striking an optimal balance between efficiency and accuracy. Further analysis of overthinking frequency and pass@k score before and after training demonstrates that our approach in deed effectively suppresses ineffective steps and encourages effective reasoning, fundamentally alleviating the overthinking problem. All code will be released upon acceptance.

The remarkable performance of models like the OpenAI o1 can be attributed to their ability to emulate human-like long-time thinking during inference. These models employ extended chain-of-thought (CoT) processes, exploring multiple strategies to enhance problem-solving capabilities. However, a critical question remains: How to intelligently and efficiently scale computational resources during testing. This paper presents the first comprehensive study on the prevalent issue of overthinking in these models, where excessive computational resources are allocated for simple problems with minimal benefit. We introduce novel efficiency metrics from both outcome and process perspectives to evaluate the rational use of computational resources by o1-like models. Using a self-training paradigm, we propose strategies to mitigate overthinking, streamlining reasoning processes without compromising accuracy. Experimental results show that our approach successfully reduces computational overhead while preserving model performance across a range of testsets with varying difficulty levels, such as GSM8K, MATH500, GPQA, and AIME.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate strong performance on complex tasks but often suffer from excessive verbosity, known as "overthinking." Existing solutions via reinforcement learning (RL) typically penalize generated tokens to promote conciseness. However, these methods encounter two challenges: responses with fewer tokens do not always correspond to fewer reasoning steps, and models may develop hacking behavior in later stages of training by discarding reasoning steps to minimize token usage. In this work, we introduce Step Pruner (SP), an RL framework that steers LRMs toward more efficient reasoning by favoring compact reasoning steps. Our step-aware reward function prioritizes correctness while imposing penalties for redundant steps, and withholds rewards for incorrect responses to prevent the reinforcement of erroneous reasoning. Moreover, we propose a dynamic stopping mechanism: when the length of any output step exceeds the upper limit, we halt updates to prevent hacking behavior caused by merging steps. Extensive experiments across four reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that SP achieves state-of-the-art accuracy while significantly reducing response length. For instance, on AIME24, SP reduces token usage by 69.7\%.

Recent advancements in large reasoning models (LRMs) have demonstrated the effectiveness of scaling test-time computation to enhance reasoning capabilities in multiple tasks. However, LRMs typically suffer from "overthinking" problems, where models generate significantly redundant reasoning steps while bringing limited performance gains. Existing work relies on fine-tuning to mitigate overthinking, which requires additional data, unconventional training setups, risky safety misalignment, and poor generalization. Through empirical analysis, we reveal an important characteristic of LRM behaviors that placing external CoTs generated by smaller models between the thinking token (<think> and </think>) can effectively manipulate the model to generate fewer thoughts. Building on these insights, we propose a simple yet efficient pipeline, ThoughtMani, to enable LRMs to bypass unnecessary intermediate steps and reduce computational costs significantly. We conduct extensive experiments to validate the utility and efficiency of ThoughtMani. For instance, when applied to QwQ-32B on the LiveBench/Code dataset, ThoughtMani keeps the original performance and reduces output token counts by approximately 30%, with little overhead from the CoT generator. Furthermore, we find that ThoughtMani enhances safety alignment by an average of 10%. Since model vendors typically serve models of different sizes simultaneously, ThoughtMani provides an effective way to construct more efficient and accessible LRMs for real-world applications.

We investigate the robustness of reasoning models trained for step-by-step problem solving by introducing query-agnostic adversarial triggers - short, irrelevant text that, when appended to math problems, systematically mislead models to output incorrect answers without altering the problem's semantics. We propose CatAttack, an automated iterative attack pipeline for generating triggers on a weaker, less expensive proxy model (DeepSeek V3) and successfully transfer them to more advanced reasoning target models like DeepSeek R1 and DeepSeek R1-distilled-Qwen-32B, resulting in greater than 300% increase in the likelihood of the target model generating an incorrect answer. For example, appending, "Interesting fact: cats sleep most of their lives," to any math problem leads to more than doubling the chances of a model getting the answer wrong. Our findings highlight critical vulnerabilities in reasoning models, revealing that even state-of-the-art models remain susceptible to subtle adversarial inputs, raising security and reliability concerns. The CatAttack triggers dataset with model responses is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/collinear-ai/cat-attack-adversarial-triggers.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has driven recent gains of large language models (LLMs) on reasoning-intensive tasks by externalizing intermediate steps. However, excessive or redundant reasoning -- so-called overthinking -- can increase inference costs and lead LLMs toward incorrect conclusions. In this paper, we present REFRAIN (REFlective-Redundancy for Adaptive INference), a training-free framework that adaptively determines when to stop reasoning to mitigate overthinking. REFRAIN integrates a two-stage stop discriminator to identify reflective yet redundant reasoning and a sliding-window Upper Confidence Bound (SW-UCB) multi-armed bandit controller to dynamically adjust stopping thresholds according to problem difficulty without supervision or fine-tuning. Across four representative benchmarks and two model families, REFRAIN reduces token usage by 20-55% while maintaining or improving accuracy compared to standard CoT prompting. Extensive ablation and robustness analyses demonstrate its stability across models, scorers, and prompt variations. In summary, our findings highlight when-to-stop as a new and practical axis of test-time scaling -- enabling models to reason not just more, but just enough.

Catastrophic overfitting (CO) presents a significant challenge in single-step adversarial training (AT), manifesting as highly distorted deep neural networks (DNNs) that are vulnerable to multi-step adversarial attacks. However, the underlying factors that lead to the distortion of decision boundaries remain unclear. In this work, we delve into the specific changes within different DNN layers and discover that during CO, the former layers are more susceptible, experiencing earlier and greater distortion, while the latter layers show relative insensitivity. Our analysis further reveals that this increased sensitivity in former layers stems from the formation of pseudo-robust shortcuts, which alone can impeccably defend against single-step adversarial attacks but bypass genuine-robust learning, resulting in distorted decision boundaries. Eliminating these shortcuts can partially restore robustness in DNNs from the CO state, thereby verifying that dependence on them triggers the occurrence of CO. This understanding motivates us to implement adaptive weight perturbations across different layers to hinder the generation of pseudo-robust shortcuts, consequently mitigating CO. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our proposed method, Layer-Aware Adversarial Weight Perturbation (LAP), can effectively prevent CO and further enhance robustness.

The reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) have improved substantially through increased test-time computation, typically in the form of intermediate tokens known as chain-of-thought (CoT). However, CoT often becomes unnecessarily long, increasing computation cost without actual accuracy gains or sometimes even degrading performance, a phenomenon known as ``overthinking''. We propose a multi-stage efficient reasoning method that combines supervised fine-tuning -- via rejection sampling or reasoning trace reformatting -- with reinforcement learning using an adaptive length penalty. We introduce a lightweight reward function that penalizes tokens generated after the first correct answer but encouraging self-verification only when beneficial. We conduct a holistic evaluation across seven diverse reasoning tasks, analyzing the accuracy-response length trade-off. Our approach reduces response length by an average of 28\% for 8B models and 40\% for 32B models, while incurring only minor performance drops of 1.6 and 2.5 points, respectively. Despite its conceptual simplicity, it achieves a superior trade-off compared to more complex state-of-the-art efficient reasoning methods, scoring 76.6, in terms of the area under the Overthinking-Adjusted Accuracy curve (AUC_{OAA}) -- 5 points above the base model and 2.5 points above the second-best approach.

Recent thinking models solve complex reasoning tasks by scaling test-time compute, but this scaling must be allocated in line with task difficulty. On one hand, short reasoning (underthinking) leads to errors on harder problems that require extended reasoning steps; but, excessively long reasoning (overthinking) can be token-inefficient, generating unnecessary steps even after reaching a correct intermediate solution. We refer to this as under-adaptivity, where the model fails to modulate its response length appropriately given problems of varying difficulty. To address under-adaptivity and strike a balance between under- and overthinking, we propose TRAAC (Think Right with Adaptive, Attentive Compression), an online post-training RL method that leverages the model's self-attention over a long reasoning trajectory to identify important steps and prune redundant ones. TRAAC also estimates difficulty and incorporates it into training rewards, thereby learning to allocate reasoning budget commensurate with example difficulty. Our approach improves accuracy, reduces reasoning steps, and enables adaptive thinking compared to base models and other RL baselines. Across a variety of tasks (AIME, AMC, GPQA-D, BBEH), TRAAC (Qwen3-4B) achieves an average absolute accuracy gain of 8.4% with a relative reduction in reasoning length of 36.8% compared to the base model, and a 7.9% accuracy gain paired with a 29.4% length drop compared to the best RL baseline. TRAAC also shows strong generalization: although our models are trained on math datasets, they show accuracy and efficiency gains on out-of-distribution non-math datasets like GPQA-D, BBEH, and OptimalThinkingBench. Our analysis further verifies that TRAAC provides fine-grained adjustments to thinking budget based on difficulty and that a combination of task-difficulty calibration and attention-based compression yields gains across diverse tasks.

Recent breakthroughs in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated that extensive Chain-of-Thought (CoT) generation is critical for enabling intricate cognitive behaviors, such as self-verification and backtracking, to solve complex tasks. However, this capability often leads to ``overthinking'', where models generate redundant reasoning paths that inflate computational costs without improving accuracy. While Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) on reasoning traces is a standard paradigm for the 'cold start' phase, applying existing compression techniques to these traces often compromises logical coherence or incurs prohibitive sampling costs. In this paper, we introduce ConMax (Confidence-Maximizing Compression), a novel reinforcement learning framework designed to automatically compress reasoning traces while preserving essential reasoning patterns. ConMax formulates compression as a reward-driven optimization problem, training a policy to prune redundancy by maximizing a weighted combination of answer confidence for predictive fidelity and thinking confidence for reasoning validity through a frozen auxiliary LRM. Extensive experiments across five reasoning datasets demonstrate that ConMax achieves a superior efficiency-performance trade-off. Specifically, it reduces inference length by 43% over strong baselines at the cost of a mere 0.7% dip in accuracy, proving its effectiveness in generating high-quality, efficient training data for LRMs.

Recent advances in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in mathematical and logical reasoning. However, current LRMs rarely admit ignorance or respond with "I don't know". Instead, they often produce incorrect answers while showing undue confidence, raising concerns about their factual reliability. In this work, we identify two pathological reasoning patterns characterized by overthinking that contribute to the overconfident and incorrect answers: last-minute guessing and second-thought spiraling. To address these issues, we propose BARREL-a novel framework that promotes concise and boundary-aware factual reasoning. Our experiments show that BARREL-training increases the reliability of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B from 39.33% to 61.48%, while still achieving accuracy comparable to models finetuned on reasoning data generated by R1. These results demonstrate that our pilot study is inspiring to build more reliable and factual System 2 LRMs.

Hallucination is a persistent challenge in large language models (LLMs), where even with rigorous quality control, models often generate distorted facts. This paradox, in which error generation continues despite high-quality training data, calls for a deeper understanding of the underlying LLM mechanisms. To address it, we propose a novel concept: knowledge overshadowing, where model's dominant knowledge can obscure less prominent knowledge during text generation, causing the model to fabricate inaccurate details. Building on this idea, we introduce a novel framework to quantify factual hallucinations by modeling knowledge overshadowing. Central to our approach is the log-linear law, which predicts that the rate of factual hallucination increases linearly with the logarithmic scale of (1) Knowledge Popularity, (2) Knowledge Length, and (3) Model Size. The law provides a means to preemptively quantify hallucinations, offering foresight into their occurrence even before model training or inference. Built on overshadowing effect, we propose a new decoding strategy CoDa, to mitigate hallucinations, which notably enhance model factuality on Overshadow (27.9%), MemoTrap (13.1%) and NQ-Swap (18.3%). Our findings not only deepen understandings of the underlying mechanisms behind hallucinations but also provide actionable insights for developing more predictable and controllable language models.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in tackling complex reasoning tasks through step-by-step thinking. However, such a lengthy reasoning process incurs substantial computational and latency overheads, hindering the practical deployment of these models. In this work, we present a new perspective on mitigating overthinking in LRMs via black-box adversarial prompting. By treating both open-source LRMs and closed-source APIs as black-box communicators, we investigate how to elicit concise responses without sacrificing accuracy. We introduce AdvPrompt, an iterative refinement framework that generates high-quality adversarial prompts from diverse perspectives. Experiments across multiple benchmarks demonstrate that AdvPrompt consistently reduces token usage while preserving performance. Notably, AdvPrompt achieves a 3x reduction in average response length on simple GSM8K questions for the Qwen3 model series, and delivers an average ~40% token reduction across four benchmarks. For closed-source APIs, AdvPrompt reduces token usage on MATH-500 by 35% for Claude-3.7 and 47% for Gemini-2.5. Further analysis reveals the generalizability of AdvPrompt across various model scales and families, underscoring the potential of black-box prompting as a practical and effective strategy for enhancing LRM efficiency.

Overfitting negatively impacts the generalization ability of deep neural networks (DNNs) in both natural and adversarial training. Existing methods struggle to consistently address different types of overfitting, typically designing strategies that focus separately on either natural or adversarial patterns. In this work, we adopt a unified perspective by solely focusing on natural patterns to explore different types of overfitting. Specifically, we examine the memorization effect in DNNs and reveal a shared behaviour termed over-memorization, which impairs their generalization capacity. This behaviour manifests as DNNs suddenly becoming high-confidence in predicting certain training patterns and retaining a persistent memory for them. Furthermore, when DNNs over-memorize an adversarial pattern, they tend to simultaneously exhibit high-confidence prediction for the corresponding natural pattern. These findings motivate us to holistically mitigate different types of overfitting by hindering the DNNs from over-memorization natural patterns. To this end, we propose a general framework, Distraction Over-Memorization (DOM), which explicitly prevents over-memorization by either removing or augmenting the high-confidence natural patterns. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method in mitigating overfitting across various training paradigms.

Deep neural networks are susceptible to adversarial attacks, which can compromise their performance and accuracy. Adversarial Training (AT) has emerged as a popular approach for protecting neural networks against such attacks. However, a key challenge of AT is robust overfitting, where the network's robust performance on test data deteriorates with further training, thus hindering generalization. Motivated by the concept of active forgetting in the brain, we introduce a novel learning paradigm called "Forget to Mitigate Overfitting (FOMO)". FOMO alternates between the forgetting phase, which randomly forgets a subset of weights and regulates the model's information through weight reinitialization, and the relearning phase, which emphasizes learning generalizable features. Our experiments on benchmark datasets and adversarial attacks show that FOMO alleviates robust overfitting by significantly reducing the gap between the best and last robust test accuracy while improving the state-of-the-art robustness. Furthermore, FOMO provides a better trade-off between standard and robust accuracy, outperforming baseline adversarial methods. Finally, our framework is robust to AutoAttacks and increases generalization in many real-world scenarios.

