Daily Papers

For the immanent challenge of insufficiently annotated samples in the medical field, semi-supervised medical image segmentation (SSMIS) offers a promising solution. Despite achieving impressive results in delineating primary target areas, most current methodologies struggle to precisely capture the subtle details of boundaries. This deficiency often leads to significant diagnostic inaccuracies. To tackle this issue, we introduce C3S3, a novel semi-supervised segmentation model that synergistically integrates complementary competition and contrastive selection. This design significantly sharpens boundary delineation and enhances overall precision. Specifically, we develop an Outcome-Driven Contrastive Learning module dedicated to refining boundary localization. Additionally, we incorporate a Dynamic Complementary Competition module that leverages two high-performing sub-networks to generate pseudo-labels, thereby further improving segmentation quality. The proposed C3S3 undergoes rigorous validation on two publicly accessible datasets, encompassing the practices of both MRI and CT scans. The results demonstrate that our method achieves superior performance compared to previous cutting-edge competitors. Especially, on the 95HD and ASD metrics, our approach achieves a notable improvement of at least 6%, highlighting the significant advancements. The code is available at https://github.com/Y-TARL/C3S3.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

Unsupervised learning of object-centric representations in dynamic visual scenes is challenging. Unlike most previous approaches that learn to decompose 2D images, we present DynaVol, a 3D scene generative model that unifies geometric structures and object-centric learning in a differentiable volume rendering framework. The key idea is to perform object-centric voxelization to capture the 3D nature of the scene, which infers the probability distribution over objects at individual spatial locations. These voxel features evolve over time through a canonical-space deformation function, forming the basis for global representation learning via slot attention. The voxel features and global features are complementary and are both leveraged by a compositional NeRF decoder for volume rendering. DynaVol remarkably outperforms existing approaches for unsupervised dynamic scene decomposition. Once trained, the explicitly meaningful voxel features enable additional capabilities that 2D scene decomposition methods cannot achieve: it is possible to freely edit the geometric shapes or manipulate the motion trajectories of the objects.

Reconstructing clean, distractor-free 3D scenes from real-world captures remains a significant challenge, particularly in highly dynamic and cluttered settings such as egocentric videos. To tackle this problem, we introduce DeGauss, a simple and robust self-supervised framework for dynamic scene reconstruction based on a decoupled dynamic-static Gaussian Splatting design. DeGauss models dynamic elements with foreground Gaussians and static content with background Gaussians, using a probabilistic mask to coordinate their composition and enable independent yet complementary optimization. DeGauss generalizes robustly across a wide range of real-world scenarios, from casual image collections to long, dynamic egocentric videos, without relying on complex heuristics or extensive supervision. Experiments on benchmarks including NeRF-on-the-go, ADT, AEA, Hot3D, and EPIC-Fields demonstrate that DeGauss consistently outperforms existing methods, establishing a strong baseline for generalizable, distractor-free 3D reconstructionin highly dynamic, interaction-rich environments. Project page: https://batfacewayne.github.io/DeGauss.io/

A major technique in learning-augmented online algorithms is combining multiple algorithms or predictors. Since the performance of each predictor may vary over time, it is desirable to use not the single best predictor as a benchmark, but rather a dynamic combination which follows different predictors at different times. We design algorithms that combine predictions and are competitive against such dynamic combinations for a wide class of online problems, namely, metrical task systems. Against the best (in hindsight) unconstrained combination of ell predictors, we obtain a competitive ratio of O(ell^2), and show that this is best possible. However, for a benchmark with slightly constrained number of switches between different predictors, we can get a (1+epsilon)-competitive algorithm. Moreover, our algorithms can be adapted to access predictors in a bandit-like fashion, querying only one predictor at a time. An unexpected implication of one of our lower bounds is a new structural insight about covering formulations for the k-server problem.

Competitive Pok\'emon Singles (CPS) is a popular strategy game where players learn to exploit their opponent based on imperfect information in battles that can last more than one hundred stochastic turns. AI research in CPS has been led by heuristic tree search and online self-play, but the game may also create a platform to study adaptive policies trained offline on large datasets. We develop a pipeline to reconstruct the first-person perspective of an agent from logs saved from the third-person perspective of a spectator, thereby unlocking a dataset of real human battles spanning more than a decade that grows larger every day. This dataset enables a black-box approach where we train large sequence models to adapt to their opponent based solely on their input trajectory while selecting moves without explicit search of any kind. We study a progression from imitation learning to offline RL and offline fine-tuning on self-play data in the hardcore competitive setting of Pok\'emon's four oldest (and most partially observed) game generations. The resulting agents outperform a recent LLM Agent approach and a strong heuristic search engine. While playing anonymously in online battles against humans, our best agents climb to rankings inside the top 10% of active players.

The emergence of complex life on Earth is often attributed to the arms race that ensued from a huge number of organisms all competing for finite resources. We present an artificial intelligence research environment, inspired by the human game genre of MMORPGs (Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games, a.k.a. MMOs), that aims to simulate this setting in microcosm. As with MMORPGs and the real world alike, our environment is persistent and supports a large and variable number of agents. Our environment is well suited to the study of large-scale multiagent interaction: it requires that agents learn robust combat and navigation policies in the presence of large populations attempting to do the same. Baseline experiments reveal that population size magnifies and incentivizes the development of skillful behaviors and results in agents that outcompete agents trained in smaller populations. We further show that the policies of agents with unshared weights naturally diverge to fill different niches in order to avoid competition.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

Learning to play optimally against any mixture over a diverse set of strategies is of important practical interests in competitive games. In this paper, we propose simplex-NeuPL that satisfies two desiderata simultaneously: i) learning a population of strategically diverse basis policies, represented by a single conditional network; ii) using the same network, learn best-responses to any mixture over the simplex of basis policies. We show that the resulting conditional policies incorporate prior information about their opponents effectively, enabling near optimal returns against arbitrary mixture policies in a game with tractable best-responses. We verify that such policies behave Bayes-optimally under uncertainty and offer insights in using this flexibility at test time. Finally, we offer evidence that learning best-responses to any mixture policies is an effective auxiliary task for strategic exploration, which, by itself, can lead to more performant populations.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

Recent evidence suggests that the use of generative artificial intelligence reduces the diversity of content produced. In this work, we develop a game-theoretic model to explore the downstream consequences of content homogeneity when producers use generative AI to compete with one another. At equilibrium, players indeed produce content that is less diverse than optimal. However, stronger competition mitigates homogeneity and induces more diverse production. Perhaps more surprisingly, we show that a generative AI model that performs well in isolation (i.e., according to a benchmark) may fail to do so when faced with competition, and vice versa. We validate our results empirically by using language models to play Scattergories, a word game in which players are rewarded for producing answers that are both correct and unique. We discuss how the interplay between competition and homogeneity has implications for the development, evaluation, and use of generative AI.

The rapid proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) and diverse specialized benchmarks necessitates a shift from fragmented, task-specific metrics to a holistic, competitive ranking system that effectively aggregates performance across multiple ability dimensions. Primarily using static scoring, current evaluation methods are fundamentally limited. They struggle to determine the proper mix ratio across diverse benchmarks, and critically, they fail to capture a model's dynamic competitive fitness or its vulnerability when confronted with sequential, high-stakes tasks. To address this, we introduce the novel Competitive Swiss-System Dynamics (CSD) framework. CSD simulates a multi-round, sequential contest where models are dynamically paired across a curated sequence of benchmarks based on their accumulated win-loss record. And Monte Carlo Simulation (N=100,000 iterations) is used to approximate the statistically robust Expected Win Score (E[S_m]), which eliminates the noise of random pairing and early-round luck. Furthermore, we implement a Failure Sensitivity Analysis by parameterizing the per-round elimination quantity (T_k), which allows us to profile models based on their risk appetite--distinguishing between robust generalists and aggressive specialists. We demonstrate that CSD provides a more nuanced and context-aware ranking than traditional aggregate scoring and static pairwise models, representing a vital step towards risk-informed, next-generation LLM evaluation.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

Through multi-agent competition, the simple objective of hide-and-seek, and standard reinforcement learning algorithms at scale, we find that agents create a self-supervised autocurriculum inducing multiple distinct rounds of emergent strategy, many of which require sophisticated tool use and coordination. We find clear evidence of six emergent phases in agent strategy in our environment, each of which creates a new pressure for the opposing team to adapt; for instance, agents learn to build multi-object shelters using moveable boxes which in turn leads to agents discovering that they can overcome obstacles using ramps. We further provide evidence that multi-agent competition may scale better with increasing environment complexity and leads to behavior that centers around far more human-relevant skills than other self-supervised reinforcement learning methods such as intrinsic motivation. Finally, we propose transfer and fine-tuning as a way to quantitatively evaluate targeted capabilities, and we compare hide-and-seek agents to both intrinsic motivation and random initialization baselines in a suite of domain-specific intelligence tests.