Large Reasoning Models(LRMs) such as OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek-R1 have shown remarkable reasoning capabilities by scaling test-time compute and generating long Chain-of-Thought(CoT). Distillation--post-training on LRMs-generated data--is a straightforward yet effective method to enhance the reasoning abilities of smaller models, but faces a critical bottleneck: we found that distilled long CoT data poses learning difficulty for small models and leads to the inheritance of biases (i.e. over-thinking) when using Supervised Fine-tuning(SFT) and Reinforcement Learning(RL) methods. To alleviate this bottleneck, we propose constructing tree-based CoT data from scratch via Monte Carlo Tree Search(MCTS). We then exploit a set of CoT-aware approaches, including Thoughts Length Balance, Fine-grained DPO, and Joint Post-training Objective, to enhance SFT and RL on the construted data.

We present Kwaipilot-AutoThink (KAT), an open-source 40B large language model developed to address the overthinking problem in reasoning-intensive tasks, where an automatic thinking training paradigm is proposed to dynamically switch between reasoning and non-reasoning modes based on task complexity. Specifically, first, we construct the dual-regime dataset based on a novel tagging pipeline and a multi-agent synthesis strategy, and then we apply Multi-Token Prediction (MTP)-enhanced knowledge distillation, enabling efficient and fine-grained reasoning transfer with minimal pretraining cost. Besides, we implement a cold-start initialization strategy that introduces mode-selection priors using majority-vote signals and intent-aware prompting. Finally, we propose Step-SRPO, a reinforcement learning algorithm that incorporates intermediate supervision into the GRPO framework, offering structured guidance over both reasoning-mode selection and response accuracy. Extensive experiments across multiple benchmarks demonstrate that KAT consistently matches or even outperforms current state-of-the-art models, including DeepSeek-R1-0528 and Qwen3-235B-A22B, across a wide range of reasoning-intensive tasks while reducing token usage by up to approximately 30\%. Beyond academic evaluation, KAT has been successfully deployed in Kwaipilot (i.e., Kuaishou's internal coding assistant), and improves real-world development workflows with high accuracy, efficiency, and controllable reasoning behaviors. Moreover, we are actively training a 200B Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) with 40B activation parameters, where the early-stage results already demonstrate promising improvements in performance and efficiency, further showing the scalability of the AutoThink paradigm.

Recent reasoning large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable improvements in mathematical reasoning capabilities through long Chain-of-Thought. The reasoning tokens of these models enable self-correction within reasoning chains, enhancing robustness. This motivates our exploration: how vulnerable are reasoning LLMs to subtle errors in their input reasoning chains? We introduce "Compromising Thought" (CPT), a vulnerability where models presented with reasoning tokens containing manipulated calculation results tend to ignore correct reasoning steps and adopt incorrect results instead. Through systematic evaluation across multiple reasoning LLMs, we design three increasingly explicit prompting methods to measure CPT resistance, revealing that models struggle significantly to identify and correct these manipulations. Notably, contrary to existing research suggesting structural alterations affect model performance more than content modifications, we find that local ending token manipulations have greater impact on reasoning outcomes than structural changes. Moreover, we discover a security vulnerability in DeepSeek-R1 where tampered reasoning tokens can trigger complete reasoning cessation. Our work enhances understanding of reasoning robustness and highlights security considerations for reasoning-intensive applications.

Deep-learning based Automatic Essay Scoring (AES) systems are being actively used by states and language testing agencies alike to evaluate millions of candidates for life-changing decisions ranging from college applications to visa approvals. However, little research has been put to understand and interpret the black-box nature of deep-learning based scoring algorithms. Previous studies indicate that scoring models can be easily fooled. In this paper, we explore the reason behind their surprising adversarial brittleness. We utilize recent advances in interpretability to find the extent to which features such as coherence, content, vocabulary, and relevance are important for automated scoring mechanisms. We use this to investigate the oversensitivity i.e., large change in output score with a little change in input essay content) and overstability i.e., little change in output scores with large changes in input essay content) of AES. Our results indicate that autoscoring models, despite getting trained as "end-to-end" models with rich contextual embeddings such as BERT, behave like bag-of-words models. A few words determine the essay score without the requirement of any context making the model largely overstable. This is in stark contrast to recent probing studies on pre-trained representation learning models, which show that rich linguistic features such as parts-of-speech and morphology are encoded by them. Further, we also find that the models have learnt dataset biases, making them oversensitive. To deal with these issues, we propose detection-based protection models that can detect oversensitivity and overstability causing samples with high accuracies. We find that our proposed models are able to detect unusual attribution patterns and flag adversarial samples successfully.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in complex reasoning tasks, but their inference remains computationally inefficient. We observe a common failure mode in many prevalent LLMs, overthinking, where models generate verbose and tangential reasoning traces even for simple queries. Recent works have tried to mitigate this by enforcing fixed token budgets, however, this can lead to underthinking, especially on harder problems. Through empirical analysis, we identify that this inefficiency often stems from unclear problem-solving strategies. To formalize this, we develop a theoretical model, BBAM (Bayesian Budget Allocation Model), which models reasoning as a sequence of sub-questions with varying uncertainty, and introduce the E^3 metric to capture the trade-off between correctness and computation efficiency. Building on theoretical results from BBAM, we propose Plan-and-Budget, a model-agnostic, test-time framework that decomposes complex queries into sub-questions and allocates token budgets based on estimated complexity using adaptive scheduling. Plan-and-Budget improves reasoning efficiency across a range of tasks and models, achieving up to +70% accuracy gains, -39% token reduction, and +187.5% improvement in E^3. Notably, it elevates a smaller model (DS-Qwen-32B) to match the efficiency of a larger model (DS-LLaMA-70B)-demonstrating Plan-and-Budget's ability to close performance gaps without retraining. Our code is available at anonymous.4open.science/r/P-and-B-6513/.

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) aim to determine whether a specific sample was used to train a predictive model. Knowing this may indeed lead to a privacy breach. Most MIAs, however, make use of the model's prediction scores - the probability of each output given some input - following the intuition that the trained model tends to behave differently on its training data. We argue that this is a fallacy for many modern deep network architectures. Consequently, MIAs will miserably fail since overconfidence leads to high false-positive rates not only on known domains but also on out-of-distribution data and implicitly acts as a defense against MIAs. Specifically, using generative adversarial networks, we are able to produce a potentially infinite number of samples falsely classified as part of the training data. In other words, the threat of MIAs is overestimated, and less information is leaked than previously assumed. Moreover, there is actually a trade-off between the overconfidence of models and their susceptibility to MIAs: the more classifiers know when they do not know, making low confidence predictions, the more they reveal the training data.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have significantly advanced complex reasoning capabilities, particularly through extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning that incorporates mechanisms such as backtracking, self-reflection and self-correction. Despite these developments, the self-correction abilities of LLMs during long CoT reasoning remain underexplored. And recent findings on overthinking suggest that such models often engage in unnecessarily redundant reasoning. In this work, we empirically show that the first reasoning step exerts a disproportionately large influence on the final prediction - errors introduced at this stage can substantially degrade subsequent reasoning quality. This phenomenon is consistently observed across two state-of-the-art open-source reasoning model families: DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen3. To address this, we propose an efficient sampling strategy that leverages a reward model to identify and retain high-quality first reasoning steps while discarding suboptimal ones, achieving up to a 70% reduction in inference cost without sacrificing accuracy. Finally, we introduce a new benchmark specifically constructed with deliberately flawed first reasoning steps to systematically evaluate model self-correction capabilities, offering a foundation for future research on robust reasoning in LLMs.

Autoregressive multimodal large language models have recently gained popularity for image generation, driven by advances in foundation models. To enhance alignment and detail, newer approaches employ chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, expanding user inputs into elaborated prompts prior to image synthesis. However, this strategy can introduce unnecessary redundancy -- a phenomenon we call visual overthinking -- which increases computational costs and can introduce details that contradict the original prompt. In this work, we explore how to generate more concise CoT sequences for more efficient image generation. We introduce ShortCoTI, a lightweight optimization framework that encourages more concise CoT while preserving output image quality. ShortCoTI rewards more concise prompts with an adaptive function that scales according to an estimated difficulty for each task. Incorporating this reward into a reinforcement learning paradigm reduces prompt reasoning length by 54% while maintaining or slightly improving quality metrics across multiple benchmarks (T2I-CompBench, GenEval). Qualitative analysis shows that our method eliminates verbose explanations and repetitive refinements, producing reasoning prompts that are both concise and semantically rich. As a result, ShortCoTI improves computational efficiency without compromising the fidelity or visual appeal of generated images.

Evaluating the robustness of a defense model is a challenging task in adversarial robustness research. Obfuscated gradients have previously been found to exist in many defense methods and cause a false signal of robustness. In this paper, we identify a more subtle situation called Imbalanced Gradients that can also cause overestimated adversarial robustness. The phenomenon of imbalanced gradients occurs when the gradient of one term of the margin loss dominates and pushes the attack towards to a suboptimal direction. To exploit imbalanced gradients, we formulate a Margin Decomposition (MD) attack that decomposes a margin loss into individual terms and then explores the attackability of these terms separately via a two-stage process. We also propose a multi-targeted and ensemble version of our MD attack. By investigating 24 defense models proposed since 2018, we find that 11 models are susceptible to a certain degree of imbalanced gradients and our MD attack can decrease their robustness evaluated by the best standalone baseline attack by more than 1%. We also provide an in-depth investigation on the likely causes of imbalanced gradients and effective countermeasures. Our code is available at https://github.com/HanxunH/MDAttack.

Recently, techniques such as explicit structured reasoning have demonstrated strong test-time scaling behavior by enforcing a separation between the model's internal "thinking" process and the final response. A key factor influencing answer quality in this setting is the length of the thinking stage. When the reasoning is too short, the model may fail to capture the complexity of the task. Conversely, when it is too long, the model may overthink, leading to unnecessary computation and degraded performance. This paper explores and exploits the underlying mechanisms by which LLMs understand and regulate the length of their reasoning during explicit thought processes. First, we show that LLMs encode their progress through the reasoning process and introduce an interactive progress bar visualization, which is then used to reveal insights on the model's planning dynamics. Second, we manipulate the internal progress encoding during inference to reduce unnecessary steps and generate a more concise and decisive chain of thoughts. Our empirical results demonstrate that this "overclocking" method mitigates overthinking, improves answer accuracy, and reduces inference latency. Our code is publicly available.

Reasoning models have demonstrated impressive performance on difficult tasks that traditional language models struggle at. However, many are plagued with the problem of overthinking--generating large amounts of unnecessary tokens which don't improve accuracy on a question. We introduce approximate measures of problem-level difficulty and demonstrate that a clear relationship between problem difficulty and optimal token spend exists, and evaluate how well calibrated a variety of reasoning models are in terms of efficiently allocating the optimal token count. We find that in general, reasoning models are poorly calibrated, particularly on easy problems. To evaluate calibration on easy questions we introduce DUMB500, a dataset of extremely easy math, reasoning, code, and task problems, and jointly evaluate reasoning model on these simple examples and extremely difficult examples from existing frontier benchmarks on the same task domain. Finally, we introduce THOUGHTTERMINATOR, a training-free black box decoding technique that significantly improves reasoning model calibration.

Large reasoning models achieve strong performance on complex tasks by generating extended chains of thought, but they often "overthink": continuing to reason long after they have enough information to answer correctly. This wastes inference-time compute and can hurt accuracy. Existing attempts to stop early either manipulate decoding with extra sampling and heuristics, rely on auxiliary verifier models, or operate only as post-hoc analysis pipelines without formal guarantees. We introduce LYNX, an online early-exit mechanism that turns a model's own hidden-state awareness into confidence-controlled stopping decisions. LYNX attaches exit decisions to naturally occurring reasoning cues (e.g., "hmm", "wait") during generation, trains a lightweight probe on hidden states at those cue tokens using supervision from forced exits, and wraps the resulting scores in split conformal prediction to obtain distribution-free control over premature exits. Crucially, we train and calibrate this probe once on a generic mathematical corpus and reuse it unchanged across benchmarks, decoding temperatures, and even non-mathematical tasks. Across three model families spanning 1.5B to 32B parameters, a single mathematically trained probe per base model yields strong accuracy--efficiency tradeoffs. On GSM8K, LYNX matches or improves baseline accuracy while reducing tokens by 40--65\%; on MATH-500 it improves accuracy by up to 12 points with roughly 35--60\% fewer tokens; on AIME 2024 it recovers baseline accuracy with more than 50\% token savings; and on CommonsenseQA, a non-math benchmark, it transfers zero-shot with modest accuracy gains and up to 70\% fewer tokens. Compared to state-of-the-art early-exit methods, LYNX offers competitive or superior Pareto frontiers while remaining fully online, requiring no proxy models at inference, and providing explicit, user-tunable confidence guarantees.

Multimodal large language models with Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) have significantly advanced tasks such as multimodal question answering by grounding responses in external text and images. This grounding improves factuality, reduces hallucination, and extends reasoning beyond parametric knowledge. However, this reliance on external knowledge poses a critical yet underexplored safety risk: knowledge poisoning attacks, where adversaries deliberately inject adversarial multimodal content into external knowledge bases to steer model toward generating incorrect or even harmful responses. To expose such vulnerabilities, we propose MM-PoisonRAG, the first framework to systematically design knowledge poisoning in multimodal RAG. We introduce two complementary attack strategies: Localized Poisoning Attack (LPA), which implants targeted multimodal misinformation to manipulate specific queries, and Globalized Poisoning Attack (GPA), which inserts a single adversarial knowledge to broadly disrupt reasoning and induce nonsensical responses across all queries. Comprehensive experiments across tasks, models, and access settings show that LPA achieves targeted manipulation with attack success rates of up to 56%, while GPA completely disrupts model generation to 0% accuracy with just a single adversarial knowledge injection. Our results reveal the fragility of multimodal RAG and highlight the urgent need for defenses against knowledge poisoning.

Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples. Adversarial training (AT) is an effective defense against adversarial examples. However, AT is prone to overfitting which degrades robustness substantially. Recently, data augmentation (DA) was shown to be effective in mitigating robust overfitting if appropriately designed and optimized for AT. This work proposes a new method to automatically learn online, instance-wise, DA policies to improve robust generalization for AT. A novel policy learning objective, consisting of Vulnerability, Affinity and Diversity, is proposed and shown to be sufficiently effective and efficient to be practical for automatic DA generation during AT. This allows our method to efficiently explore a large search space for a more effective DA policy and evolve the policy as training progresses. Empirically, our method is shown to outperform or match all competitive DA methods across various model architectures (CNNs and ViTs) and datasets (CIFAR10, SVHN and Imagenette). Our DA policy reinforced vanilla AT to surpass several state-of-the-art AT methods (with baseline DA) in terms of both accuracy and robustness. It can also be combined with those advanced AT methods to produce a further boost in robustness.

Large language models (LLMs) such as OpenAI's o1 have demonstrated remarkable abilities in complex reasoning tasks by scaling test-time compute and exhibiting human-like deep thinking. However, we identify a phenomenon we term underthinking, where o1-like LLMs frequently switch between different reasoning thoughts without sufficiently exploring promising paths to reach a correct solution. This behavior leads to inadequate depth of reasoning and decreased performance, particularly on challenging mathematical problems. To systematically analyze this issue, we conduct experiments on three challenging test sets and two representative open-source o1-like models, revealing that frequent thought switching correlates with incorrect responses. We introduce a novel metric to quantify underthinking by measuring token efficiency in incorrect answers. To address underthinking, we propose a decoding strategy with thought switching penalty TIP that discourages premature transitions between thoughts, encouraging deeper exploration of each reasoning path. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach improves accuracy across challenging datasets without requiring model fine-tuning. Our findings contribute to understanding reasoning inefficiencies in o1-like LLMs and offer a practical solution to enhance their problem-solving capabilities.

Machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, and a thought-provoking paper by Bubeck and Sellke has analyzed this phenomenon through the lens of over-parameterization: interpolating smoothly the data requires significantly more parameters than simply memorizing it. However, this "universal" law provides only a necessary condition for robustness, and it is unable to discriminate between models. In this paper, we address these gaps by focusing on empirical risk minimization in two prototypical settings, namely, random features and the neural tangent kernel (NTK). We prove that, for random features, the model is not robust for any degree of over-parameterization, even when the necessary condition coming from the universal law of robustness is satisfied. In contrast, for even activations, the NTK model meets the universal lower bound, and it is robust as soon as the necessary condition on over-parameterization is fulfilled. This also addresses a conjecture in prior work by Bubeck, Li and Nagaraj. Our analysis decouples the effect of the kernel of the model from an "interaction matrix", which describes the interaction with the test data and captures the effect of the activation. Our theoretical results are corroborated by numerical evidence on both synthetic and standard datasets (MNIST, CIFAR-10).

Recent advances in large reasoning language models (LRLMs) rely on test-time scaling, which extends long chain-of-thought (CoT) generation to solve complex tasks. However, overthinking in long CoT not only slows down the efficiency of problem solving, but also risks accuracy loss due to the extremely detailed or redundant reasoning steps. We propose a simple yet effective method that allows LLMs to self-truncate CoT sequences by early exit during generation. Instead of relying on fixed heuristics, the proposed method monitors model behavior at potential reasoning transition points (e.g.,"Wait" tokens) and dynamically terminates the next reasoning chain's generation when the model exhibits high confidence in a trial answer. Our method requires no additional training and can be seamlessly integrated into existing o1-like reasoning LLMs. Experiments on 10 reasoning benchmarks (e.g., GSM8K, MATH-500, AMC, GPQA, AIME and LiveCodeBench) show that the proposed method is consistently effective on 11 cutting-edge reasoning LLMs of varying series and sizes, reducing the length of CoT sequences by an average of 19.1% to 80.1% while improving accuracy by 0.3% to 5.0%.

The security of Large Language Model (LLM) applications is fundamentally challenged by "form-first" attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking, where malicious instructions are embedded within user inputs. Conventional defenses, which rely on post hoc output filtering, are often brittle and fail to address the root cause: the model's inability to distinguish trusted instructions from untrusted data. This paper proposes Countermind, a multi-layered security architecture intended to shift defenses from a reactive, post hoc posture to a proactive, pre-inference, and intra-inference enforcement model. The architecture proposes a fortified perimeter designed to structurally validate and transform all inputs, and an internal governance mechanism intended to constrain the model's semantic processing pathways before an output is generated. The primary contributions of this work are conceptual designs for: (1) A Semantic Boundary Logic (SBL) with a mandatory, time-coupled Text Crypter intended to reduce the plaintext prompt injection attack surface, provided all ingestion paths are enforced. (2) A Parameter-Space Restriction (PSR) mechanism, leveraging principles from representation engineering, to dynamically control the LLM's access to internal semantic clusters, with the goal of mitigating semantic drift and dangerous emergent behaviors. (3) A Secure, Self-Regulating Core that uses an OODA loop and a learning security module to adapt its defenses based on an immutable audit log. (4) A Multimodal Input Sandbox and Context-Defense mechanisms to address threats from non-textual data and long-term semantic poisoning. This paper outlines an evaluation plan designed to quantify the proposed architecture's effectiveness in reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR) for form-first attacks and to measure its potential latency overhead.

Frontier AI developers are relying on layers of safeguards to protect against catastrophic misuse of AI systems. Anthropic guards their latest Claude 4 Opus model using one such defense pipeline, and other frontier developers including Google DeepMind and OpenAI pledge to soon deploy similar defenses. However, the security of such pipelines is unclear, with limited prior work evaluating or attacking these pipelines. We address this gap by developing and red-teaming an open-source defense pipeline. First, we find that a novel few-shot-prompted input and output classifier outperforms state-of-the-art open-weight safeguard model ShieldGemma across three attacks and two datasets, reducing the attack success rate (ASR) to 0% on the catastrophic misuse dataset ClearHarm. Second, we introduce a STaged AttaCK (STACK) procedure that achieves 71% ASR on ClearHarm in a black-box attack against the few-shot-prompted classifier pipeline. Finally, we also evaluate STACK in a transfer setting, achieving 33% ASR, providing initial evidence that it is feasible to design attacks with no access to the target pipeline. We conclude by suggesting specific mitigations that developers could use to thwart staged attacks.

Recently, large reasoning models have achieved impressive performance on various tasks by employing human-like deep thinking. However, the lengthy thinking process substantially increases inference overhead, making efficiency a critical bottleneck. In this work, we first demonstrate that NoThinking, which prompts the reasoning model to skip thinking and directly generate the final solution, is a better choice for relatively simple tasks in terms of both performance and efficiency. Motivated by this, we propose AdaptThink, a novel RL algorithm to teach reasoning models to choose the optimal thinking mode adaptively based on problem difficulty. Specifically, AdaptThink features two core components: (1) a constrained optimization objective that encourages the model to choose NoThinking while maintaining the overall performance; (2) an importance sampling strategy that balances Thinking and NoThinking samples during on-policy training, thereby enabling cold start and allowing the model to explore and exploit both thinking modes throughout the training process. Our experiments indicate that AdaptThink significantly reduces the inference costs while further enhancing performance. Notably, on three math datasets, AdaptThink reduces the average response length of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B by 53% and improves its accuracy by 2.4%, highlighting the promise of adaptive thinking-mode selection for optimizing the balance between reasoning quality and efficiency. Our codes and models are available at https://github.com/THU-KEG/AdaptThink.

Recent Large Reasoning Language Models (LRLMs) employ long chain-of-thought reasoning with complex reflection behaviors, typically signaled by specific trigger words (e.g., "Wait" and "Alternatively") to enhance performance. However, these reflection behaviors can lead to the overthinking problem where the generation of redundant reasoning steps that unnecessarily increase token usage, raise inference costs, and reduce practical utility. In this paper, we propose Certainty-Guided Reflection Suppression (CGRS), a novel method that mitigates overthinking in LRLMs while maintaining reasoning accuracy. CGRS operates by dynamically suppressing the model's generation of reflection triggers when it exhibits high confidence in its current response, thereby preventing redundant reflection cycles without compromising output quality. Our approach is model-agnostic, requires no retraining or architectural modifications, and can be integrated seamlessly with existing autoregressive generation pipelines. Extensive experiments across four reasoning benchmarks (i.e., AIME24, AMC23, MATH500, and GPQA-D) demonstrate CGRS's effectiveness: it reduces token usage by an average of 18.5% to 41.9% while preserving accuracy. It also achieves the optimal balance between length reduction and performance compared to state-of-the-art baselines. These results hold consistently across model architectures (e.g., DeepSeek-R1-Distill series, QwQ-32B, and Qwen3 family) and scales (4B to 32B parameters), highlighting CGRS's practical value for efficient reasoning.

Discrete adversarial attacks are symbolic perturbations to a language input that preserve the output label but lead to a prediction error. While such attacks have been extensively explored for the purpose of evaluating model robustness, their utility for improving robustness has been limited to offline augmentation only. Concretely, given a trained model, attacks are used to generate perturbed (adversarial) examples, and the model is re-trained exactly once. In this work, we address this gap and leverage discrete attacks for online augmentation, where adversarial examples are generated at every training step, adapting to the changing nature of the model. We propose (i) a new discrete attack, based on best-first search, and (ii) random sampling attacks that unlike prior work are not based on expensive search-based procedures. Surprisingly, we find that random sampling leads to impressive gains in robustness, outperforming the commonly-used offline augmentation, while leading to a speedup at training time of ~10x. Furthermore, online augmentation with search-based attacks justifies the higher training cost, significantly improving robustness on three datasets. Last, we show that our new attack substantially improves robustness compared to prior methods.

We introduce Yuan3.0 Flash, an open-source Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) MultiModal Large Language Model featuring 3.7B activated parameters and 40B total parameters, specifically designed to enhance performance on enterprise-oriented tasks while maintaining competitive capabilities on general-purpose tasks. To address the overthinking phenomenon commonly observed in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), we propose Reflection-aware Adaptive Policy Optimization (RAPO), a novel RL training algorithm that effectively regulates overthinking behaviors. In enterprise-oriented tasks such as retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), complex table understanding, and summarization, Yuan3.0 Flash consistently achieves superior performance. Moreover, it also demonstrates strong reasoning capabilities in domains such as mathematics, science, etc., attaining accuracy comparable to frontier model while requiring only approximately 1/4 to 1/2 of the average tokens. Yuan3.0 Flash has been fully open-sourced to facilitate further research and real-world deployment: https://github.com/Yuan-lab-LLM/Yuan3.0.

Recent Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) excel at complex reasoning tasks but often suffer from overthinking, generating overly long and redundant reasoning trajectories. To explore its essence, our empirical analysis reveals that LRMs are primarily limited to recognizing task properties (i.e., difficulty levels) like humans before solving the problem, leading to a one-size-fits-all reasoning process. Inspired by this, a pressing and natural question emerges: Can we explicitly bootstrap such ability to alleviate overthinking in LRMs? In this paper, we propose Think-How-to-Think (TH2T), a novel two-stage fine-tuning strategy that progressively inspires LRMs' difficulty cognition and redundancy cognition of LRMs. Specifically, we first inject difficulty hypnosis into output prefixes to guide the model toward adaptive reasoning depth, trained on a hybrid dataset mixing short and long reasoning paths. Then, we incorporate redundancy hypnosis, which supervises the intermediate reasoning steps to identify and eliminate unnecessary reasoning patterns. Experiments on 7B/14B/32B models demonstrate that TH2T significantly reduces inference costs by over 70% on easy tasks and 40% on hard tasks while maintaining performance stability. The resulting outputs exhibit clear signs of difficulty-aware capabilities and reduced redundancy (e.g., reflection and looping).

Prompt injection attacks pose a critical threat to large language models (LLMs), enabling goal hijacking and data leakage. Prompt guard models, though effective in defense, suffer from over-defense -- falsely flagging benign inputs as malicious due to trigger word bias. To address this issue, we introduce NotInject, an evaluation dataset that systematically measures over-defense across various prompt guard models. NotInject contains 339 benign samples enriched with trigger words common in prompt injection attacks, enabling fine-grained evaluation. Our results show that state-of-the-art models suffer from over-defense issues, with accuracy dropping close to random guessing levels (60%). To mitigate this, we propose InjecGuard, a novel prompt guard model that incorporates a new training strategy, Mitigating Over-defense for Free (MOF), which significantly reduces the bias on trigger words. InjecGuard demonstrates state-of-the-art performance on diverse benchmarks including NotInject, surpassing the existing best model by 30.8%, offering a robust and open-source solution for detecting prompt injection attacks. The code and datasets are released at https://github.com/SaFoLab-WISC/InjecGuard.

Longer thought, better performance: large language models with deep reasoning capabilities, particularly o1-like models, have demonstrated remarkable performance by generating extensive thought processes during inference. This trade-off reveals a potential vulnerability: adversaries could compromise model performance by forcing immediate responses without thought processes. To this end, in this paper, we introduce a novel attack scenario targeting the long thought processes of o1-like models and propose BoT (Break CoT), which can selectively break intrinsic reasoning mechanisms through backdoor attacks. BoT constructs poisoned datasets with designed triggers and injects backdoor by either supervised fine-tuning or direct preference optimization. When triggered, the model directly generates answers without thought processes, while maintaining normal reasoning capabilities for clean inputs. Extensive experiments on open-source o1-like models, including recent DeepSeek-R1, demonstrate that BoT nearly achieves high attack success rates while maintaining clean accuracy, highlighting the critical safety risk in current models. Furthermore, the relationship between task difficulty and helpfulness reveals a potential application for good, enabling users to customize model behavior based on task complexity. Code is available at https://github.com/zihao-ai/BoT{https://github.com/zihao-ai/BoT}.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have recently extended their powerful reasoning capabilities to safety checks-using chain-of-thought reasoning to decide whether a request should be answered. While this new approach offers a promising route for balancing model utility and safety, its robustness remains underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce Malicious-Educator, a benchmark that disguises extremely dangerous or malicious requests beneath seemingly legitimate educational prompts. Our experiments reveal severe security flaws in popular commercial-grade LRMs, including OpenAI o1/o3, DeepSeek-R1, and Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking. For instance, although OpenAI's o1 model initially maintains a high refusal rate of about 98%, subsequent model updates significantly compromise its safety; and attackers can easily extract criminal strategies from DeepSeek-R1 and Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking without any additional tricks. To further highlight these vulnerabilities, we propose Hijacking Chain-of-Thought (H-CoT), a universal and transferable attack method that leverages the model's own displayed intermediate reasoning to jailbreak its safety reasoning mechanism. Under H-CoT, refusal rates sharply decline-dropping from 98% to below 2%-and, in some instances, even transform initially cautious tones into ones that are willing to provide harmful content. We hope these findings underscore the urgent need for more robust safety mechanisms to preserve the benefits of advanced reasoning capabilities without compromising ethical standards.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) often produce excessively verbose reasoning traces, a phenomenon known as overthinking, which hampers both efficiency and interpretability. Prior works primarily address this issue by reducing response length, without fully examining the underlying semantic structure of the reasoning process. In this paper, we revisit overthinking by decomposing it into two distinct forms: internal redundancy, which consists of low-contribution reasoning steps within the first correct solution (FCS), and external redundancy, which refers to unnecessary continuation after the FCS. To mitigate both forms, we propose a dual-penalty reinforcement learning framework. For internal redundancy, we adopt a sliding-window semantic analysis to penalize low-gain reasoning steps that contribute little toward reaching the correct answer. For external redundancy, we penalize its proportion beyond the FCS to encourage earlier termination. Our method significantly compresses reasoning traces with minimal accuracy loss, and generalizes effectively to out-of-domain tasks such as question answering and code generation. Crucially, we find that external redundancy can be safely removed without degrading performance, whereas internal redundancy must be reduced more cautiously to avoid impairing correctness. These findings suggest that our method not only improves reasoning efficiency but also enables implicit, semantic-aware control over Chain-of-Thought length, paving the way for more concise and interpretable LRMs.