Competitive debate is a complex task of computational argumentation. Large Language Models (LLMs) suffer from hallucinations and lack competitiveness in this field. To address these challenges, we introduce Agent for Debate (Agent4Debate), a dynamic multi-agent framework based on LLMs designed to enhance their capabilities in competitive debate. Drawing inspiration from human behavior in debate preparation and execution, Agent4Debate employs a collaborative architecture where four specialized agents, involving Searcher, Analyzer, Writer, and Reviewer, dynamically interact and cooperate. These agents work throughout the debate process, covering multiple stages from initial research and argument formulation to rebuttal and summary. To comprehensively evaluate framework performance, we construct the Competitive Debate Arena, comprising 66 carefully selected Chinese debate motions. We recruit ten experienced human debaters and collect records of 200 debates involving Agent4Debate, baseline models, and humans. The evaluation employs the Debatrix automatic scoring system and professional human reviewers based on the established Debatrix-Elo and Human-Elo ranking. Experimental results indicate that the state-of-the-art Agent4Debate exhibits capabilities comparable to those of humans. Furthermore, ablation studies demonstrate the effectiveness of each component in the agent structure.

Learning the continuous dynamics of a system from snapshots of its temporal marginals is a problem which appears throughout natural sciences and machine learning, including in quantum systems, single-cell biological data, and generative modeling. In these settings, we assume access to cross-sectional samples that are uncorrelated over time, rather than full trajectories of samples. In order to better understand the systems under observation, we would like to learn a model of the underlying process that allows us to propagate samples in time and thereby simulate entire individual trajectories. In this work, we propose Action Matching, a method for learning a rich family of dynamics using only independent samples from its time evolution. We derive a tractable training objective, which does not rely on explicit assumptions about the underlying dynamics and does not require back-propagation through differential equations or optimal transport solvers. Inspired by connections with optimal transport, we derive extensions of Action Matching to learn stochastic differential equations and dynamics involving creation and destruction of probability mass. Finally, we showcase applications of Action Matching by achieving competitive performance in a diverse set of experiments from biology, physics, and generative modeling.

Sparse mixture of experts (SMoE) offers an appealing solution to scale up the model complexity beyond the mean of increasing the network's depth or width. However, effective training of SMoE has proven to be challenging due to the representation collapse issue, which causes parameter redundancy and limited representation potentials. In this work, we propose a competition mechanism to address this fundamental challenge of representation collapse. By routing inputs only to experts with the highest neural response, we show that, under mild assumptions, competition enjoys the same convergence rate as the optimal estimator. We further propose CompeteSMoE, an effective and efficient algorithm to train large language models by deploying a simple router that predicts the competition outcomes. Consequently, CompeteSMoE enjoys strong performance gains from the competition routing policy while having low computation overheads. Our extensive empirical evaluations on two transformer architectures and a wide range of tasks demonstrate the efficacy, robustness, and scalability of CompeteSMoE compared to state-of-the-art SMoE strategies.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated their proficiency in complex reasoning tasks, their performance in dynamic, interactive, and competitive scenarios - such as business strategy and stock market analysis - remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we formally explore the dynamic reasoning capabilities of LLMs for decision-making in rapidly evolving environments. We introduce two game theory-based pilot challenges that mirror the complexities of real-world dynamic decision-making. These challenges are well-defined, enabling clear, controllable, and precise evaluation of LLMs' dynamic reasoning abilities. Through extensive experiments, we find that existing reasoning methods tend to falter in dynamic settings that require k-level thinking - a key concept not tackled by previous works. To address this, we propose a novel reasoning approach for LLMs, named "K-Level Reasoning". This approach adopts the perspective of rivals to recursively employ k-level thinking based on available historical information, which significantly improves the prediction accuracy of rivals' subsequent moves and informs more strategic decision-making. This research not only sets a robust quantitative benchmark for the assessment of dynamic reasoning but also markedly enhances the proficiency of LLMs in dynamic contexts.

Card games are widely used to study sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with real-world analogues in negotiation, finance, and cybersecurity. These games typically fall into three categories based on the flow of control: strictly sequential (players alternate single actions), deterministic response (some actions trigger a fixed outcome), and unbounded reciprocal response (alternating counterplays are permitted). A less-explored but strategically rich structure is the bounded one-sided response, where a player's action briefly transfers control to the opponent, who must satisfy a fixed condition through one or more moves before the turn resolves. We term games featuring this mechanism Bounded One-Sided Response Games (BORGs). We introduce a modified version of Monopoly Deal as a benchmark environment that isolates this dynamic, where a Rent action forces the opponent to choose payment assets. The gold-standard algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), converges on effective strategies without novel algorithmic extensions. A lightweight full-stack research platform unifies the environment, a parallelized CFR runtime, and a human-playable web interface. The trained CFR agent and source code are available at https://monopolydeal.ai.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly shaping how information is created and disseminated, from companies using them to craft persuasive advertisements, to election campaigns optimizing messaging to gain votes, to social media influencers boosting engagement. These settings are inherently competitive, with sellers, candidates, and influencers vying for audience approval, yet it remains poorly understood how competitive feedback loops influence LLM behavior. We show that optimizing LLMs for competitive success can inadvertently drive misalignment. Using simulated environments across these scenarios, we find that, 6.3% increase in sales is accompanied by a 14.0% rise in deceptive marketing; in elections, a 4.9% gain in vote share coincides with 22.3% more disinformation and 12.5% more populist rhetoric; and on social media, a 7.5% engagement boost comes with 188.6% more disinformation and a 16.3% increase in promotion of harmful behaviors. We call this phenomenon Moloch's Bargain for AI--competitive success achieved at the cost of alignment. These misaligned behaviors emerge even when models are explicitly instructed to remain truthful and grounded, revealing the fragility of current alignment safeguards. Our findings highlight how market-driven optimization pressures can systematically erode alignment, creating a race to the bottom, and suggest that safe deployment of AI systems will require stronger governance and carefully designed incentives to prevent competitive dynamics from undermining societal trust.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

Generalizing policies across different domains with dynamics mismatch poses a significant challenge in reinforcement learning. For example, a robot learns the policy in a simulator, but when it is deployed in the real world, the dynamics of the environment may be different. Given the source and target domain with dynamics mismatch, we consider the online dynamics adaptation problem, in which case the agent can access sufficient source domain data while online interactions with the target domain are limited. Existing research has attempted to solve the problem from the dynamics discrepancy perspective. In this work, we reveal the limitations of these methods and explore the problem from the value difference perspective via a novel insight on the value consistency across domains. Specifically, we present the Value-Guided Data Filtering (VGDF) algorithm, which selectively shares transitions from the source domain based on the proximity of paired value targets across the two domains. Empirical results on various environments with kinematic and morphology shifts demonstrate that our method achieves superior performance compared to prior approaches.

Dynamical systems with complex behaviours, e.g. immune system cells interacting with a pathogen, are commonly modelled by splitting the behaviour into different regimes, or modes, each with simpler dynamics, and then learning the switching behaviour from one mode to another. Switching Dynamical Systems (SDS) are a powerful tool that automatically discovers these modes and mode-switching behaviour from time series data. While effective, these methods focus on independent objects, where the modes of one object are independent of the modes of the other objects. In this paper, we focus on the more general interacting object setting for switching dynamical systems, where the per-object dynamics also depends on an unknown and dynamically changing subset of other objects and their modes. To this end, we propose a novel graph-based approach for switching dynamical systems, GRAph Switching dynamical Systems (GRASS), in which we use a dynamic graph to characterize interactions between objects and learn both intra-object and inter-object mode-switching behaviour. We introduce two new datasets for this setting, a synthesized ODE-driven particles dataset and a real-world Salsa Couple Dancing dataset. Experiments show that GRASS can consistently outperforms previous state-of-the-art methods.

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

In many real-world sequential decision-making problems, an action does not immediately reflect on the feedback and spreads its effects over a long time frame. For instance, in online advertising, investing in a platform produces an instantaneous increase of awareness, but the actual reward, i.e., a conversion, might occur far in the future. Furthermore, whether a conversion takes place depends on: how fast the awareness grows, its vanishing effects, and the synergy or interference with other advertising platforms. Previous work has investigated the Multi-Armed Bandit framework with the possibility of delayed and aggregated feedback, without a particular structure on how an action propagates in the future, disregarding possible dynamical effects. In this paper, we introduce a novel setting, the Dynamical Linear Bandits (DLB), an extension of the linear bandits characterized by a hidden state. When an action is performed, the learner observes a noisy reward whose mean is a linear function of the hidden state and of the action. Then, the hidden state evolves according to linear dynamics, affected by the performed action too. We start by introducing the setting, discussing the notion of optimal policy, and deriving an expected regret lower bound. Then, we provide an optimistic regret minimization algorithm, Dynamical Linear Upper Confidence Bound (DynLin-UCB), that suffers an expected regret of order mathcal{O} Big( d sqrt{T}{(1-rho)^{3/2}} Big), where rho is a measure of the stability of the system, and d is the dimension of the action vector. Finally, we conduct a numerical validation on a synthetic environment and on real-world data to show the effectiveness of DynLin-UCB in comparison with several baselines.