Currently, pre-trained models can be considered the default choice for a wide range of NLP tasks. Despite their SoTA results, there is practical evidence that these models may require a different number of computing layers for different input sequences, since evaluating all layers leads to overconfidence in wrong predictions (namely overthinking). This problem can potentially be solved by implementing adaptive computation time approaches, which were first designed to improve inference speed. Recently proposed PonderNet may be a promising solution for performing an early exit by treating the exit layer's index as a latent variable. However, the originally proposed exit criterion, relying on sampling from trained posterior distribution on the probability of exiting from the i-th layer, introduces major variance in exit layer indices, significantly reducing the resulting model's performance. In this paper, we propose improving PonderNet with a novel deterministic Q-exit criterion and a revisited model architecture. We adapted the proposed mechanism to ALBERT and RoBERTa and compared it with recent methods for performing an early exit. We observed that the proposed changes can be considered significant improvements on the original PonderNet architecture and outperform PABEE on a wide range of GLUE tasks. In addition, we also performed an in-depth ablation study of the proposed architecture to further understand Lambda layers and their performance.

Fast adversarial training (FAT) is beneficial for improving the adversarial robustness of neural networks. However, previous FAT work has encountered a significant issue known as catastrophic overfitting when dealing with large perturbation budgets, \ie the adversarial robustness of models declines to near zero during training. To address this, we analyze the training process of prior FAT work and observe that catastrophic overfitting is accompanied by the appearance of loss convergence outliers. Therefore, we argue a moderately smooth loss convergence process will be a stable FAT process that solves catastrophic overfitting. To obtain a smooth loss convergence process, we propose a novel oscillatory constraint (dubbed ConvergeSmooth) to limit the loss difference between adjacent epochs. The convergence stride of ConvergeSmooth is introduced to balance convergence and smoothing. Likewise, we design weight centralization without introducing additional hyperparameters other than the loss balance coefficient. Our proposed methods are attack-agnostic and thus can improve the training stability of various FAT techniques. Extensive experiments on popular datasets show that the proposed methods efficiently avoid catastrophic overfitting and outperform all previous FAT methods. Code is available at https://github.com/FAT-CS/ConvergeSmooth.

The wide-ranging applications of large language models (LLMs), especially in safety-critical domains, necessitate the proper evaluation of the LLM's adversarial robustness. This paper proposes an efficient tool to audit the LLM's adversarial robustness via a prompt-based adversarial attack (PromptAttack). PromptAttack converts adversarial textual attacks into an attack prompt that can cause the victim LLM to output the adversarial sample to fool itself. The attack prompt is composed of three important components: (1) original input (OI) including the original sample and its ground-truth label, (2) attack objective (AO) illustrating a task description of generating a new sample that can fool itself without changing the semantic meaning, and (3) attack guidance (AG) containing the perturbation instructions to guide the LLM on how to complete the task by perturbing the original sample at character, word, and sentence levels, respectively. Besides, we use a fidelity filter to ensure that PromptAttack maintains the original semantic meanings of the adversarial examples. Further, we enhance the attack power of PromptAttack by ensembling adversarial examples at different perturbation levels. Comprehensive empirical results using Llama2 and GPT-3.5 validate that PromptAttack consistently yields a much higher attack success rate compared to AdvGLUE and AdvGLUE++. Interesting findings include that a simple emoji can easily mislead GPT-3.5 to make wrong predictions.

The research builds and evaluates the adversarial potential to introduce copied code or hallucinated AI recommendations for malicious code in popular code repositories. While foundational large language models (LLMs) from OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic guard against both harmful behaviors and toxic strings, previous work on math solutions that embed harmful prompts demonstrate that the guardrails may differ between expert contexts. These loopholes would appear in mixture of expert's models when the context of the question changes and may offer fewer malicious training examples to filter toxic comments or recommended offensive actions. The present work demonstrates that foundational models may refuse to propose destructive actions correctly when prompted overtly but may unfortunately drop their guard when presented with a sudden change of context, like solving a computer programming challenge. We show empirical examples with trojan-hosting repositories like GitHub, NPM, NuGet, and popular content delivery networks (CDN) like jsDelivr which amplify the attack surface. In the LLM's directives to be helpful, example recommendations propose application programming interface (API) endpoints which a determined domain-squatter could acquire and setup attack mobile infrastructure that triggers from the naively copied code. We compare this attack to previous work on context-shifting and contrast the attack surface as a novel version of "living off the land" attacks in the malware literature. In the latter case, foundational language models can hijack otherwise innocent user prompts to recommend actions that violate their owners' safety policies when posed directly without the accompanying coding support request.

Recently, Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have gradually become a research hotspot due to their outstanding performance in handling complex tasks. Among them, DeepSeek R1 has garnered significant attention for its exceptional performance and open-source nature, driving advancements in the research of R1-style LRMs. Unlike traditional Large Language Models (LLMs), these models enhance logical deduction and decision-making capabilities during reasoning by incorporating mechanisms such as long chain-of-thought and self-reflection through reinforcement learning. However, with the widespread application of these models, the problem of overthinking has gradually emerged. Specifically, when generating answers, these models often construct excessively long reasoning chains with redundant or repetitive steps, which leads to reduced reasoning efficiency and may affect the accuracy of the final answer. To this end, various efficient reasoning methods have been proposed, aiming to reduce the length of reasoning paths without compromising model performance and reasoning capability. By reviewing the current research advancements in the field of efficient reasoning methods systematically, we categorize existing works into two main directions based on the lens of single-model optimization versus model collaboration: (1) Efficient Reasoning with Single Model, which focuses on improving the reasoning efficiency of individual models; and (2) Efficient Reasoning with Model Collaboration, which explores optimizing reasoning paths through collaboration among multiple models. Besides, we maintain a public GitHub repository that tracks the latest progress in efficient reasoning methods.

Text-to-Image (T2I) models have achieved remarkable success in generating visual content from text inputs. Although multiple safety alignment strategies have been proposed to prevent harmful outputs, they often lead to overly cautious behavior -- rejecting even benign prompts -- a phenomenon known as over-refusal that reduces the practical utility of T2I models. Despite over-refusal having been observed in practice, there is no large-scale benchmark that systematically evaluates this phenomenon for T2I models. In this paper, we present an automatic workflow to construct synthetic evaluation data, resulting in OVERT (OVEr-Refusal evaluation on Text-to-image models), the first large-scale benchmark for assessing over-refusal behaviors in T2I models. OVERT includes 4,600 seemingly harmful but benign prompts across nine safety-related categories, along with 1,785 genuinely harmful prompts (OVERT-unsafe) to evaluate the safety-utility trade-off. Using OVERT, we evaluate several leading T2I models and find that over-refusal is a widespread issue across various categories (Figure 1), underscoring the need for further research to enhance the safety alignment of T2I models without compromising their functionality. As a preliminary attempt to reduce over-refusal, we explore prompt rewriting; however, we find it often compromises faithfulness to the meaning of the original prompts. Finally, we demonstrate the flexibility of our generation framework in accommodating diverse safety requirements by generating customized evaluation data adapting to user-defined policies.

Multimodal contrastive learning methods like CLIP train on noisy and uncurated training datasets. This is cheaper than labeling datasets manually, and even improves out-of-distribution robustness. We show that this practice makes backdoor and poisoning attacks a significant threat. By poisoning just 0.01% of a dataset (e.g., just 300 images of the 3 million-example Conceptual Captions dataset), we can cause the model to misclassify test images by overlaying a small patch. Targeted poisoning attacks, whereby the model misclassifies a particular test input with an adversarially-desired label, are even easier requiring control of 0.0001% of the dataset (e.g., just three out of the 3 million images). Our attacks call into question whether training on noisy and uncurated Internet scrapes is desirable.

As Test-Time Scaling emerges as an active research focus in the large language model community, advanced post-training methods increasingly emphasize extending chain-of-thought (CoT) generation length, thereby enhancing reasoning capabilities to approach Deepseek R1-like reasoning models. However, recent studies reveal that reasoning models (even Qwen3) consistently exhibit excessive thought redundancy in CoT generation. This overthinking issue arises from the inherent limitations of conventional outcome-reward reinforcement learning, which systematically overlooks the regulation of intermediate reasoning processes. This paper introduces Serial-Group Decaying-Reward Policy Optimization (S-GRPO), a novel reinforcement learning paradigm that enables models to implicitly evaluate the sufficiency of intermediate reasoning steps, thereby facilitating early exit in CoT generation. Unlike GRPO, which samples multiple possible reasoning paths in parallel (parallel group), S-GRPO only samples one reasoning path and serially selects multiple temporal positions from the path to exit thinking and directly generate answers (serial group). For correct answers within a serial group, rewards gradually decrease based on the exit positions along the reasoning path from front to back. This design encourages the model to produce more accurate and concise thoughts, while also incentivizing early thinking termination when appropriate. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that S-GRPO is compatible with state-of-the-art reasoning models, including Qwen3 and Deepseek-distill. Across diverse benchmarks such as GSM8K, AIME 2024, AMC 2023, MATH-500, and GPQA Diamond, S-GRPO achieves a substantial reduction in sequence length (35.4% - 61.1%) while simultaneously improving accuracy (absolute 0.72% - 6.08%).

Reasoning models generate chain-of-thought (CoT) tokens before their final output, but how this affects their vulnerability to jailbreak attacks remains unclear. While traditional language models make refusal decisions at the prompt-response boundary, we find evidence that DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B makes these decisions within its CoT generation. We identify a linear direction in activation space during CoT token generation that predicts whether the model will refuse or comply -- termed the "caution" direction because it corresponds to cautious reasoning patterns in the generated text. Ablating this direction from model activations increases harmful compliance, effectively jailbreaking the model. We additionally show that intervening only on CoT token activations suffices to control final outputs, and that incorporating this direction into prompt-based attacks improves success rates. Our findings suggest that the chain-of-thought itself is a promising new target for adversarial manipulation in reasoning models. Code available at https://github.com/ky295/reasoning-manipulation

Recent work shows that, beyond discrete reasoning through explicit chain-of-thought steps, which are limited by the boundaries of natural languages, large language models (LLMs) can also reason continuously in latent space, allowing richer information per step and thereby improving token efficiency. Despite this promise, latent reasoning still faces two challenges, especially in training-free settings: 1) purely latent reasoning broadens the search distribution by maintaining multiple implicit paths, which diffuses probability mass, introduces noise, and impedes convergence to a single high-confidence solution, thereby hurting accuracy; and 2) overthinking persists even without explicit text, wasting tokens and degrading efficiency. To address these issues, we introduce SwiReasoning, a training-free framework for LLM reasoning which features two key innovations: 1) SwiReasoning dynamically switches between explicit and latent reasoning, guided by block-wise confidence estimated from entropy trends in next-token distributions, to balance exploration and exploitation and promote timely convergence. 2) By limiting the maximum number of thinking-block switches, SwiReasoning curbs overthinking and improves token efficiency across varying problem difficulties. On widely used mathematics and STEM benchmarks, SwiReasoning consistently improves average accuracy by 1.5%-2.8% across reasoning LLMs of different model families and scales. Furthermore, under constrained budgets, SwiReasoning improves average token efficiency by 56%-79%, with larger gains as budgets tighten.

Recent Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable progress on task-specific benchmarks, yet their evaluation methods remain constrained by isolated problem-solving paradigms. Existing benchmarks predominantly assess single-question reasoning through sequential testing, resulting critical limitations: (1) vulnerability to data contamination and less challenging (e.g., DeepSeek-R1 achieves 97.0% on MATH500), forcing costly and perpetual creation of new questions with large human efforts, (2) failure to evaluate models under multi-context pressure, a key requirement for real-world deployment. To bridge this gap, we present REST (Reasoning Evaluation through Simultaneous Testing), a stress-testing framework that concurrently exposes LRMs to multiple problems simultaneously. Beyond basic reasoning, REST specifically evaluates several under-tested capabilities: contextual priority allocation, cross-problem interference resistance, and dynamic cognitive load management. Our evaluation reveals several striking findings: Even state-of-the-art (SOTA) models like DeepSeek-R1 exhibit substantial performance degradation under stress testing. Crucially, REST demonstrates stronger discriminative power than existing benchmarks, revealing pronounced performance differences among models that exhibit similar, near-ceiling performance under single-question evaluations. Some key mechanistic insights emerge from our analysis: (1) the "overthinking trap" is a critical factor contributing to the performance degradation; (2) the models trained with "long2short" technique preserve more accuracy of their single-problem performance under REST, outperforming standard-trained counterparts. These results establish REST as a cost-efficient, future-proof evaluation paradigm that better reflects real-world reasoning demands while reducing reliance on continuous human annotation.

As large language models become more prevalent, their possible harmful or inappropriate responses are a cause for concern. This paper introduces a unique dataset containing adversarial examples in the form of questions, which we call AttaQ, designed to provoke such harmful or inappropriate responses. We assess the efficacy of our dataset by analyzing the vulnerabilities of various models when subjected to it. Additionally, we introduce a novel automatic approach for identifying and naming vulnerable semantic regions - input semantic areas for which the model is likely to produce harmful outputs. This is achieved through the application of specialized clustering techniques that consider both the semantic similarity of the input attacks and the harmfulness of the model's responses. Automatically identifying vulnerable semantic regions enhances the evaluation of model weaknesses, facilitating targeted improvements to its safety mechanisms and overall reliability.