Computing stable partitions in hedonic games is a challenging task because there exist games in which stable outcomes do not exist. Even more, these No-instances can often be leveraged to prove computational hardness results. We make this impression rigorous in a dynamic model of cardinal hedonic games by providing meta theorems. These imply hardness of deciding about the possible or necessary convergence of deviation dynamics based on the mere existence of No-instances. Our results hold for additively separable, fractional, and modified fractional hedonic games (ASHGs, FHGs, and MFHGs). Moreover, they encompass essentially all reasonable stability notions based on single-agent deviations. In addition, we propose dynamics as a method to find individually rational and contractually individual stable (CIS) partitions in ASHGs. In particular, we find that CIS dynamics from the singleton partition possibly converge after a linear number of deviations but may require an exponential number of deviations in the worst case.

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are increasingly vital in dynamic domains like online gaming, yet the lack of a dedicated benchmark has impeded standardized evaluation in this area. The core difficulty lies in Dual Dynamics: the constant interplay between game content updates and the shifting focus of the player community. Furthermore, the necessity of automating such a benchmark introduces a critical requirement for player-centric authenticity to ensure generated questions are realistic. To address this integrated challenge, we introduce ChronoPlay, a novel framework for the automated and continuous generation of game RAG benchmarks. ChronoPlay utilizes a dual-dynamic update mechanism to track both forms of change, and a dual-source synthesis engine that draws from official sources and player community to ensure both factual correctness and authentic query patterns. We instantiate our framework on three distinct games to create the first dynamic RAG benchmark for the gaming domain, offering new insights into model performance under these complex and realistic conditions. Code is avaliable at: https://github.com/hly1998/ChronoPlay.

A complex system with cluttered observations may be a coupled mixture of multiple simple sub-systems corresponding to latent entities. Such sub-systems may hold distinct dynamics in the continuous-time domain; therein, complicated interactions between sub-systems also evolve over time. This setting is fairly common in the real world but has been less considered. In this paper, we propose a sequential learning approach under this setting by decoupling a complex system for handling irregularly sampled and cluttered sequential observations. Such decoupling brings about not only subsystems describing the dynamics of each latent entity but also a meta-system capturing the interaction between entities over time. Specifically, we argue that the meta-system evolving within a simplex is governed by projected differential equations (ProjDEs). We further analyze and provide neural-friendly projection operators in the context of Bregman divergence. Experimental results on synthetic and real-world datasets show the advantages of our approach when facing complex and cluttered sequential data compared to the state-of-the-art.

The study of hardest and easiest fitness landscapes is an active area of research. Recently, Kaufmann, Larcher, Lengler and Zou conjectured that for the self-adjusting (1,lambda)-EA, Adversarial Dynamic BinVal (ADBV) is the hardest dynamic monotone function to optimize. We introduce the function Switching Dynamic BinVal (SDBV) which coincides with ADBV whenever the number of remaining zeros in the search point is strictly less than n/2, where n denotes the dimension of the search space. We show, using a combinatorial argument, that for the (1+1)-EA with any mutation rate p in [0,1], SDBV is drift-minimizing among the class of dynamic monotone functions. Our construction provides the first explicit example of an instance of the partially-ordered evolutionary algorithm (PO-EA) model with parameterized pessimism introduced by Colin, Doerr and F\'erey, building on work of Jansen. We further show that the (1+1)-EA optimizes SDBV in Theta(n^{3/2}) generations. Our simulations demonstrate matching runtimes for both static and self-adjusting (1,lambda) and (1+lambda)-EA. We further show, using an example of fixed dimension, that drift-minimization does not equal maximal runtime.

Dynamic feature selection, where we sequentially query features to make accurate predictions with a minimal budget, is a promising paradigm to reduce feature acquisition costs and provide transparency into a model's predictions. The problem is challenging, however, as it requires both predicting with arbitrary feature sets and learning a policy to identify valuable selections. Here, we take an information-theoretic perspective and prioritize features based on their mutual information with the response variable. The main challenge is implementing this policy, and we design a new approach that estimates the mutual information in a discriminative rather than generative fashion. Building on our approach, we then introduce several further improvements: allowing variable feature budgets across samples, enabling non-uniform feature costs, incorporating prior information, and exploring modern architectures to handle partial inputs. Our experiments show that our method provides consistent gains over recent methods across a variety of datasets.

Sparse mixture of experts (SMoE) offers an appealing solution to scale up the model complexity beyond the mean of increasing the network's depth or width. However, we argue that effective SMoE training remains challenging because of the suboptimal routing process where experts that perform computation do not directly contribute to the routing process. In this work, we propose competition, a novel mechanism to route tokens to experts with the highest neural response. Theoretically, we show that the competition mechanism enjoys a better sample efficiency than the traditional softmax routing. Furthermore, we develop CompeteSMoE, a simple yet effective algorithm to train large language models by deploying a router to learn the competition policy, thus enjoying strong performances at a low training overhead. Our extensive empirical evaluations on both the visual instruction tuning and language pre-training tasks demonstrate the efficacy, robustness, and scalability of CompeteSMoE compared to state-of-the-art SMoE strategies. We have made the implementation available at: https://github.com/Fsoft-AIC/CompeteSMoE. This work is an improved version of the previous study at arXiv:2402.02526

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems, widely used to improve the factual grounding of large language models (LLMs), are increasingly vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject manipulated content into the retriever's corpus. While prior research has predominantly focused on single-attacker settings, real-world scenarios often involve multiple, competing attackers with conflicting objectives. In this work, we introduce PoisonArena, the first benchmark to systematically study and evaluate competing poisoning attacks in RAG. We formalize the multi-attacker threat model, where attackers vie to control the answer to the same query using mutually exclusive misinformation. PoisonArena leverages the Bradley-Terry model to quantify each method's competitive effectiveness in such adversarial environments. Through extensive experiments on the Natural Questions and MS MARCO datasets, we demonstrate that many attack strategies successful in isolation fail under competitive pressure. Our findings highlight the limitations of conventional evaluation metrics like Attack Success Rate (ASR) and F1 score and underscore the need for competitive evaluation to assess real-world attack robustness. PoisonArena provides a standardized framework to benchmark and develop future attack and defense strategies under more realistic, multi-adversary conditions.

Designing control policies whose performance level is guaranteed to remain above a given threshold in a span of environments is a critical feature for the adoption of reinforcement learning (RL) in real-world applications. The search for such robust policies is a notoriously difficult problem, related to the so-called dynamic model of transition function uncertainty, where the environment dynamics are allowed to change at each time step. But in practical cases, one is rather interested in robustness to a span of static transition models throughout interaction episodes. The static model is known to be harder to solve than the dynamic one, and seminal algorithms, such as robust value iteration, as well as most recent works on deep robust RL, build upon the dynamic model. In this work, we propose to revisit the static model. We suggest an analysis of why solving the static model under some mild hypotheses is a reasonable endeavor, based on an equivalence with the dynamic model, and formalize the general intuition that robust MDPs can be solved by tackling a series of static problems. We introduce a generic meta-algorithm called IWOCS, which incrementally identifies worst-case transition models so as to guide the search for a robust policy. Discussion on IWOCS sheds light on new ways to decouple policy optimization and adversarial transition functions and opens new perspectives for analysis. We derive a deep RL version of IWOCS and demonstrate it is competitive with state-of-the-art algorithms on classical benchmarks.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being used to evolve solutions to problems in many domains, in a process inspired by biological evolution. However, unlike biological evolution, most LLM-evolution frameworks are formulated as static optimization problems, overlooking the open-ended adversarial dynamics that characterize real-world evolutionary processes. Here, we study Digital Red Queen (DRQ), a simple self-play algorithm that embraces these so-called "Red Queen" dynamics via continual adaptation to a changing objective. DRQ uses an LLM to evolve assembly-like programs, called warriors, which compete against each other for control of a virtual machine in the game of Core War, a Turing-complete environment studied in artificial life and connected to cybersecurity. In each round of DRQ, the model evolves a new warrior to defeat all previous ones, producing a sequence of adapted warriors. Over many rounds, we observe that warriors become increasingly general (relative to a set of held-out human warriors). Interestingly, warriors also become less behaviorally diverse across independent runs, indicating a convergence pressure toward a general-purpose behavioral strategy, much like convergent evolution in nature. This result highlights a potential value of shifting from static objectives to dynamic Red Queen objectives. Our work positions Core War as a rich, controllable sandbox for studying adversarial adaptation in artificial systems and for evaluating LLM-based evolution methods. More broadly, the simplicity and effectiveness of DRQ suggest that similarly minimal self-play approaches could prove useful in other more practical multi-agent adversarial domains, like real-world cybersecurity or combating drug resistance.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

The emergence and impact of tipping points have garnered significant interest in both the social and natural sciences. Despite widespread recognition of the importance of feedbacks between human and natural systems, it is often assumed that the observed nonlinear dynamics in these coupled systems rests within either underlying human or natural processes, rather than the rates at which they interact. Using adoption of agricultural diversification practices as a case study, we show how two stable management paradigms (one dominated by conventional, homogeneous practices, the other by diversified practices) can emerge purely from temporal feedbacks between human decisions and ecological responses. We explore how this temporal mechanism of tipping points provides insight into designing more effective interventions that promote farmers transitions towards sustainable agriculture. Moreover, our flexible modeling framework could be applied to other cases to provide insight into numerous questions in social-ecological systems research and environmental policy.

It has long been known in both neuroscience and AI that ``binding'' between neurons leads to a form of competitive learning where representations are compressed in order to represent more abstract concepts in deeper layers of the network. More recently, it was also hypothesized that dynamic (spatiotemporal) representations play an important role in both neuroscience and AI. Building on these ideas, we introduce Artificial Kuramoto Oscillatory Neurons (AKOrN) as a dynamical alternative to threshold units, which can be combined with arbitrary connectivity designs such as fully connected, convolutional, or attentive mechanisms. Our generalized Kuramoto updates bind neurons together through their synchronization dynamics. We show that this idea provides performance improvements across a wide spectrum of tasks such as unsupervised object discovery, adversarial robustness, calibrated uncertainty quantification, and reasoning. We believe that these empirical results show the importance of rethinking our assumptions at the most basic neuronal level of neural representation, and in particular show the importance of dynamical representations.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

We propose SPARTA ALIGNMENT, an algorithm to collectively align multiple LLMs through competition and combat. To complement a single model's lack of diversity in generation and biases in evaluation, multiple LLMs form a "sparta tribe" to compete against each other in fulfilling instructions while serving as judges for the competition of others. For each iteration, one instruction and two models are selected for a duel, the other models evaluate the two responses, and their evaluation scores are aggregated through a adapted elo-ranking based reputation system, where winners/losers of combat gain/lose weight in evaluating others. The peer-evaluated combat results then become preference pairs where the winning response is preferred over the losing one, and all models learn from these preferences at the end of each iteration. SPARTA ALIGNMENT enables the self-evolution of multiple LLMs in an iterative and collective competition process. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SPARTA ALIGNMENT outperforms initial models and 4 self-alignment baselines across 10 out of 12 tasks and datasets with 7.0% average improvement. Further analysis reveals that SPARTA ALIGNMENT generalizes more effectively to unseen tasks and leverages the expertise diversity of participating models to produce more logical, direct and informative outputs.

Organizations typically train large models individually. This is costly and time-consuming, particularly for large-scale foundation models. Such vertical production is known to be suboptimal. Inspired by this economic insight, we ask whether it is possible to leverage others' expertise by trading the constituent parts in models, i.e., sets of weights, as if they were market commodities. While recent advances in aligning and interpolating models suggest that doing so may be possible, a number of fundamental questions must be answered to create viable parameter markets. In this work, we address these basic questions, propose a framework containing the infrastructure necessary for market operations to take place, study strategies for exchanging parameters, and offer means for agents to monetize parameters. Excitingly, compared to agents who train siloed models from scratch, we show that it is possible to mutually gain by using the market, even in competitive settings. This suggests that the notion of parameter markets may be a useful paradigm for improving large-scale model training in the future.

We revisit the structure learning problem for dynamic Bayesian networks and propose a method that simultaneously estimates contemporaneous (intra-slice) and time-lagged (inter-slice) relationships between variables in a time-series. Our approach is score-based, and revolves around minimizing a penalized loss subject to an acyclicity constraint. To solve this problem, we leverage a recent algebraic result characterizing the acyclicity constraint as a smooth equality constraint. The resulting algorithm, which we call DYNOTEARS, outperforms other methods on simulated data, especially in high-dimensions as the number of variables increases. We also apply this algorithm on real datasets from two different domains, finance and molecular biology, and analyze the resulting output. Compared to state-of-the-art methods for learning dynamic Bayesian networks, our method is both scalable and accurate on real data. The simple formulation and competitive performance of our method make it suitable for a variety of problems where one seeks to learn connections between variables across time.

We study the problem of convergence to a stationary point in zero-sum games. We propose competitive gradient optimization (CGO ), a gradient-based method that incorporates the interactions between the two players in zero-sum games for optimization updates. We provide continuous-time analysis of CGO and its convergence properties while showing that in the continuous limit, CGO predecessors degenerate to their gradient descent ascent (GDA) variants. We provide a rate of convergence to stationary points and further propose a generalized class of alpha-coherent function for which we provide convergence analysis. We show that for strictly alpha-coherent functions, our algorithm convergences to a saddle point. Moreover, we propose optimistic CGO (OCGO), an optimistic variant, for which we show convergence rate to saddle points in alpha-coherent class of functions.

The objective of personalized medicine is to tailor interventions to an individual patient's unique characteristics. A key technology for this purpose involves medical digital twins, computational models of human biology that can be personalized and dynamically updated to incorporate patient-specific data collected over time. Certain aspects of human biology, such as the immune system, are not easily captured with physics-based models, such as differential equations. Instead, they are often multi-scale, stochastic, and hybrid. This poses a challenge to existing model-based control and optimization approaches that cannot be readily applied to such models. Recent advances in automatic differentiation and neural-network control methods hold promise in addressing complex control problems. However, the application of these approaches to biomedical systems is still in its early stages. This work introduces dynamics-informed neural-network controllers as an alternative approach to control of medical digital twins. As a first use case for this method, the focus is on agent-based models, a versatile and increasingly common modeling platform in biomedicine. The effectiveness of the proposed neural-network control method is illustrated and benchmarked against other methods with two widely-used agent-based model types. The relevance of the method introduced here extends beyond medical digital twins to other complex dynamical systems.

Operating robots precisely and at high speeds has been a long-standing goal of robotics research. Balancing these competing demands is key to enabling the seamless collaboration of robots and humans and increasing task performance. However, traditional motor-driven systems often fall short in this balancing act. Due to their rigid and often heavy design exacerbated by positioning the motors into the joints, faster motions of such robots transfer high forces at impact. To enable precise and safe dynamic motions, we introduce a four degree-of-freedom~(DoF) tendon-driven robot arm. Tendons allow placing the actuation at the base to reduce the robot's inertia, which we show significantly reduces peak collision forces compared to conventional robots with motors placed near the joints. Pairing our robot with pneumatic muscles allows generating high forces and highly accelerated motions, while benefiting from impact resilience through passive compliance. Since tendons are subject to additional friction and hence prone to wear and tear, we validate the reliability of our robotic arm on various experiments, including long-term dynamic motions. We also demonstrate its ease of control by quantifying the nonlinearities of the system and the performance on a challenging dynamic table tennis task learned from scratch using reinforcement learning. We open-source the entire hardware design, which can be largely 3D printed, the control software, and a proprioceptive dataset of 25 days of diverse robot motions at webdav.tuebingen.mpg.de/pamy2.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) integrate into our social and economic interactions, we need to deepen our understanding of how humans respond to LLMs opponents in strategic settings. We present the results of the first controlled monetarily-incentivised laboratory experiment looking at differences in human behaviour in a multi-player p-beauty contest against other humans and LLMs. We use a within-subject design in order to compare behaviour at the individual level. We show that, in this environment, human subjects choose significantly lower numbers when playing against LLMs than humans, which is mainly driven by the increased prevalence of `zero' Nash-equilibrium choices. This shift is mainly driven by subjects with high strategic reasoning ability. Subjects who play the zero Nash-equilibrium choice motivate their strategy by appealing to perceived LLM's reasoning ability and, unexpectedly, propensity towards cooperation. Our findings provide foundational insights into the multi-player human-LLM interaction in simultaneous choice games, uncover heterogeneities in both subjects' behaviour and beliefs about LLM's play when playing against them, and suggest important implications for mechanism design in mixed human-LLM systems.

Neural network pruning is widely used to reduce model size and computational cost. Yet, most existing methods treat sparsity as an externally imposed constraint, enforced through heuristic importance scores or training-time regularization. In this work, we propose a fundamentally different perspective: pruning as an equilibrium outcome of strategic interaction among model components. We model parameter groups such as weights, neurons, or filters as players in a continuous non-cooperative game, where each player selects its level of participation in the network to balance contribution against redundancy and competition. Within this formulation, sparsity emerges naturally when continued participation becomes a dominated strategy at equilibrium. We analyze the resulting game and show that dominated players collapse to zero participation under mild conditions, providing a principled explanation for pruning behavior. Building on this insight, we derive a simple equilibrium-driven pruning algorithm that jointly updates network parameters and participation variables without relying on explicit importance scores. This work focuses on establishing a principled formulation and empirical validation of pruning as an equilibrium phenomenon, rather than exhaustive architectural or large-scale benchmarking. Experiments on standard benchmarks demonstrate that the proposed approach achieves competitive sparsity-accuracy trade-offs while offering an interpretable, theory-grounded alternative to existing pruning methods.

The bandits with knapsack (BwK) framework models online decision-making problems in which an agent makes a sequence of decisions subject to resource consumption constraints. The traditional model assumes that each action consumes a non-negative amount of resources and the process ends when the initial budgets are fully depleted. We study a natural generalization of the BwK framework which allows non-monotonic resource utilization, i.e., resources can be replenished by a positive amount. We propose a best-of-both-worlds primal-dual template that can handle any online learning problem with replenishment for which a suitable primal regret minimizer exists. In particular, we provide the first positive results for the case of adversarial inputs by showing that our framework guarantees a constant competitive ratio alpha when B=Omega(T) or when the possible per-round replenishment is a positive constant. Moreover, under a stochastic input model, our algorithm yields an instance-independent O(T^{1/2}) regret bound which complements existing instance-dependent bounds for the same setting. Finally, we provide applications of our framework to some economic problems of practical relevance.