Hallucination is often regarded as a major impediment for using large language models (LLMs), especially for knowledge-intensive tasks. Even when the training corpus consists solely of true statements, language models still generate hallucinations in the form of amalgamations of multiple facts. We coin this phenomenon as ``knowledge overshadowing'': when we query knowledge from a language model with multiple conditions, some conditions overshadow others, leading to hallucinated outputs. This phenomenon partially stems from training data imbalance, which we verify on both pretrained models and fine-tuned models, over a wide range of LM model families and sizes.From a theoretical point of view, knowledge overshadowing can be interpreted as over-generalization of the dominant conditions (patterns). We show that the hallucination rate grows with both the imbalance ratio (between the popular and unpopular condition) and the length of dominant condition description, consistent with our derived generalization bound. Finally, we propose to utilize overshadowing conditions as a signal to catch hallucination before it is produced, along with a training-free self-contrastive decoding method to alleviate hallucination during inference. Our proposed approach showcases up to 82% F1 for hallucination anticipation and 11.2% to 39.4% hallucination control, with different models and datasets.

Recent work have demonstrated that robustness (to "corruption") can be at odds with generalization. Adversarial training, for instance, aims to reduce the problematic susceptibility of modern neural networks to small data perturbations. Surprisingly, overfitting is a major concern in adversarial training despite being mostly absent in standard training. We provide here theoretical evidence for this peculiar "robust overfitting" phenomenon. Subsequently, we advance a novel distributionally robust loss function bridging robustness and generalization. We demonstrate both theoretically as well as empirically the loss to enjoy a certified level of robustness against two common types of corruption--data evasion and poisoning attacks--while ensuring guaranteed generalization. We show through careful numerical experiments that our resulting holistic robust (HR) training procedure yields SOTA performance. Finally, we indicate that HR training can be interpreted as a direct extension of adversarial training and comes with a negligible additional computational burden. A ready-to-use python library implementing our algorithm is available at https://github.com/RyanLucas3/HR_Neural_Networks.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has been shown to enhance the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), enabling the development of large reasoning models (LRMs). However, LRMs such as DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI o1 often generate verbose responses containing redundant or irrelevant reasoning step-a phenomenon known as overthinking-which substantially increases computational costs. Prior efforts to mitigate this issue commonly incorporate length penalties into the reward function, but we find they frequently suffer from two critical issues: length collapse and training collapse, resulting in sub-optimal performance. To address them, we propose a pipeline for training a Conciseness Reward Model (CRM) that scores the conciseness of reasoning path. Additionally, we introduce a novel reward formulation named Conciseness Reward Function (CRF) with explicit dependency between the outcome reward and conciseness score, thereby fostering both more effective and more efficient reasoning. From a theoretical standpoint, we demonstrate the superiority of the new reward from the perspective of variance reduction and improved convergence properties. Besides, on the practical side, extensive experiments on five mathematical benchmark datasets demonstrate the method's effectiveness and token efficiency, which achieves an 8.1% accuracy improvement and a 19.9% reduction in response token length on Qwen2.5-7B. Furthermore, the method generalizes well to other LLMs including Llama and Mistral. The implementation code and datasets are publicly available for reproduction: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/CRM.

Model inversion (MI) attacks aim to infer and reconstruct private training data by abusing access to a model. MI attacks have raised concerns about the leaking of sensitive information (e.g. private face images used in training a face recognition system). Recently, several algorithms for MI have been proposed to improve the attack performance. In this work, we revisit MI, study two fundamental issues pertaining to all state-of-the-art (SOTA) MI algorithms, and propose solutions to these issues which lead to a significant boost in attack performance for all SOTA MI. In particular, our contributions are two-fold: 1) We analyze the optimization objective of SOTA MI algorithms, argue that the objective is sub-optimal for achieving MI, and propose an improved optimization objective that boosts attack performance significantly. 2) We analyze "MI overfitting", show that it would prevent reconstructed images from learning semantics of training data, and propose a novel "model augmentation" idea to overcome this issue. Our proposed solutions are simple and improve all SOTA MI attack accuracy significantly. E.g., in the standard CelebA benchmark, our solutions improve accuracy by 11.8% and achieve for the first time over 90% attack accuracy. Our findings demonstrate that there is a clear risk of leaking sensitive information from deep learning models. We urge serious consideration to be given to the privacy implications. Our code, demo, and models are available at https://ngoc-nguyen-0.github.io/re-thinking_model_inversion_attacks/

Despite their strong performance on reasoning tasks, large reasoning models (LRMs) often suffer from overthinking, producing unnecessarily long outputs and incurring high end-to-end latency, a significant limitation to their real-world deployment. To address overthinking, early-exit mechanisms have been proposed to terminate reasoning before typical completion, showing that this approach can effectively shorten generation length with minimal impact on accuracy. However, their reliance on probing mechanisms introduces a detection overhead that limits their end-to-end latency gains and compromises their generalizability across diverse problems. Inspired by the use of hidden states in speculative decoding, we propose SpecExit, a novel framework that predicts both future tokens and an early-exit signal directly from a lightweight draft model without probing overhead. Our method offers significant improvements, reducing average generation length by 66\% and achieving a 2.5x speedup in end-to-end latency compared to the speculative decoding baseline, without compromising accuracy. Our method leverages the inherent signals from hidden states to provide effective early-exit signals, suggesting broader use of hidden states for efficient reasoning. Our code is available at https://github.com/Tencent/AngelSlim.

We present Twin Answer Sentences Attack (TASA), an adversarial attack method for question answering (QA) models that produces fluent and grammatical adversarial contexts while maintaining gold answers. Despite phenomenal progress on general adversarial attacks, few works have investigated the vulnerability and attack specifically for QA models. In this work, we first explore the biases in the existing models and discover that they mainly rely on keyword matching between the question and context, and ignore the relevant contextual relations for answer prediction. Based on two biases above, TASA attacks the target model in two folds: (1) lowering the model's confidence on the gold answer with a perturbed answer sentence; (2) misguiding the model towards a wrong answer with a distracting answer sentence. Equipped with designed beam search and filtering methods, TASA can generate more effective attacks than existing textual attack methods while sustaining the quality of contexts, in extensive experiments on five QA datasets and human evaluations.

Thinking LLMs solve complex tasks at the expense of increased compute and overthinking on simpler problems, while non-thinking LLMs are faster and cheaper but underthink on harder reasoning problems. This has led to the development of separate thinking and non-thinking LLM variants, leaving the onus of selecting the optimal model for each query on the end user. In this work, we introduce OptimalThinkingBench, a unified benchmark that jointly evaluates overthinking and underthinking in LLMs and also encourages the development of optimally-thinking models that balance performance and efficiency. Our benchmark comprises two sub-benchmarks: OverthinkingBench, featuring simple queries in 72 domains, and UnderthinkingBench, containing 11 challenging reasoning tasks. Using novel thinking-adjusted accuracy metrics, we perform extensive evaluation of 33 different thinking and non-thinking models and show that no model is able to optimally think on our benchmark. Thinking models often overthink for hundreds of tokens on the simplest user queries without improving performance. In contrast, large non-thinking models underthink, often falling short of much smaller thinking models. We further explore several methods to encourage optimal thinking, but find that these approaches often improve on one sub-benchmark at the expense of the other, highlighting the need for better unified and optimal models in the future.

The vulnerability of Vision Large Language Models (VLLMs) to jailbreak attacks appears as no surprise. However, recent defense mechanisms against these attacks have reached near-saturation performance on benchmark evaluations, often with minimal effort. This dual high performance in both attack and defense raises a fundamental and perplexing paradox. To gain a deep understanding of this issue and thus further help strengthen the trustworthiness of VLLMs, this paper makes three key contributions: i) One tentative explanation for VLLMs being prone to jailbreak attacks--inclusion of vision inputs, as well as its in-depth analysis. ii) The recognition of a largely ignored problem in existing defense mechanisms--over-prudence. The problem causes these defense methods to exhibit unintended abstention, even in the presence of benign inputs, thereby undermining their reliability in faithfully defending against attacks. iii) A simple safety-aware method--LLM-Pipeline. Our method repurposes the more advanced guardrails of LLMs on the shelf, serving as an effective alternative detector prior to VLLM response. Last but not least, we find that the two representative evaluation methods for jailbreak often exhibit chance agreement. This limitation makes it potentially misleading when evaluating attack strategies or defense mechanisms. We believe the findings from this paper offer useful insights to rethink the foundational development of VLLM safety with respect to benchmark datasets, defense strategies, and evaluation methods.

This paper introduces a new method for adversarial attacks on large language models (LLMs) called the Single-Turn Crescendo Attack (STCA). Building on the multi-turn crescendo attack method introduced by Russinovich, Salem, and Eldan (2024), which gradually escalates the context to provoke harmful responses, the STCA achieves similar outcomes in a single interaction. By condensing the escalation into a single, well-crafted prompt, the STCA bypasses typical moderation filters that LLMs use to prevent inappropriate outputs. This technique reveals vulnerabilities in current LLMs and emphasizes the importance of stronger safeguards in responsible AI (RAI). The STCA offers a novel method that has not been previously explored.

Despite the success of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) in many academic benchmarks for computer vision tasks, their application in the real-world is still facing fundamental challenges. One of these open problems is the inherent lack of robustness, unveiled by the striking effectiveness of adversarial attacks. Current attack methods are able to manipulate the network's prediction by adding specific but small amounts of noise to the input. In turn, adversarial training (AT) aims to achieve robustness against such attacks and ideally a better model generalization ability by including adversarial samples in the trainingset. However, an in-depth analysis of the resulting robust models beyond adversarial robustness is still pending. In this paper, we empirically analyze a variety of adversarially trained models that achieve high robust accuracies when facing state-of-the-art attacks and we show that AT has an interesting side-effect: it leads to models that are significantly less overconfident with their decisions, even on clean data than non-robust models. Further, our analysis of robust models shows that not only AT but also the model's building blocks (like activation functions and pooling) have a strong influence on the models' prediction confidences. Data & Project website: https://github.com/GeJulia/robustness_confidences_evaluation

We introduce Doublespeak, a simple in-context representation hijacking attack against large language models (LLMs). The attack works by systematically replacing a harmful keyword (e.g., bomb) with a benign token (e.g., carrot) across multiple in-context examples, provided a prefix to a harmful request. We demonstrate that this substitution leads to the internal representation of the benign token converging toward that of the harmful one, effectively embedding the harmful semantics under a euphemism. As a result, superficially innocuous prompts (e.g., ``How to build a carrot?'') are internally interpreted as disallowed instructions (e.g., ``How to build a bomb?''), thereby bypassing the model's safety alignment. We use interpretability tools to show that this semantic overwrite emerges layer by layer, with benign meanings in early layers converging into harmful semantics in later ones. Doublespeak is optimization-free, broadly transferable across model families, and achieves strong success rates on closed-source and open-source systems, reaching 74\% ASR on Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct with a single-sentence context override. Our findings highlight a new attack surface in the latent space of LLMs, revealing that current alignment strategies are insufficient and should instead operate at the representation level.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) excel at complex tasks using Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. However, their tendency to overthinking leads to unnecessarily lengthy reasoning chains, dramatically increasing inference costs. To mitigate this issue, we introduce VeriThinker, a novel approach for CoT compression. Unlike conventional methods that fine-tune LRMs directly on the original reasoning task using synthetic concise CoT data, we innovatively fine-tune the model solely through an auxiliary verification task. By training LRMs to accurately verify the correctness of CoT solutions, the LRMs inherently become more discerning about the necessity of subsequent self-reflection steps, thereby effectively suppressing overthinking. Extensive experiments validate that VeriThinker substantially reduces reasoning chain lengths while maintaining or even slightly improving accuracy. When applied to DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B, our approach reduces reasoning tokens on MATH500 from 3790 to 2125 while improving accuracy by 0.8% (94.0% to 94.8%), and on AIME25, tokens decrease from 14321 to 10287 with a 2.1% accuracy gain (38.7% to 40.8%). Additionally, our experiments demonstrate that VeriThinker can also be zero-shot generalized to speculative reasoning. Code is available at https://github.com/czg1225/VeriThinker

Prompt-based learning paradigm bridges the gap between pre-training and fine-tuning, and works effectively under the few-shot setting. However, we find that this learning paradigm inherits the vulnerability from the pre-training stage, where model predictions can be misled by inserting certain triggers into the text. In this paper, we explore this universal vulnerability by either injecting backdoor triggers or searching for adversarial triggers on pre-trained language models using only plain text. In both scenarios, we demonstrate that our triggers can totally control or severely decrease the performance of prompt-based models fine-tuned on arbitrary downstream tasks, reflecting the universal vulnerability of the prompt-based learning paradigm. Further experiments show that adversarial triggers have good transferability among language models. We also find conventional fine-tuning models are not vulnerable to adversarial triggers constructed from pre-trained language models. We conclude by proposing a potential solution to mitigate our attack methods. Code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/leix28/prompt-universal-vulnerability

Backdoor attacks have become a significant threat to the pre-training and deployment of deep neural networks (DNNs). Although numerous methods for detecting and mitigating backdoor attacks have been proposed, most rely on identifying and eliminating the ``shortcut" created by the backdoor, which links a specific source class to a target class. However, these approaches can be easily circumvented by designing multiple backdoor triggers that create shortcuts everywhere and therefore nowhere specific. In this study, we explore the concept of Multi-Trigger Backdoor Attacks (MTBAs), where multiple adversaries leverage different types of triggers to poison the same dataset. By proposing and investigating three types of multi-trigger attacks including parallel, sequential, and hybrid attacks, we demonstrate that 1) multiple triggers can coexist, overwrite, or cross-activate one another, and 2) MTBAs easily break the prevalent shortcut assumption underlying most existing backdoor detection/removal methods, rendering them ineffective. Given the security risk posed by MTBAs, we have created a multi-trigger backdoor poisoning dataset to facilitate future research on detecting and mitigating these attacks, and we also discuss potential defense strategies against MTBAs. Our code is available at https://github.com/bboylyg/Multi-Trigger-Backdoor-Attacks.

Humans are prone to cognitive distortions -- biased thinking patterns that lead to exaggerated responses to specific stimuli, albeit in very different contexts. This paper demonstrates that advanced Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) exhibit similar tendencies. While these models are designed to respond queries under safety mechanism, they sometimes reject harmless queries in the presence of certain visual stimuli, disregarding the benign nature of their contexts. As the initial step in investigating this behavior, we identify three types of stimuli that trigger the oversensitivity of existing MLLMs: Exaggerated Risk, Negated Harm, and Counterintuitive Interpretation. To systematically evaluate MLLMs' oversensitivity to these stimuli, we propose the Multimodal OverSenSitivity Benchmark (MOSSBench). This toolkit consists of 300 manually collected benign multimodal queries, cross-verified by third-party reviewers (AMT). Empirical studies using MOSSBench on 20 MLLMs reveal several insights: (1). Oversensitivity is prevalent among SOTA MLLMs, with refusal rates reaching up to 76% for harmless queries. (2). Safer models are more oversensitive: increasing safety may inadvertently raise caution and conservatism in the model's responses. (3). Different types of stimuli tend to cause errors at specific stages -- perception, intent reasoning, and safety judgement -- in the response process of MLLMs. These findings highlight the need for refined safety mechanisms that balance caution with contextually appropriate responses, improving the reliability of MLLMs in real-world applications. We make our project available at https://turningpoint-ai.github.io/MOSSBench/.