We consider the task of identifying the Copeland winner(s) in a dueling bandits problem with ternary feedback. This is an underexplored but practically relevant variant of the conventional dueling bandits problem, in which, in addition to strict preference between two arms, one may observe feedback in the form of an indifference. We provide a lower bound on the sample complexity for any learning algorithm finding the Copeland winner(s) with a fixed error probability. Moreover, we propose POCOWISTA, an algorithm with a sample complexity that almost matches this lower bound, and which shows excellent empirical performance, even for the conventional dueling bandits problem. For the case where the preference probabilities satisfy a specific type of stochastic transitivity, we provide a refined version with an improved worst case sample complexity.

Dynamic adaptation has become an essential technique in accelerating distributed machine learning (ML) training. Recent studies have shown that dynamically adjusting model structure (e.g., lottery ticket hypothesis) or hyperparameters (e.g., batch size) can significantly accelerate training without sacrificing accuracy. However, existing ML cluster schedulers are not designed to handle dynamic adaptation. We show that existing schemes fail to provide fairness and degrade system efficiency when the training throughput changes over time under dynamic adaptation. We design Shockwave, a scheduler with future planning that builds on two key ideas. First, Shockwave extends classic market theory from static settings to dynamic settings to co-optimize efficiency and fairness. Second, Shockwave utilizes stochastic dynamic programming to handle dynamic changes. We build a system for Shockwave and validate its performance with both trace-driven simulation and cluster experiments. Results show that for traces of ML jobs with dynamic adaptation, Shockwave improves makespan by 1.3X and fairness by 2X when compared with existing fair scheduling schemes.

Subject-driven image generation models face a fundamental trade-off between identity preservation (fidelity) and prompt adherence (editability). While online reinforcement learning (RL), specifically GPRO, offers a promising solution, we find that a naive application of GRPO leads to competitive degradation, as the simple linear aggregation of rewards with static weights causes conflicting gradient signals and a misalignment with the temporal dynamics of the diffusion process. To overcome these limitations, we propose Customized-GRPO, a novel framework featuring two key innovations: (i) Synergy-Aware Reward Shaping (SARS), a non-linear mechanism that explicitly penalizes conflicted reward signals and amplifies synergistic ones, providing a sharper and more decisive gradient. (ii) Time-Aware Dynamic Weighting (TDW), which aligns the optimization pressure with the model's temporal dynamics by prioritizing prompt-following in the early, identity preservation in the later. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms naive GRPO baselines, successfully mitigating competitive degradation. Our model achieves a superior balance, generating images that both preserve key identity features and accurately adhere to complex textual prompts.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

Recent advances in reinforcement learning (RL) heavily rely on a variety of well-designed benchmarks, which provide environmental platforms and consistent criteria to evaluate existing and novel algorithms. Specifically, in multi-agent RL (MARL), a plethora of benchmarks based on cooperative games have spurred the development of algorithms that improve the scalability of cooperative multi-agent systems. However, for the competitive setting, a lightweight and open-sourced benchmark with challenging gaming dynamics and visual inputs has not yet been established. In this work, we present FightLadder, a real-time fighting game platform, to empower competitive MARL research. Along with the platform, we provide implementations of state-of-the-art MARL algorithms for competitive games, as well as a set of evaluation metrics to characterize the performance and exploitability of agents. We demonstrate the feasibility of this platform by training a general agent that consistently defeats 12 built-in characters in single-player mode, and expose the difficulty of training a non-exploitable agent without human knowledge and demonstrations in two-player mode. FightLadder provides meticulously designed environments to address critical challenges in competitive MARL research, aiming to catalyze a new era of discovery and advancement in the field. Videos and code at https://sites.google.com/view/fightladder/home.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) improves the alignment of large language models (LLMs) with human values by training directly on human preference datasets, eliminating the need for reward models. However, due to the presence of cross-domain human preferences, direct continual training can lead to catastrophic forgetting, limiting DPO's performance and efficiency. Inspired by intraspecific competition driving species evolution, we propose a Online Fast-Slow chasing DPO (OFS-DPO) for preference alignment, simulating competition through fast and slow chasing among models to facilitate rapid adaptation. Specifically, we first derive the regret upper bound for online learning, validating our motivation with a min-max optimization pattern. Based on this, we introduce two identical modules using Low-rank Adaptive (LoRA) with different optimization speeds to simulate intraspecific competition, and propose a new regularization term to guide their learning. To further mitigate catastrophic forgetting in cross-domain scenarios, we extend the OFS-DPO with LoRA modules combination strategy, resulting in the Cross domain Online Fast-Slow chasing DPO (COFS-DPO). This method leverages linear combinations of fast modules parameters from different task domains, fully utilizing historical information to achive continual value alignment. Experimental results show that OFS-DPO outperforms DPO in in-domain alignment, while COFS-DPO excels in cross-domain continual learning scenarios.

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

Dynamic treatment regimes (DTRs) are personalized, adaptive, multi-stage treatment plans that adapt treatment decisions both to an individual's initial features and to intermediate outcomes and features at each subsequent stage, which are affected by decisions in prior stages. Examples include personalized first- and second-line treatments of chronic conditions like diabetes, cancer, and depression, which adapt to patient response to first-line treatment, disease progression, and individual characteristics. While existing literature mostly focuses on estimating the optimal DTR from offline data such as from sequentially randomized trials, we study the problem of developing the optimal DTR in an online manner, where the interaction with each individual affect both our cumulative reward and our data collection for future learning. We term this the DTR bandit problem. We propose a novel algorithm that, by carefully balancing exploration and exploitation, is guaranteed to achieve rate-optimal regret when the transition and reward models are linear. We demonstrate our algorithm and its benefits both in synthetic experiments and in a case study of adaptive treatment of major depressive disorder using real-world data.

Model-based reinforcement learning is a powerful tool, but collecting data to fit an accurate model of the system can be costly. Exploring an unknown environment in a sample-efficient manner is hence of great importance. However, the complexity of dynamics and the computational limitations of real systems make this task challenging. In this work, we introduce FLEX, an exploration algorithm for nonlinear dynamics based on optimal experimental design. Our policy maximizes the information of the next step and results in an adaptive exploration algorithm, compatible with generic parametric learning models and requiring minimal resources. We test our method on a number of nonlinear environments covering different settings, including time-varying dynamics. Keeping in mind that exploration is intended to serve an exploitation objective, we also test our algorithm on downstream model-based classical control tasks and compare it to other state-of-the-art model-based and model-free approaches. The performance achieved by FLEX is competitive and its computational cost is low.

Interpretability research aims to bridge the gap between empirical success and our scientific understanding of the inner workings of large language models (LLMs). However, most existing research focuses on analyzing a single mechanism, such as how models copy or recall factual knowledge. In this work, we propose a formulation of competition of mechanisms, which focuses on the interplay of multiple mechanisms instead of individual mechanisms and traces how one of them becomes dominant in the final prediction. We uncover how and where mechanisms compete within LLMs using two interpretability methods: logit inspection and attention modification. Our findings show traces of the mechanisms and their competition across various model components and reveal attention positions that effectively control the strength of certain mechanisms. Code: https://github.com/francescortu/comp-mech. Data: https://huggingface.co/datasets/francescortu/comp-mech.

Mixture of Experts (MoE) models scale capacity but often suffer from representation collapse and gradient instability. We propose Dynamic Subspace Composition (DSC), a framework that approximates context-dependent weights via a state-dependent, sparse expansion of a shared basis bank. Formally, DSC models the weight update as a residual trajectory within a Star- Shaped Domain, employing a Magnitude-Gated Simplex Interpolation to ensure continuity at the identity. Unlike standard Mixture-of-LoRAs, which incurs O(M rd) parameter complexity by retrieving independent rank-r matrices, DSC constructs a compositional rank-K approximation from decoupled unit-norm basis vectors. This reduces parameter complexity to O(M d) and memory traffic to O(Kd), while Frame-Theoretic regularization and spectral constraints provide rigorous worst-case bounds on the dynamic update. The code is available at https://github. com/VladimerKhasia/DSC

Deception is prevalent in human social settings. However, studies into the effect of deception on reinforcement learning algorithms have been limited to simplistic settings, restricting their applicability to complex real-world problems. This paper addresses this by introducing a new mixed competitive-cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) environment inspired by popular role-based deception games such as Werewolf, Avalon, and Among Us. The environment's unique challenge lies in the necessity to cooperate with other agents despite not knowing if they are friend or foe. Furthermore, we introduce a model of deception, which we call Bayesian belief manipulation (BBM) and demonstrate its effectiveness at deceiving other agents in this environment while also increasing the deceiving agent's performance.