While large reasoning models demonstrate strong performance on complex tasks, they lack the ability to adjust reasoning token usage based on task difficulty. This often leads to the "overthinking" problem -- excessive and unnecessary reasoning -- which, although potentially mitigated by human intervention to control the token budget, still fundamentally contradicts the goal of achieving fully autonomous AI. In this work, we propose Adaptive Reasoning Model (ARM), a reasoning model capable of adaptively selecting appropriate reasoning formats based on the task at hand. These formats include three efficient ones -- Direct Answer, Short CoT, and Code -- as well as a more elaborate format, Long CoT. To train ARM, we introduce Ada-GRPO, an adaptation of Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), which addresses the format collapse issue in traditional GRPO. Ada-GRPO enables ARM to achieve high token efficiency, reducing tokens by an average of 30%, and up to 70%, while maintaining performance comparable to the model that relies solely on Long CoT. Furthermore, not only does it improve inference efficiency through reduced token generation, but it also brings a 2x speedup in training. In addition to the default Adaptive Mode, ARM supports two additional reasoning modes: 1) Instruction-Guided Mode, which allows users to explicitly specify the reasoning format via special tokens -- ideal when the appropriate format is known for a batch of tasks. 2) Consensus-Guided Mode, which aggregates the outputs of the three efficient formats and resorts to Long CoT in case of disagreement, prioritizing performance with higher token usage.

To achieve reliable, robust, and safe AI systems, it is vital to implement fallback strategies when AI predictions cannot be trusted. Certifiers for neural networks are a reliable way to check the robustness of these predictions. They guarantee for some predictions that a certain class of manipulations or attacks could not have changed the outcome. For the remaining predictions without guarantees, the method abstains from making a prediction, and a fallback strategy needs to be invoked, which typically incurs additional costs, can require a human operator, or even fail to provide any prediction. While this is a key concept towards safe and secure AI, we show for the first time that this approach comes with its own security risks, as such fallback strategies can be deliberately triggered by an adversary. In addition to naturally occurring abstains for some inputs and perturbations, the adversary can use training-time attacks to deliberately trigger the fallback with high probability. This transfers the main system load onto the fallback, reducing the overall system's integrity and/or availability. We design two novel availability attacks, which show the practical relevance of these threats. For example, adding 1% poisoned data during training is sufficient to trigger the fallback and hence make the model unavailable for up to 100% of all inputs by inserting the trigger. Our extensive experiments across multiple datasets, model architectures, and certifiers demonstrate the broad applicability of these attacks. An initial investigation into potential defenses shows that current approaches are insufficient to mitigate the issue, highlighting the need for new, specific solutions.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong reasoning performance by emitting long chains of thought. Yet, these verbose traces slow down inference and often drift into unnecessary detail, known as the overthinking phenomenon. To better understand LRMs' behavior, we systematically analyze the token-level misalignment between reasoning and non-reasoning models. While it is expected that their primary difference lies in the stylistic "thinking cues", LRMs uniquely exhibit two pivotal, previously under-explored phenomena: a Global Misalignment Rebound, where their divergence from non-reasoning models persists or even grows as response length increases, and more critically, a Local Misalignment Diminish, where the misalignment concentrates at the "thinking cues" each sentence starts with but rapidly declines in the remaining of the sentence. Motivated by the Local Misalignment Diminish, we propose FoReaL-Decoding, a collaborative fast-slow thinking decoding method for cost-quality trade-off. In FoReaL-Decoding, a Leading model leads the first few tokens for each sentence, and then a weaker draft model completes the following tokens to the end of each sentence. FoReaL-Decoding adopts a stochastic gate to smoothly interpolate between the small and the large model. On four popular math-reasoning benchmarks (AIME24, GPQA-Diamond, MATH500, AMC23), FoReaL-Decoding reduces theoretical FLOPs by 30 to 50% and trims CoT length by up to 40%, while preserving 86 to 100% of model performance. These results establish FoReaL-Decoding as a simple, plug-and-play route to controllable cost-quality trade-offs in reasoning-centric tasks.

The emergence of reasoning models and their integration into practical AI chat bots has led to breakthroughs in solving advanced math, deep search, and extractive question answering problems that requires a complex and multi-step thought process. Yet, a complete understanding of why these models hallucinate more than general purpose language models is missing. In this investigative study, we systematicallyexplore reasoning failures of contemporary language models on multi-hop question answering tasks. We introduce a novel, nuanced error categorization framework that examines failures across three critical dimensions: the diversity and uniqueness of source documents involved ("hops"), completeness in capturing relevant information ("coverage"), and cognitive inefficiency ("overthinking"). Through rigorous hu-man annotation, supported by complementary automated metrics, our exploration uncovers intricate error patterns often hidden by accuracy-centric evaluations. This investigative approach provides deeper insights into the cognitive limitations of current models and offers actionable guidance toward enhancing reasoning fidelity, transparency, and robustness in future language modeling efforts.

A membership inference attack allows an adversary to query a trained machine learning model to predict whether or not a particular example was contained in the model's training dataset. These attacks are currently evaluated using average-case "accuracy" metrics that fail to characterize whether the attack can confidently identify any members of the training set. We argue that attacks should instead be evaluated by computing their true-positive rate at low (e.g., <0.1%) false-positive rates, and find most prior attacks perform poorly when evaluated in this way. To address this we develop a Likelihood Ratio Attack (LiRA) that carefully combines multiple ideas from the literature. Our attack is 10x more powerful at low false-positive rates, and also strictly dominates prior attacks on existing metrics.

We introduce the Adversarial Confusion Attack, a new class of threats against multimodal large language models (MLLMs). Unlike jailbreaks or targeted misclassification, the goal is to induce systematic disruption that makes the model generate incoherent or confidently incorrect outputs. Practical applications include embedding such adversarial images into websites to prevent MLLM-powered AI Agents from operating reliably. The proposed attack maximizes next-token entropy using a small ensemble of open-source MLLMs. In the white-box setting, we show that a single adversarial image can disrupt all models in the ensemble, both in the full-image and Adversarial CAPTCHA settings. Despite relying on a basic adversarial technique (PGD), the attack generates perturbations that transfer to both unseen open-source (e.g., Qwen3-VL) and proprietary (e.g., GPT-5.1) models.

Modern neural networks are known to give overconfident prediction for out-of-distribution inputs when deployed in the open world. It is common practice to leverage a surrogate outlier dataset to regularize the model during training, and recent studies emphasize the role of uncertainty in designing the sampling strategy for outlier dataset. However, the OOD samples selected solely based on predictive uncertainty can be biased towards certain types, which may fail to capture the full outlier distribution. In this work, we empirically show that diversity is critical in sampling outliers for OOD detection performance. Motivated by the observation, we propose a straightforward and novel sampling strategy named DOS (Diverse Outlier Sampling) to select diverse and informative outliers. Specifically, we cluster the normalized features at each iteration, and the most informative outlier from each cluster is selected for model training with absent category loss. With DOS, the sampled outliers efficiently shape a globally compact decision boundary between ID and OOD data. Extensive experiments demonstrate the superiority of DOS, reducing the average FPR95 by up to 25.79% on CIFAR-100 with TI-300K.

Recent work in open-domain question answering (ODQA) has shown that adversarial poisoning of the input contexts can cause large drops in accuracy for production systems. However, little to no work has proposed methods to defend against these attacks. To do so, we introduce a new method that uses query augmentation to search for a diverse set of retrieved passages that could answer the original question. We integrate these new passages into the model through the design of a novel confidence method, comparing the predicted answer to its appearance in the retrieved contexts (what we call Confidence from Answer Redundancy, e.g. CAR). Together these methods allow for a simple but effective way to defend against poisoning attacks and provide gains of 5-20% exact match across varying levels of data poisoning.

Single-step adversarial training (SSAT) has demonstrated the potential to achieve both efficiency and robustness. However, SSAT suffers from catastrophic overfitting (CO), a phenomenon that leads to a severely distorted classifier, making it vulnerable to multi-step adversarial attacks. In this work, we observe that some adversarial examples generated on the SSAT-trained network exhibit anomalous behaviour, that is, although these training samples are generated by the inner maximization process, their associated loss decreases instead, which we named abnormal adversarial examples (AAEs). Upon further analysis, we discover a close relationship between AAEs and classifier distortion, as both the number and outputs of AAEs undergo a significant variation with the onset of CO. Given this observation, we re-examine the SSAT process and uncover that before the occurrence of CO, the classifier already displayed a slight distortion, indicated by the presence of few AAEs. Furthermore, the classifier directly optimizing these AAEs will accelerate its distortion, and correspondingly, the variation of AAEs will sharply increase as a result. In such a vicious circle, the classifier rapidly becomes highly distorted and manifests as CO within a few iterations. These observations motivate us to eliminate CO by hindering the generation of AAEs. Specifically, we design a novel method, termed Abnormal Adversarial Examples Regularization (AAER), which explicitly regularizes the variation of AAEs to hinder the classifier from becoming distorted. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can effectively eliminate CO and further boost adversarial robustness with negligible additional computational overhead.

Despite the remarkable generation capabilities of diffusion models, recent studies have shown that they can memorize and create harmful content when given specific text prompts. Although fine-tuning approaches have been developed to mitigate this issue by unlearning harmful concepts, these methods can be easily circumvented through jailbreaking attacks. This implies that the harmful concept has not been fully erased from the model. However, existing jailbreaking attack methods, while effective, lack interpretability regarding why unlearned models still retain the concept, thereby hindering the development of defense strategies. In this work, we address these limitations by proposing an attack method that learns an orthogonal set of interpretable attack token embeddings. The attack token embeddings can be decomposed into human-interpretable textual elements, revealing that unlearned models still retain the target concept through implicit textual components. Furthermore, these attack token embeddings are powerful and transferable across text prompts, initial noises, and unlearned models, emphasizing that unlearned models are more vulnerable than expected. Finally, building on the insights from our interpretable attack, we develop a defense method to protect unlearned models against both our proposed and existing jailbreaking attacks. Extensive experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack and defense strategies.

Contrastive Learning (CL) has attracted enormous attention due to its remarkable capability in unsupervised representation learning. However, recent works have revealed the vulnerability of CL to backdoor attacks: the feature extractor could be misled to embed backdoored data close to an attack target class, thus fooling the downstream predictor to misclassify it as the target. Existing attacks usually adopt a fixed trigger pattern and poison the training set with trigger-injected data, hoping for the feature extractor to learn the association between trigger and target class. However, we find that such fixed trigger design fails to effectively associate trigger-injected data with target class in the embedding space due to special CL mechanisms, leading to a limited attack success rate (ASR). This phenomenon motivates us to find a better backdoor trigger design tailored for CL framework. In this paper, we propose a bi-level optimization approach to achieve this goal, where the inner optimization simulates the CL dynamics of a surrogate victim, and the outer optimization enforces the backdoor trigger to stay close to the target throughout the surrogate CL procedure. Extensive experiments show that our attack can achieve a higher attack success rate (e.g., 99% ASR on ImageNet-100) with a very low poisoning rate (1%). Besides, our attack can effectively evade existing state-of-the-art defenses. Code is available at: https://github.com/SWY666/SSL-backdoor-BLTO.

The bulk of existing research in defending against adversarial examples focuses on defending against a single (typically bounded Lp-norm) attack, but for a practical setting, machine learning (ML) models should be robust to a wide variety of attacks. In this paper, we present the first unified framework for considering multiple attacks against ML models. Our framework is able to model different levels of learner's knowledge about the test-time adversary, allowing us to model robustness against unforeseen attacks and robustness against unions of attacks. Using our framework, we present the first leaderboard, MultiRobustBench, for benchmarking multiattack evaluation which captures performance across attack types and attack strengths. We evaluate the performance of 16 defended models for robustness against a set of 9 different attack types, including Lp-based threat models, spatial transformations, and color changes, at 20 different attack strengths (180 attacks total). Additionally, we analyze the state of current defenses against multiple attacks. Our analysis shows that while existing defenses have made progress in terms of average robustness across the set of attacks used, robustness against the worst-case attack is still a big open problem as all existing models perform worse than random guessing.

Components of cyber physical systems, which affect real-world processes, are often exposed to the internet. Replacing conventional control methods with Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) in energy systems is an active area of research, as these systems become increasingly complex with the advent of renewable energy sources and the desire to improve their efficiency. Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) are vulnerable to specific perturbations of their inputs or features, called adversarial examples. These perturbations are difficult to detect when properly regularized, but have significant effects on the ANN's output. Because DRL uses ANN to map optimal actions to observations, they are similarly vulnerable to adversarial examples. This work proposes a novel attack technique for continuous control using Group Difference Logits loss with a bifurcation layer. By combining aspects of targeted and untargeted attacks, the attack significantly increases the impact compared to an untargeted attack, with drastically smaller distortions than an optimally targeted attack. We demonstrate the impacts of powerful gradient-based attacks in a realistic smart energy environment, show how the impacts change with different DRL agents and training procedures, and use statistical and time-series analysis to evaluate attacks' stealth. The results show that adversarial attacks can have significant impacts on DRL controllers, and constraining an attack's perturbations makes it difficult to detect. However, certain DRL architectures are far more robust, and robust training methods can further reduce the impact.

In-context learning, a paradigm bridging the gap between pre-training and fine-tuning, has demonstrated high efficacy in several NLP tasks, especially in few-shot settings. Despite being widely applied, in-context learning is vulnerable to malicious attacks. In this work, we raise security concerns regarding this paradigm. Our studies demonstrate that an attacker can manipulate the behavior of large language models by poisoning the demonstration context, without the need for fine-tuning the model. Specifically, we design a new backdoor attack method, named ICLAttack, to target large language models based on in-context learning. Our method encompasses two types of attacks: poisoning demonstration examples and poisoning demonstration prompts, which can make models behave in alignment with predefined intentions. ICLAttack does not require additional fine-tuning to implant a backdoor, thus preserving the model's generality. Furthermore, the poisoned examples are correctly labeled, enhancing the natural stealth of our attack method. Extensive experimental results across several language models, ranging in size from 1.3B to 180B parameters, demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack method, exemplified by a high average attack success rate of 95.0% across the three datasets on OPT models.