In various real-world scenarios, interactions among agents often resemble the dynamics of general-sum games, where each agent strives to optimize its own utility. Despite the ubiquitous relevance of such settings, decentralized machine learning algorithms have struggled to find equilibria that maximize individual utility while preserving social welfare. In this paper we introduce Learning with Opponent Q-Learning Awareness (LOQA), a novel, decentralized reinforcement learning algorithm tailored to optimizing an agent's individual utility while fostering cooperation among adversaries in partially competitive environments. LOQA assumes the opponent samples actions proportionally to their action-value function Q. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of LOQA at achieving state-of-the-art performance in benchmark scenarios such as the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and the Coin Game. LOQA achieves these outcomes with a significantly reduced computational footprint, making it a promising approach for practical multi-agent applications.

Unsupervised reinforcement learning (RL) studies how to leverage environment statistics to learn useful behaviors without the cost of reward engineering. However, a central challenge in unsupervised RL is to extract behaviors that meaningfully affect the world and cover the range of possible outcomes, without getting distracted by inherently unpredictable, uncontrollable, and stochastic elements in the environment. To this end, we propose an unsupervised RL method designed for high-dimensional, stochastic environments based on an adversarial game between two policies (which we call Explore and Control) controlling a single body and competing over the amount of observation entropy the agent experiences. The Explore agent seeks out states that maximally surprise the Control agent, which in turn aims to minimize surprise, and thereby manipulate the environment to return to familiar and predictable states. The competition between these two policies drives them to seek out increasingly surprising parts of the environment while learning to gain mastery over them. We show formally that the resulting algorithm maximizes coverage of the underlying state in block MDPs with stochastic observations, providing theoretical backing to our hypothesis that this procedure avoids uncontrollable and stochastic distractions. Our experiments further demonstrate that Adversarial Surprise leads to the emergence of complex and meaningful skills, and outperforms state-of-the-art unsupervised reinforcement learning methods in terms of both exploration and zero-shot transfer to downstream tasks.

Applying reinforcement learning (RL) to combinatorial optimization problems is attractive as it removes the need for expert knowledge or pre-solved instances. However, it is unrealistic to expect an agent to solve these (often NP-)hard problems in a single shot at inference due to their inherent complexity. Thus, leading approaches often implement additional search strategies, from stochastic sampling and beam search to explicit fine-tuning. In this paper, we argue for the benefits of learning a population of complementary policies, which can be simultaneously rolled out at inference. To this end, we introduce Poppy, a simple training procedure for populations. Instead of relying on a predefined or hand-crafted notion of diversity, Poppy induces an unsupervised specialization targeted solely at maximizing the performance of the population. We show that Poppy produces a set of complementary policies, and obtains state-of-the-art RL results on four popular NP-hard problems: traveling salesman, capacitated vehicle routing, 0-1 knapsack, and job-shop scheduling.

The Reinforcement Learning (RL) building blocks, i.e. Q-functions and policy networks, usually take elements from the cartesian product of two domains as input. In particular, the input of the Q-function is both the state and the action, and in multi-task problems (Meta-RL) the policy can take a state and a context. Standard architectures tend to ignore these variables' underlying interpretations and simply concatenate their features into a single vector. In this work, we argue that this choice may lead to poor gradient estimation in actor-critic algorithms and high variance learning steps in Meta-RL algorithms. To consider the interaction between the input variables, we suggest using a Hypernetwork architecture where a primary network determines the weights of a conditional dynamic network. We show that this approach improves the gradient approximation and reduces the learning step variance, which both accelerates learning and improves the final performance. We demonstrate a consistent improvement across different locomotion tasks and different algorithms both in RL (TD3 and SAC) and in Meta-RL (MAML and PEARL).

When one agent interacts with a multi-agent environment, it is challenging to deal with various opponents unseen before. Modeling the behaviors, goals, or beliefs of opponents could help the agent adjust its policy to adapt to different opponents. In addition, it is also important to consider opponents who are learning simultaneously or capable of reasoning. However, existing work usually tackles only one of the aforementioned types of opponents. In this paper, we propose model-based opponent modeling (MBOM), which employs the environment model to adapt to all kinds of opponents. MBOM simulates the recursive reasoning process in the environment model and imagines a set of improving opponent policies. To effectively and accurately represent the opponent policy, MBOM further mixes the imagined opponent policies according to the similarity with the real behaviors of opponents. Empirically, we show that MBOM achieves more effective adaptation than existing methods in a variety of tasks, respectively with different types of opponents, i.e., fixed policy, na\"ive learner, and reasoning learner.

We introduce an Implicit Game-Theoretic MPC (IGT-MPC), a decentralized algorithm for two-agent motion planning that uses a learned value function that predicts the game-theoretic interaction outcomes as the terminal cost-to-go function in a model predictive control (MPC) framework, guiding agents to implicitly account for interactions with other agents and maximize their reward. This approach applies to competitive and cooperative multi-agent motion planning problems which we formulate as constrained dynamic games. Given a constrained dynamic game, we randomly sample initial conditions and solve for the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) to generate a dataset of GNE solutions, computing the reward outcome of each game-theoretic interaction from the GNE. The data is used to train a simple neural network to predict the reward outcome, which we use as the terminal cost-to-go function in an MPC scheme. We showcase emerging competitive and coordinated behaviors using IGT-MPC in scenarios such as two-vehicle head-to-head racing and un-signalized intersection navigation. IGT-MPC offers a novel method integrating machine learning and game-theoretic reasoning into model-based decentralized multi-agent motion planning.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a sequence of indivisible items that arrive online in an arbitrary order to a group of n agents with additive normalized valuation functions. We consider both the allocation of goods and chores and propose algorithms for approximating maximin share (MMS) allocations. When agents have identical valuation functions the problem coincides with the semi-online machine covering problem (when items are goods) and load balancing problem (when items are chores), for both of which optimal competitive ratios have been achieved. In this paper, we consider the case when agents have general additive valuation functions. For the allocation of goods, we show that no competitive algorithm exists even when there are only three agents and propose an optimal 0.5-competitive algorithm for the case of two agents. For the allocation of chores, we propose a (2-1/n)-competitive algorithm for n>=3 agents and a square root of 2 (approximately 1.414)-competitive algorithm for two agents. Additionally, we show that no algorithm can do better than 15/11 (approximately 1.364)-competitive for two agents.

In heterogeneous multi-task decision-making, tasks not only exhibit diverse observation and action spaces but also vary substantially in their underlying complexities. While conventional multi-task world models like UniZero excel in single-task settings, we find that when handling a broad and diverse suite of tasks, gradient conflicts and the loss of model plasticity often constrain their sample efficiency. In this work, we address these challenges from two complementary perspectives: the single learning iteration and the overall learning process. First, to mitigate the gradient conflicts, we systematically investigate key architectural designs for extending UniZero. Our investigation identifies a Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architecture as the most effective approach. We demonstrate, both theoretically and empirically, that this architecture alleviates gradient conflicts by routing task-specific representations to specialized sub-networks. This finding leads to our proposed model, ScaleZero. Second, to dynamically allocate model capacity throughout the learning process, we introduce an online Dynamic Parameter Scaling (DPS) strategy. This strategy progressively integrates LoRA adapters in response to task-specific progress, enabling adaptive knowledge retention and parameter expansion. Evaluations on a diverse set of standard benchmarks (Atari, DMC, Jericho) demonstrate that ScaleZero, utilizing solely online reinforcement learning with one model, performs on par with specialized single-task agents. With the DPS strategy, it remains competitive while using just 71.5% of the environment interactions. These findings underscore the potential of ScaleZero for effective multi-task planning. Our code is available at magenta{https://github.com/opendilab/LightZero}.

Advancing towards generalist agents necessitates the concurrent processing of multiple tasks using a unified model, thereby underscoring the growing significance of simultaneous model training on multiple downstream tasks. A common issue in multi-task learning is the occurrence of gradient conflict, which leads to potential competition among different tasks during joint training. This competition often results in improvements in one task at the expense of deterioration in another. Although several optimization methods have been developed to address this issue by manipulating task gradients for better task balancing, they cannot decrease the incidence of gradient conflict. In this paper, we systematically investigate the occurrence of gradient conflict across different methods and propose a strategy to reduce such conflicts through sparse training (ST), wherein only a portion of the model's parameters are updated during training while keeping the rest unchanged. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that ST effectively mitigates conflicting gradients and leads to superior performance. Furthermore, ST can be easily integrated with gradient manipulation techniques, thus enhancing their effectiveness.

Closed-loop decision-making systems (e.g., lending, screening, or recidivism risk assessment) often operate under fairness and service constraints while inducing feedback effects: decisions change who appears in the future, yielding non-stationary data and potentially amplifying disparities. We study online learning of a one-dimensional threshold policy from bandit feedback under demographic parity (DP) and, optionally, service-rate constraints. The learner observes only a scalar score each round and selects a threshold; reward and constraint residuals are revealed only for the chosen threshold. We propose Optimistic Feasible Search (OFS), a simple grid-based method that maintains confidence bounds for reward and constraint residuals for each candidate threshold. At each round, OFS selects a threshold that appears feasible under confidence bounds and, among those, maximizes optimistic reward; if no threshold appears feasible, OFS selects the threshold minimizing optimistic constraint violation. This design directly targets feasible high-utility thresholds and is particularly effective for low-dimensional, interpretable policy classes where discretization is natural. We evaluate OFS on (i) a synthetic closed-loop benchmark with stable contraction dynamics and (ii) two semi-synthetic closed-loop benchmarks grounded in German Credit and COMPAS, constructed by training a score model and feeding group-dependent acceptance decisions back into population composition. Across all environments, OFS achieves higher reward with smaller cumulative constraint violation than unconstrained and primal-dual bandit baselines, and is near-oracle relative to the best feasible fixed threshold under the same sweep procedure. Experiments are reproducible and organized with double-blind-friendly relative outputs.

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a game adequately capture the limit behavior of natural game dynamics. These two results have created a need and opportunity to articulate a principled computational theory of the meaning of the game that is based on game dynamics. Given any game in normal form, and any prior distribution of play, we study the problem of computing the asymptotic behavior of a class of natural dynamics called the noisy replicator dynamics as a limit distribution over the sink equilibria of the game. When the prior distribution has pure strategy support, we prove this distribution can be computed efficiently, in near-linear time to the size of the best-response graph. When the distribution can be sampled -- for example, if it is the uniform distribution over all mixed strategy profiles -- we show through experiments that the limit distribution of reasonably large games can be estimated quite accurately through sampling and simulation.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback has emerged as a standard for aligning diffusion models. However, we identify a fundamental limitation in the standard DPO formulation because it relies on the Bradley-Terry model to aggregate diverse evaluation axes like aesthetic quality and semantic alignment into a single scalar reward. This aggregation creates a reward conflict where the model is forced to unlearn desirable features of a specific dimension if they appear in a globally non-preferred sample. To address this issue, we propose Multi Reward Conditional DPO (MCDPO). This method resolves reward conflicts by introducing a disentangled Bradley-Terry objective. MCDPO explicitly injects a preference outcome vector as a condition during training, which allows the model to learn the correct optimization direction for each reward axis independently within a single network. We further introduce dimensional reward dropout to ensure balanced optimization across dimensions. Extensive experiments on Stable Diffusion 1.5 and SDXL demonstrate that MCDPO achieves superior performance on benchmarks. Notably, our conditional framework enables dynamic and multiple-axis control at inference time using Classifier Free Guidance to amplify specific reward dimensions without additional training or external reward models.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

Machine learning methods can be a valuable aid in the scientific process, but they need to face challenging settings where data come from inhomogeneous experimental conditions. Recent meta-learning methods have made significant progress in multi-task learning, but they rely on black-box neural networks, resulting in high computational costs and limited interpretability. Leveraging the structure of the learning problem, we argue that multi-environment generalization can be achieved using a simpler learning model, with an affine structure with respect to the learning task. Crucially, we prove that this architecture can identify the physical parameters of the system, enabling interpreable learning. We demonstrate the competitive generalization performance and the low computational cost of our method by comparing it to state-of-the-art algorithms on physical systems, ranging from toy models to complex, non-analytical systems. The interpretability of our method is illustrated with original applications to physical-parameter-induced adaptation and to adaptive control.

We derive an expression for the variation between parallel trajectories in phenotypic evolution, extending the well known result that predicts the mean evolutionary path in adaptive dynamics or quantitative genetics. We show how this expression gives rise to the notion of fluctuation domains - parts of the fitness landscape where the rate of evolution is very predictable (due to fluctuation dissipation) and parts where it is highly variable (due to fluctuation enhancement). These fluctuation domains are determined by the curvature of the fitness landscape. Regions of the fitness landscape with positive curvature, such as adaptive valleys or branching points, experience enhancement. Regions with negative curvature, such as adaptive peaks, experience dissipation. We explore these dynamics in the ecological scenarios of implicit and explicit competition for a limiting resource.

In financial trading, large language model (LLM)-based agents demonstrate significant potential. However, the high sensitivity to market noise undermines the performance of LLM-based trading systems. To address this limitation, we propose a novel multi-agent system featuring an internal competitive mechanism inspired by modern corporate management structures. The system consists of two specialized teams: (1) Data Team - responsible for processing and condensing massive market data into diversified text factors, ensuring they fit the model's constrained context. (2) Research Team - tasked with making parallelized multipath trading decisions based on deep research methods. The core innovation lies in implementing a real-time evaluation and ranking mechanism within each team, driven by authentic market feedback. Each agent's performance undergoes continuous scoring and ranking, with only outputs from top-performing agents being adopted. The design enables the system to adaptively adjust to dynamic environment, enhances robustness against market noise and ultimately delivers superior trading performance. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed system significantly outperforms prevailing multi-agent systems and traditional quantitative investment methods across diverse evaluation metrics. ContestTrade is open-sourced on GitHub at https://github.com/FinStep-AI/ContestTrade.

In this paper, we tackle the problem of learning to play 3v3 multi-drone volleyball, a new embodied competitive task that requires both high-level strategic coordination and low-level agile control. The task is turn-based, multi-agent, and physically grounded, posing significant challenges due to its long-horizon dependencies, tight inter-agent coupling, and the underactuated dynamics of quadrotors. To address this, we propose Hierarchical Co-Self-Play (HCSP), a hierarchical reinforcement learning framework that separates centralized high-level strategic decision-making from decentralized low-level motion control. We design a three-stage population-based training pipeline to enable both strategy and skill to emerge from scratch without expert demonstrations: (I) training diverse low-level skills, (II) learning high-level strategy via self-play with fixed low-level skills, and (III) joint fine-tuning through co-self-play. Experiments show that HCSP achieves superior performance, outperforming non-hierarchical self-play and rule-based hierarchical baselines with an average 82.9% win rate and a 71.5% win rate against the two-stage variant. Moreover, co-self-play leads to emergent team behaviors such as role switching and coordinated formations, demonstrating the effectiveness of our hierarchical design and training scheme. The project page is at https://sites.google.com/view/hi-co-self-play.

In this work, our goal is to train agents that can coordinate with seen, unseen as well as human partners in a multi-agent communication environment involving natural language. Previous work using a single set of agents has shown great progress in generalizing to known partners, however it struggles when coordinating with unfamiliar agents. To mitigate that, recent work explored the use of population-based approaches, where multiple agents interact with each other with the goal of learning more generic protocols. These methods, while able to result in good coordination between unseen partners, still only achieve so in cases of simple languages, thus failing to adapt to human partners using natural language. We attribute this to the use of static populations and instead propose a dynamic population-based meta-learning approach that builds such a population in an iterative manner. We perform a holistic evaluation of our method on two different referential games, and show that our agents outperform all prior work when communicating with seen partners and humans. Furthermore, we analyze the natural language generation skills of our agents, where we find that our agents also outperform strong baselines. Finally, we test the robustness of our agents when communicating with out-of-population agents and carefully test the importance of each component of our method through ablation studies.

We initiate a principled study of algorithmic collective action on digital platforms that deploy machine learning algorithms. We propose a simple theoretical model of a collective interacting with a firm's learning algorithm. The collective pools the data of participating individuals and executes an algorithmic strategy by instructing participants how to modify their own data to achieve a collective goal. We investigate the consequences of this model in three fundamental learning-theoretic settings: the case of a nonparametric optimal learning algorithm, a parametric risk minimizer, and gradient-based optimization. In each setting, we come up with coordinated algorithmic strategies and characterize natural success criteria as a function of the collective's size. Complementing our theory, we conduct systematic experiments on a skill classification task involving tens of thousands of resumes from a gig platform for freelancers. Through more than two thousand model training runs of a BERT-like language model, we see a striking correspondence emerge between our empirical observations and the predictions made by our theory. Taken together, our theory and experiments broadly support the conclusion that algorithmic collectives of exceedingly small fractional size can exert significant control over a platform's learning algorithm.

Multi-agent systems often require agents to collaborate with or compete against other agents with diverse goals, behaviors, or strategies. Agent modeling is essential when designing adaptive policies for intelligent machine agents in multiagent systems, as this is the means by which the ego agent understands other agents' behavior and extracts their meaningful policy representations. These representations can be used to enhance the ego agent's adaptive policy which is trained by reinforcement learning. However, existing agent modeling approaches typically assume the availability of local observations from other agents (modeled agents) during training or a long observation trajectory for policy adaption. To remove these constrictive assumptions and improve agent modeling performance, we devised a Contrastive Learning-based Agent Modeling (CLAM) method that relies only on the local observations from the ego agent during training and execution. With these observations, CLAM is capable of generating consistent high-quality policy representations in real-time right from the beginning of each episode. We evaluated the efficacy of our approach in both cooperative and competitive multi-agent environments. Our experiments demonstrate that our approach achieves state-of-the-art on both cooperative and competitive tasks, highlighting the potential of contrastive learning-based agent modeling for enhancing reinforcement learning.