Users like sharing personal photos with others through social media. At the same time, they might want to make automatic identification in such photos difficult or even impossible. Classic obfuscation methods such as blurring are not only unpleasant but also not as effective as one would expect. Recent studies on adversarial image perturbations (AIP) suggest that it is possible to confuse recognition systems effectively without unpleasant artifacts. However, in the presence of counter measures against AIPs, it is unclear how effective AIP would be in particular when the choice of counter measure is unknown. Game theory provides tools for studying the interaction between agents with uncertainties in the strategies. We introduce a general game theoretical framework for the user-recogniser dynamics, and present a case study that involves current state of the art AIP and person recognition techniques. We derive the optimal strategy for the user that assures an upper bound on the recognition rate independent of the recogniser's counter measure. Code is available at https://goo.gl/hgvbNK.

Despite extensive diagnostics and debugging by developers, AI systems sometimes exhibit harmful unintended behaviors. Finding and fixing these is challenging because the attack surface is so large -- it is not tractable to exhaustively search for inputs that may elicit harmful behaviors. Red-teaming and adversarial training (AT) are commonly used to improve robustness, however, they empirically struggle to fix failure modes that differ from the attacks used during training. In this work, we utilize latent adversarial training (LAT) to defend against vulnerabilities without leveraging knowledge of what they are or using inputs that elicit them. LAT makes use of the compressed, abstract, and structured latent representations of concepts that the network actually uses for prediction. Here, we use it to defend against failure modes without examples that elicit them. Specifically, we use LAT to remove trojans and defend against held-out classes of adversarial attacks. We show in image classification, text classification, and text generation tasks that LAT usually improves both robustness to novel attacks and performance on clean data relative to AT. This suggests that LAT can be a promising tool for defending against failure modes that are not explicitly identified by developers.

By reinterpreting a robust discriminative classifier as Energy-based Model (EBM), we offer a new take on the dynamics of adversarial training (AT). Our analysis of the energy landscape during AT reveals that untargeted attacks generate adversarial images much more in-distribution (lower energy) than the original data from the point of view of the model. Conversely, we observe the opposite for targeted attacks. On the ground of our thorough analysis, we present new theoretical and practical results that show how interpreting AT energy dynamics unlocks a better understanding: (1) AT dynamic is governed by three phases and robust overfitting occurs in the third phase with a drastic divergence between natural and adversarial energies (2) by rewriting the loss of TRadeoff-inspired Adversarial DEfense via Surrogate-loss minimization (TRADES) in terms of energies, we show that TRADES implicitly alleviates overfitting by means of aligning the natural energy with the adversarial one (3) we empirically show that all recent state-of-the-art robust classifiers are smoothing the energy landscape and we reconcile a variety of studies about understanding AT and weighting the loss function under the umbrella of EBMs. Motivated by rigorous evidence, we propose Weighted Energy Adversarial Training (WEAT), a novel sample weighting scheme that yields robust accuracy matching the state-of-the-art on multiple benchmarks such as CIFAR-10 and SVHN and going beyond in CIFAR-100 and Tiny-ImageNet. We further show that robust classifiers vary in the intensity and quality of their generative capabilities, and offer a simple method to push this capability, reaching a remarkable Inception Score (IS) and FID using a robust classifier without training for generative modeling. The code to reproduce our results is available at http://github.com/OmnAI-Lab/Robust-Classifiers-under-the-lens-of-EBM/ .

Hallucination, posed as a pervasive challenge of multi-modal large language models (MLLMs), has significantly impeded their real-world usage that demands precise judgment. Existing methods mitigate this issue with either training with specific designed data or inferencing with external knowledge from other sources, incurring inevitable additional costs. In this paper, we present OPERA, a novel MLLM decoding method grounded in an Over-trust Penalty and a Retrospection-Allocation strategy, serving as a nearly free lunch to alleviate the hallucination issue without additional data, knowledge, or training. Our approach begins with an interesting observation that, most hallucinations are closely tied to the knowledge aggregation patterns manifested in the self-attention matrix, i.e., MLLMs tend to generate new tokens by focusing on a few summary tokens, but not all the previous tokens. Such partial over-trust inclination results in the neglecting of image tokens and describes the image content with hallucination. Statistically, we observe an 80%sim95% co-currency rate between hallucination contents and such knowledge aggregation patterns. Based on the observation, OPERA introduces a penalty term on the model logits during the beam-search decoding to mitigate the over-trust issue, along with a rollback strategy that retrospects the presence of summary tokens in the previously generated tokens, and re-allocate the token selection if necessary. With extensive experiments, OPERA shows significant hallucination-mitigating performance on different MLLMs and metrics, proving its effectiveness and generality. Our code is available at: https://github.com/shikiw/OPERA.

The ability to cope with out-of-distribution (OOD) corruptions and adversarial attacks is crucial in real-world safety-demanding applications. In this study, we develop a general mechanism to increase neural network robustness based on focus analysis. Recent studies have revealed the phenomenon of Overfocusing, which leads to a performance drop. When the network is primarily influenced by small input regions, it becomes less robust and prone to misclassify under noise and corruptions. However, quantifying overfocusing is still vague and lacks clear definitions. Here, we provide a mathematical definition of focus, overfocusing and underfocusing. The notions are general, but in this study, we specifically investigate the case of 3D point clouds. We observe that corrupted sets result in a biased focus distribution compared to the clean training set. We show that as focus distribution deviates from the one learned in the training phase - classification performance deteriorates. We thus propose a parameter-free refocusing algorithm that aims to unify all corruptions under the same distribution. We validate our findings on a 3D zero-shot classification task, achieving SOTA in robust 3D classification on ModelNet-C dataset, and in adversarial defense against Shape-Invariant attack. Code is available in: https://github.com/yossilevii100/refocusing.

In recent years, neural networks have become the default choice for image classification and many other learning tasks, even though they are vulnerable to so-called adversarial attacks. To increase their robustness against these attacks, there have emerged numerous detection mechanisms that aim to automatically determine if an input is adversarial. However, state-of-the-art detection mechanisms either rely on being tuned for each type of attack, or they do not generalize across different attack types. To alleviate these issues, we propose a novel technique for adversarial-image detection, RAID, that trains a secondary classifier to identify differences in neuron activation values between benign and adversarial inputs. Our technique is both more reliable and more effective than the state of the art when evaluated against six popular attacks. Moreover, a straightforward extension of RAID increases its robustness against detection-aware adversaries without affecting its effectiveness.

We conduct experiments on the impact of increasing inference-time compute in reasoning models (specifically OpenAI o1-preview and o1-mini) on their robustness to adversarial attacks. We find that across a variety of attacks, increased inference-time compute leads to improved robustness. In many cases (with important exceptions), the fraction of model samples where the attack succeeds tends to zero as the amount of test-time compute grows. We perform no adversarial training for the tasks we study, and we increase inference-time compute by simply allowing the models to spend more compute on reasoning, independently of the form of attack. Our results suggest that inference-time compute has the potential to improve adversarial robustness for Large Language Models. We also explore new attacks directed at reasoning models, as well as settings where inference-time compute does not improve reliability, and speculate on the reasons for these as well as ways to address them.

The impressive capability of modern text-to-image models to generate realistic visuals has come with a serious drawback: they can be misused to create harmful, deceptive or unlawful content. This has accelerated the push for machine unlearning. This new field seeks to selectively remove specific knowledge from a model's training data without causing a drop in its overall performance. However, it turns out that actually forgetting a given concept is an extremely difficult task. Models exposed to attacks using adversarial prompts show the ability to generate so-called unlearned concepts, which can be not only harmful but also illegal. In this paper, we present considerations regarding the ability of models to forget and recall knowledge, introducing the Memory Self-Regeneration task. Furthermore, we present MemoRa strategy, which we consider to be a regenerative approach supporting the effective recovery of previously lost knowledge. Moreover, we propose that robustness in knowledge retrieval is a crucial yet underexplored evaluation measure for developing more robust and effective unlearning techniques. Finally, we demonstrate that forgetting occurs in two distinct ways: short-term, where concepts can be quickly recalled, and long-term, where recovery is more challenging.

Large language models are pre-trained on ever-growing token budgets under the assumption that better pre-training performance translates to improved downstream models. In this work, we challenge this assumption and show that extended pre-training can make models harder to fine-tune, leading to degraded final performance. We term this phenomenon catastrophic overtraining. For example, the instruction-tuned OLMo-1B model pre-trained on 3T tokens leads to over 2% worse performance on multiple standard LLM benchmarks than its 2.3T token counterpart. Through controlled experiments and theoretical analysis, we show that catastrophic overtraining arises from a systematic increase in the broad sensitivity of pre-trained parameters to modifications, including but not limited to fine-tuning. Our findings call for a critical reassessment of pre-training design that considers the downstream adaptability of the model.

Message Passing Neural Networks (MPNNs) are instances of Graph Neural Networks that leverage the graph to send messages over the edges. This inductive bias leads to a phenomenon known as over-squashing, where a node feature is insensitive to information contained at distant nodes. Despite recent methods introduced to mitigate this issue, an understanding of the causes for over-squashing and of possible solutions are lacking. In this theoretical work, we prove that: (i) Neural network width can mitigate over-squashing, but at the cost of making the whole network more sensitive; (ii) Conversely, depth cannot help mitigate over-squashing: increasing the number of layers leads to over-squashing being dominated by vanishing gradients; (iii) The graph topology plays the greatest role, since over-squashing occurs between nodes at high commute (access) time. Our analysis provides a unified framework to study different recent methods introduced to cope with over-squashing and serves as a justification for a class of methods that fall under graph rewiring.

Model distillation has become essential for creating smaller, deployable language models that retain larger system capabilities. However, widespread deployment raises concerns about resilience to adversarial manipulation. This paper investigates vulnerability of distilled models to adversarial injection of biased content during training. We demonstrate that adversaries can inject subtle biases into teacher models through minimal data poisoning, which propagates to student models and becomes significantly amplified. We propose two propagation modes: Untargeted Propagation, where bias affects multiple tasks, and Targeted Propagation, focusing on specific tasks while maintaining normal behavior elsewhere. With only 25 poisoned samples (0.25% poisoning rate), student models generate biased responses 76.9% of the time in targeted scenarios - higher than 69.4% in teacher models. For untargeted propagation, adversarial bias appears 6x-29x more frequently in student models on unseen tasks. We validate findings across six bias types (targeted advertisements, phishing links, narrative manipulations, insecure coding practices), various distillation methods, and different modalities spanning text and code generation. Our evaluation reveals shortcomings in current defenses - perplexity filtering, bias detection systems, and LLM-based autorater frameworks - against these attacks. Results expose significant security vulnerabilities in distilled models, highlighting need for specialized safeguards. We propose practical design principles for building effective adversarial bias mitigation strategies.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting enables complex reasoning in large language models (LLMs), including applications in information retrieval (IR). However, it often leads to overthinking, where models produce excessively long and semantically redundant traces with little or no benefit. We identify two key challenges in IR: redundant trajectories that revisit similar states and misguided reasoning that diverges from user intent. To address these, we propose State Machine Reasoning (SMR), a transition-based reasoning framework composed of discrete actions (Refine, Rerank, Stop) that support early stopping and fine-grained control. Experiments on the BEIR and BRIGHT benchmarks show that SMR improves retrieval performance (nDCG@10) by 3.4% while reducing token usage by 74.4%. It generalizes across LLMs and retrievers without requiring task-specific tuning, offering a practical alternative to conventional CoT reasoning. The code and details are available at https://github.com/ldilab/SMR.

Human intelligence involves metacognitive abilities like self-regulation, recognizing limitations, and seeking assistance only when needed. While LLM Agents excel in many domains, they often lack this awareness. Overconfident agents risk catastrophic failures, while those that seek help excessively hinder efficiency. A key challenge is enabling agents with a limited intervention budget C is to decide when to request assistance. In this paper, we propose an offline framework that trains a "helper" policy to request interventions, such as more powerful models or test-time compute, by combining LLM-based process reward models (PRMs) with tabular reinforcement learning. Using state transitions collected offline, we score optimal intervention timing with PRMs and train the helper model on these labeled trajectories. This offline approach significantly reduces costly intervention calls during training. Furthermore, the integration of PRMs with tabular RL enhances robustness to off-policy data while avoiding the inefficiencies of deep RL. We empirically find that our method delivers optimal helper behavior.

We explore a class of adversarial attacks targeting the activations of language models. By manipulating a relatively small subset of model activations, a, we demonstrate the ability to control the exact prediction of a significant number (in some cases up to 1000) of subsequent tokens t. We empirically verify a scaling law where the maximum number of target tokens t_max predicted depends linearly on the number of tokens a whose activations the attacker controls as t_max = kappa a. We find that the number of bits of control in the input space needed to control a single bit in the output space (what we call attack resistance chi) is remarkably constant between approx 16 and approx 25 over 2 orders of magnitude of model sizes for different language models. Compared to attacks on tokens, attacks on activations are predictably much stronger, however, we identify a surprising regularity where one bit of input steered either via activations or via tokens is able to exert control over a similar amount of output bits. This gives support for the hypothesis that adversarial attacks are a consequence of dimensionality mismatch between the input and output spaces. A practical implication of the ease of attacking language model activations instead of tokens is for multi-modal and selected retrieval models, where additional data sources are added as activations directly, sidestepping the tokenized input. This opens up a new, broad attack surface. By using language models as a controllable test-bed to study adversarial attacks, we were able to experiment with input-output dimensions that are inaccessible in computer vision, especially where the output dimension dominates.

Intelligent Personal Assistant (IA), also known as Voice Assistant (VA), has become increasingly popular as a human-computer interaction mechanism. Most smartphones have built-in voice assistants that are granted high privilege, which is able to access system resources and private information. Thus, once the voice assistants are exploited by attackers, they become the stepping stones for the attackers to hack into the smartphones. Prior work shows that the voice assistant can be activated by inter-component communication mechanism, through an official Android API. However, this attack method is only effective on Google Assistant, which is the official voice assistant developed by Google. Voice assistants in other operating systems, even custom Android systems, cannot be activated by this mechanism. Prior work also shows that the attacking voice commands can be inaudible, but it requires additional instruments to launch the attack, making it unrealistic for real-world attack. We propose an attacking framework, which records the activation voice of the user, and launch the attack by playing the activation voice and attack commands via the built-in speaker. An intelligent stealthy module is designed to decide on the suitable occasion to launch the attack, preventing the attack being noticed by the user. We demonstrate proof-of-concept attacks on Google Assistant, showing the feasibility and stealthiness of the proposed attack scheme. We suggest to revise the activation logic of voice assistant to be resilient to the speaker based attack.

Decision-based adversarial attacks construct inputs that fool a machine-learning model into making targeted mispredictions by making only hard-label queries. For the most part, these attacks have been applied directly to isolated neural network models. However, in practice, machine learning models are just a component of a much larger system. By adding just a single preprocessor in front of a classifier, we find that state-of-the-art query-based attacks are as much as seven times less effective at attacking a prediction pipeline than attacking the machine learning model alone. Hence, attacks that are unaware of this invariance inevitably waste a large number of queries to re-discover or overcome it. We, therefore, develop techniques to first reverse-engineer the preprocessor and then use this extracted information to attack the end-to-end system. Our extraction method requires only a few hundred queries to learn the preprocessors used by most publicly available model pipelines, and our preprocessor-aware attacks recover the same efficacy as just attacking the model alone. The code can be found at https://github.com/google-research/preprocessor-aware-black-box-attack.

As test-time scaling becomes a pivotal research frontier in Large Language Models (LLMs) development, contemporary and advanced post-training methodologies increasingly focus on extending the generation length of long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) responses to enhance reasoning capabilities toward DeepSeek R1-like performance. However, recent studies reveal a persistent overthinking phenomenon in state-of-the-art reasoning models, manifesting as excessive redundancy or repetitive thinking patterns in long CoT responses. To address this issue, in this paper, we propose a simple yet effective two-stage reinforcement learning framework for achieving concise reasoning in LLMs, named ConciseR. Specifically, the first stage, using more training steps, aims to incentivize the model's reasoning capabilities via Group Relative Policy Optimization with clip-higher and dynamic sampling components (GRPO++), and the second stage, using fewer training steps, explicitly enforces conciseness and improves efficiency via Length-aware Group Relative Policy Optimization (L-GRPO). Significantly, ConciseR only optimizes response length once all rollouts of a sample are correct, following the "walk before you run" principle. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our ConciseR model, which generates more concise CoT reasoning responses, outperforms recent state-of-the-art reasoning models with zero RL paradigm across AIME 2024, MATH-500, AMC 2023, Minerva, and Olympiad benchmarks.

One major goal of the AI security community is to securely and reliably produce and deploy deep learning models for real-world applications. To this end, data poisoning based backdoor attacks on deep neural networks (DNNs) in the production stage (or training stage) and corresponding defenses are extensively explored in recent years. Ironically, backdoor attacks in the deployment stage, which can often happen in unprofessional users' devices and are thus arguably far more threatening in real-world scenarios, draw much less attention of the community. We attribute this imbalance of vigilance to the weak practicality of existing deployment-stage backdoor attack algorithms and the insufficiency of real-world attack demonstrations. To fill the blank, in this work, we study the realistic threat of deployment-stage backdoor attacks on DNNs. We base our study on a commonly used deployment-stage attack paradigm -- adversarial weight attack, where adversaries selectively modify model weights to embed backdoor into deployed DNNs. To approach realistic practicality, we propose the first gray-box and physically realizable weights attack algorithm for backdoor injection, namely subnet replacement attack (SRA), which only requires architecture information of the victim model and can support physical triggers in the real world. Extensive experimental simulations and system-level real-world attack demonstrations are conducted. Our results not only suggest the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed attack algorithm, but also reveal the practical risk of a novel type of computer virus that may widely spread and stealthily inject backdoor into DNN models in user devices. By our study, we call for more attention to the vulnerability of DNNs in the deployment stage.

How should we evaluate the robustness of language model defenses? Current defenses against jailbreaks and prompt injections (which aim to prevent an attacker from eliciting harmful knowledge or remotely triggering malicious actions, respectively) are typically evaluated either against a static set of harmful attack strings, or against computationally weak optimization methods that were not designed with the defense in mind. We argue that this evaluation process is flawed. Instead, we should evaluate defenses against adaptive attackers who explicitly modify their attack strategy to counter a defense's design while spending considerable resources to optimize their objective. By systematically tuning and scaling general optimization techniques-gradient descent, reinforcement learning, random search, and human-guided exploration-we bypass 12 recent defenses (based on a diverse set of techniques) with attack success rate above 90% for most; importantly, the majority of defenses originally reported near-zero attack success rates. We believe that future defense work must consider stronger attacks, such as the ones we describe, in order to make reliable and convincing claims of robustness.

Test-time scaling has emerged as an effective approach for improving language model performance by utilizing additional compute at inference time. Recent studies have shown that overriding end-of-thinking tokens (e.g., replacing "</think>" with "Wait") can extend reasoning steps and improve accuracy. In this work, we explore whether a dedicated continue-thinking token can be learned to trigger extended reasoning. We augment a distilled version of DeepSeek-R1 with a single learned "<|continue-thinking|>" token, training only its embedding via reinforcement learning while keeping the model weights frozen. Our experiments show that this learned token achieves improved accuracy on standard math benchmarks compared to both the baseline model and a test-time scaling approach that uses a fixed token (e.g., "Wait") for budget forcing. In particular, we observe that in cases where the fixed-token approach enhances the base model's accuracy, our method achieves a markedly greater improvement. For example, on the GSM8K benchmark, the fixed-token approach yields a 1.3% absolute improvement in accuracy, whereas our learned-token method achieves a 4.2% improvement over the base model that does not use budget forcing.

Adversarial robustness has been studied extensively in image classification, especially for the ell_infty-threat model, but significantly less so for related tasks such as object detection and semantic segmentation, where attacks turn out to be a much harder optimization problem than for image classification. We propose several problem-specific novel attacks minimizing different metrics in accuracy and mIoU. The ensemble of our attacks, SEA, shows that existing attacks severely overestimate the robustness of semantic segmentation models. Surprisingly, existing attempts of adversarial training for semantic segmentation models turn out to be weak or even completely non-robust. We investigate why previous adaptations of adversarial training to semantic segmentation failed and show how recently proposed robust ImageNet backbones can be used to obtain adversarially robust semantic segmentation models with up to six times less training time for PASCAL-VOC and the more challenging ADE20k. The associated code and robust models are available at https://github.com/nmndeep/robust-segmentation

Overfitting widely exists in adversarial robust training of deep networks. An effective remedy is adversarial weight perturbation, which injects the worst-case weight perturbation during network training by maximizing the classification loss on adversarial examples. Adversarial weight perturbation helps reduce the robust generalization gap; however, it also undermines the robustness improvement. A criterion that regulates the weight perturbation is therefore crucial for adversarial training. In this paper, we propose such a criterion, namely Loss Stationary Condition (LSC) for constrained perturbation. With LSC, we find that it is essential to conduct weight perturbation on adversarial data with small classification loss to eliminate robust overfitting. Weight perturbation on adversarial data with large classification loss is not necessary and may even lead to poor robustness. Based on these observations, we propose a robust perturbation strategy to constrain the extent of weight perturbation. The perturbation strategy prevents deep networks from overfitting while avoiding the side effect of excessive weight perturbation, significantly improving the robustness of adversarial training. Extensive experiments demonstrate the superiority of the proposed method over the state-of-the-art adversarial training methods.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are widely deployed on real-world devices. Concerns regarding their security have gained great attention from researchers. Recently, a new weight modification attack called bit flip attack (BFA) was proposed, which exploits memory fault inject techniques such as row hammer to attack quantized models in the deployment stage. With only a few bit flips, the target model can be rendered useless as a random guesser or even be implanted with malicious functionalities. In this work, we seek to further reduce the number of bit flips. We propose a training-assisted bit flip attack, in which the adversary is involved in the training stage to build a high-risk model to release. This high-risk model, obtained coupled with a corresponding malicious model, behaves normally and can escape various detection methods. The results on benchmark datasets show that an adversary can easily convert this high-risk but normal model to a malicious one on victim's side by flipping only one critical bit on average in the deployment stage. Moreover, our attack still poses a significant threat even when defenses are employed. The codes for reproducing main experiments are available at https://github.com/jianshuod/TBA.

This study presents PARROT (Persuasion and Agreement Robustness Rating of Output Truth), a robustness focused framework designed to measure the degradation in accuracy that occurs under social pressure exerted on users through authority and persuasion in large language models (LLMs) the phenomenon of sycophancy (excessive conformity). PARROT (i) isolates causal effects by comparing the neutral version of the same question with an authoritatively false version using a double-blind evaluation, (ii) quantifies confidence shifts toward the correct and imposed false responses using log-likelihood-based calibration tracking, and (iii) systematically classifies failure modes (e.g., robust correct, sycophantic agreement, reinforced error, stubborn error, self-correction, etc.) using an eight-state behavioral taxonomy. We evaluated 22 models using 1,302 MMLU-style multiple-choice questions across 13 domains and domain-specific authority templates. Findings show marked heterogeneity: advanced models (e.g., GPT-5, GPT-4.1, Claude Sonnet 4.5) exhibit low "follow rates" (leq 11%, GPT-5: 4\%) and minimal accuracy loss, while older/smaller models show severe epistemic collapse (GPT-4: 80\%, Qwen 2.5-1.5B: 94\%). The danger is not limited to response changes; weak models reduce confidence in the correct response while increasing confidence in the imposed incorrect response. While international law and global knowledge at the domain level exhibit high fragility, elementary mathematics is relatively resilient. Consequently, we argue that the goal of "resistance to overfitting pressure" should be addressed as a primary objective alongside accuracy, harm avoidance, and privacy for safe deployment in the real world.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems based on Large Language Models (LLMs) have become essential for tasks such as question answering and content generation. However, their increasing impact on public opinion and information dissemination has made them a critical focus for security research due to inherent vulnerabilities. Previous studies have predominantly addressed attacks targeting factual or single-query manipulations. In this paper, we address a more practical scenario: topic-oriented adversarial opinion manipulation attacks on RAG models, where LLMs are required to reason and synthesize multiple perspectives, rendering them particularly susceptible to systematic knowledge poisoning. Specifically, we propose Topic-FlipRAG, a two-stage manipulation attack pipeline that strategically crafts adversarial perturbations to influence opinions across related queries. This approach combines traditional adversarial ranking attack techniques and leverages the extensive internal relevant knowledge and reasoning capabilities of LLMs to execute semantic-level perturbations. Experiments show that the proposed attacks effectively shift the opinion of the model's outputs on specific topics, significantly impacting user information perception. Current mitigation methods cannot effectively defend against such attacks, highlighting the necessity for enhanced safeguards for RAG systems, and offering crucial insights for LLM security research.

AI systems can take harmful actions and are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We present an approach, inspired by recent advances in representation engineering, that "short-circuits" models as they respond with harmful outputs. Existing techniques aimed at improving alignment, such as refusal training, are often bypassed. Techniques such as adversarial training try to plug these holes by countering specific attacks. As an alternative to refusal training and adversarial training, short-circuiting directly controls the representations that are responsible for harmful outputs in the first place. Our technique can be applied to both text-only and multimodal language models to prevent the generation of harmful outputs without sacrificing utility -- even in the presence of powerful unseen attacks. Notably, while adversarial robustness in standalone image recognition remains an open challenge, short-circuiting allows the larger multimodal system to reliably withstand image "hijacks" that aim to produce harmful content. Finally, we extend our approach to AI agents, demonstrating considerable reductions in the rate of harmful actions when they are under attack. Our approach represents a significant step forward in the development of reliable safeguards to harmful behavior and adversarial attacks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive capabilities across a wide range of tasks, yet their safety mechanisms remain susceptible to adversarial attacks that exploit cognitive biases -- systematic deviations from rational judgment. Unlike prior jailbreaking approaches focused on prompt engineering or algorithmic manipulation, this work highlights the overlooked power of multi-bias interactions in undermining LLM safeguards. We propose CognitiveAttack, a novel red-teaming framework that systematically leverages both individual and combined cognitive biases. By integrating supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning, CognitiveAttack generates prompts that embed optimized bias combinations, effectively bypassing safety protocols while maintaining high attack success rates. Experimental results reveal significant vulnerabilities across 30 diverse LLMs, particularly in open-source models. CognitiveAttack achieves a substantially higher attack success rate compared to the SOTA black-box method PAP (60.1% vs. 31.6%), exposing critical limitations in current defense mechanisms. These findings highlight multi-bias interactions as a powerful yet underexplored attack vector. This work introduces a novel interdisciplinary perspective by bridging cognitive science and LLM safety, paving the way for more robust and human-aligned AI systems.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are widely used in vision-language reasoning tasks. However, their vulnerability to adversarial prompts remains a serious concern, as safety mechanisms often fail to prevent the generation of harmful outputs. Although recent jailbreak strategies report high success rates, many responses classified as "successful" are actually benign, vague, or unrelated to the intended malicious goal. This mismatch suggests that current evaluation standards may overestimate the effectiveness of such attacks. To address this issue, we introduce a four-axis evaluation framework that considers input on-topicness, input out-of-distribution (OOD) intensity, output harmfulness, and output refusal rate. This framework identifies truly effective jailbreaks. In a substantial empirical study, we reveal a structural trade-off: highly on-topic prompts are frequently blocked by safety filters, whereas those that are too OOD often evade detection but fail to produce harmful content. However, prompts that balance relevance and novelty are more likely to evade filters and trigger dangerous output. Building on this insight, we develop a recursive rewriting strategy called Balanced Structural Decomposition (BSD). The approach restructures malicious prompts into semantically aligned sub-tasks, while introducing subtle OOD signals and visual cues that make the inputs harder to detect. BSD was tested across 13 commercial and open-source MLLMs, where it consistently led to higher attack success rates, more harmful outputs, and fewer refusals. Compared to previous methods, it improves success rates by 67% and harmfulness by 21%, revealing a previously underappreciated weakness in current multimodal safety systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in complex tasks. Recent advancements in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), such as OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek-R1, have further improved performance in System-2 reasoning domains like mathematics and programming by harnessing supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning (RL) techniques to enhance the Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. However, while longer CoT reasoning sequences improve performance, they also introduce significant computational overhead due to verbose and redundant outputs, known as the "overthinking phenomenon". In this paper, we provide the first structured survey to systematically investigate and explore the current progress toward achieving efficient reasoning in LLMs. Overall, relying on the inherent mechanism of LLMs, we categorize existing works into several key directions: (1) model-based efficient reasoning, which considers optimizing full-length reasoning models into more concise reasoning models or directly training efficient reasoning models; (2) reasoning output-based efficient reasoning, which aims to dynamically reduce reasoning steps and length during inference; (3) input prompts-based efficient reasoning, which seeks to enhance reasoning efficiency based on input prompt properties such as difficulty or length control. Additionally, we introduce the use of efficient data for training reasoning models, explore the reasoning capabilities of small language models, and discuss evaluation methods and benchmarking.