We introduce Pok\'eLLMon, the first LLM-embodied agent that achieves human-parity performance in tactical battle games, as demonstrated in Pok\'emon battles. The design of Pok\'eLLMon incorporates three key strategies: (i) In-context reinforcement learning that instantly consumes text-based feedback derived from battles to iteratively refine the policy; (ii) Knowledge-augmented generation that retrieves external knowledge to counteract hallucination and enables the agent to act timely and properly; (iii) Consistent action generation to mitigate the panic switching phenomenon when the agent faces a powerful opponent and wants to elude the battle. We show that online battles against human demonstrates Pok\'eLLMon's human-like battle strategies and just-in-time decision making, achieving 49\% of win rate in the Ladder competitions and 56\% of win rate in the invited battles. Our implementation and playable battle logs are available at: https://github.com/git-disl/PokeLLMon.

This paper introduces Alympics (Olympics for Agents), a systematic simulation framework utilizing Large Language Model (LLM) agents for game theory research. Alympics creates a versatile platform for studying complex game theory problems, bridging the gap between theoretical game theory and empirical investigations by providing a controlled environment for simulating human-like strategic interactions with LLM agents. In our pilot case study, the "Water Allocation Challenge," we explore Alympics through a challenging strategic game focused on the multi-round auction on scarce survival resources. This study demonstrates the framework's ability to qualitatively and quantitatively analyze game determinants, strategies, and outcomes. Additionally, we conduct a comprehensive human assessment and an in-depth evaluation of LLM agents in strategic decision-making scenarios. Our findings not only expand the understanding of LLM agents' proficiency in emulating human strategic behavior but also highlight their potential in advancing game theory knowledge, thereby enriching our understanding of both game theory and empowering further research into strategic decision-making domains with LLM agents. Codes, prompts, and all related resources are available at https://github.com/microsoft/Alympics.

Many problems, such as online ad display, can be formulated as online bipartite matching. The crucial challenge lies in the nature of sequentially-revealed online item information, based on which we make irreversible matching decisions at each step. While numerous expert online algorithms have been proposed with bounded worst-case competitive ratios, they may not offer satisfactory performance in average cases. On the other hand, reinforcement learning (RL) has been applied to improve the average performance, but it lacks robustness and can perform arbitrarily poorly. In this paper, we propose a novel RL-based approach to edge-weighted online bipartite matching with robustness guarantees (LOMAR), achieving both good average-case and worst-case performance. The key novelty of LOMAR is a new online switching operation which, based on a judicious condition to hedge against future uncertainties, decides whether to follow the expert's decision or the RL decision for each online item. We prove that for any rhoin[0,1], LOMAR is rho-competitive against any given expert online algorithm. To improve the average performance, we train the RL policy by explicitly considering the online switching operation. Finally, we run empirical experiments to demonstrate the advantages of LOMAR compared to existing baselines. Our code is available at: https://github.com/Ren-Research/LOMAR

This paper presents a new approach that integrates deep learning with computational chess, using both the Mixture of Experts (MoE) method and Monte-Carlo Tree Search (MCTS). Our methodology employs a suite of specialized models, each designed to respond to specific changes in the game's input data. This results in a framework with sparsely activated models, which provides significant computational benefits. Our framework combines the MoE method with MCTS, in order to align it with the strategic phases of chess, thus departing from the conventional ``one-for-all'' model. Instead, we utilize distinct game phase definitions to effectively distribute computational tasks across multiple expert neural networks. Our empirical research shows a substantial improvement in playing strength, surpassing the traditional single-model framework. This validates the efficacy of our integrated approach and highlights the potential of incorporating expert knowledge and strategic principles into neural network design. The fusion of MoE and MCTS offers a promising avenue for advancing machine learning architectures.

Game-playing agents like AlphaGo have achieved superhuman performance through self-play, which is theoretically guaranteed to yield optimal policies in competitive games. However, most language tasks are partially or fully cooperative, so it is an open question whether techniques like self-play can effectively be used to improve language models. We empirically investigate this question in a negotiation game setting known as Deal or No Deal (DoND). Crucially, the objective in DoND can be modified to produce a fully cooperative game, a strictly competitive one, or anything in between. We finetune language models in self-play over multiple rounds of filtered behavior cloning in DoND for each of these objectives. Contrary to expectations, we find that language model self-play leads to significant performance gains in both cooperation and competition with humans, suggesting that self-play and related techniques have promise despite a lack of theoretical guarantees.

In this position paper, we observe that empirical evaluation in Generative AI is at a crisis point since traditional ML evaluation and benchmarking strategies are insufficient to meet the needs of evaluating modern GenAI models and systems. There are many reasons for this, including the fact that these models typically have nearly unbounded input and output spaces, typically do not have a well defined ground truth target, and typically exhibit strong feedback loops and prediction dependence based on context of previous model outputs. On top of these critical issues, we argue that the problems of {\em leakage} and {\em contamination} are in fact the most important and difficult issues to address for GenAI evaluations. Interestingly, the field of AI Competitions has developed effective measures and practices to combat leakage for the purpose of counteracting cheating by bad actors within a competition setting. This makes AI Competitions an especially valuable (but underutilized) resource. Now is time for the field to view AI Competitions as the gold standard for empirical rigor in GenAI evaluation, and to harness and harvest their results with according value.

In peer mechanisms, the competitors for a prize also determine who wins. Each competitor may be asked to rank, grade, or nominate peers for the prize. Since the prize can be valuable, such as financial aid, course grades, or an award at a conference, competitors may be tempted to manipulate the mechanism. We survey approaches to prevent or discourage the manipulation of peer mechanisms. We conclude our survey by identifying several important research challenges.

We consider a biological population whose environment varies periodically in time, exhibiting two very different "seasons" : one is favorable and the other one is unfavorable. For monotone differential models with concave nonlinearities, we address the following question: the system's period being fixed, under what conditions does there exist a critical duration for the unfavorable season? By "critical duration" we mean that above some threshold, the population cannot sustain and extincts, while below this threshold, the system converges to a unique periodic and positive solution. We term this a "sharp seasonal threshold property" (SSTP, for short). Building upon a previous result, we obtain sufficient conditions for SSTP in any dimension and apply our criterion to a two-dimensional model featuring juvenile and adult populations of insects.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Learning in strategy games (e.g. StarCraft, poker) requires the discovery of diverse policies. This is often achieved by iteratively training new policies against existing ones, growing a policy population that is robust to exploit. This iterative approach suffers from two issues in real-world games: a) under finite budget, approximate best-response operators at each iteration needs truncating, resulting in under-trained good-responses populating the population; b) repeated learning of basic skills at each iteration is wasteful and becomes intractable in the presence of increasingly strong opponents. In this work, we propose Neural Population Learning (NeuPL) as a solution to both issues. NeuPL offers convergence guarantees to a population of best-responses under mild assumptions. By representing a population of policies within a single conditional model, NeuPL enables transfer learning across policies. Empirically, we show the generality, improved performance and efficiency of NeuPL across several test domains. Most interestingly, we show that novel strategies become more accessible, not less, as the neural population expands.

Balancing game difficulty in video games is a key task to create interesting gaming experiences for players. Mismatching the game difficulty and a player's skill or commitment results in frustration or boredom on the player's side, and hence reduces time spent playing the game. In this work, we explore balancing game difficulty using machine learning-based agents to challenge players based on their current behavior. This is achieved by a combination of two agents, in which one learns to imitate the player, while the second is trained to beat the first. In our demo, we investigate the proposed framework for personalized dynamic difficulty adjustment of AI agents in the context of the fighting game AI competition.

Developing AI agents that can robustly adapt to dramatically different strategic landscapes without retraining is a central challenge for multi-agent learning. Pok\'emon Video Game Championships (VGC) is a domain with an extraordinarily large space of possible team configurations of approximately 10^{139} - far larger than those of Dota or Starcraft. The highly discrete, combinatorial nature of team building in Pok\'emon VGC causes optimal strategies to shift dramatically depending on both the team being piloted and the opponent's team, making generalization uniquely challenging. To advance research on this problem, we introduce VGC-Bench: a benchmark that provides critical infrastructure, standardizes evaluation protocols, and supplies human-play datasets and a range of baselines - from large-language-model agents and behavior cloning to reinforcement learning and empirical game-theoretic methods such as self-play, fictitious play, and double oracle. In the restricted setting where an agent is trained and evaluated on a single-team configuration, our methods are able to win against a professional VGC competitor. We extensively evaluated all baseline methods over progressively larger team sets and find that even the best-performing algorithm in the single-team setting struggles at scaling up as team size grows. Thus, policy generalization across diverse team strategies remains an open challenge for the community. Our code is open sourced at https://github.com/cameronangliss/VGC-Bench.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

End-to-end autonomous driving models trained solely with imitation learning (IL) often suffer from poor generalization. In contrast, reinforcement learning (RL) promotes exploration through reward maximization but faces challenges such as sample inefficiency and unstable convergence. A natural solution is to combine IL and RL. Moving beyond the conventional two-stage paradigm (IL pretraining followed by RL fine-tuning), we propose CoIRL-AD, a competitive dual-policy framework that enables IL and RL agents to interact during training. CoIRL-AD introduces a competition-based mechanism that facilitates knowledge exchange while preventing gradient conflicts. Experiments on the nuScenes dataset show an 18% reduction in collision rate compared to baselines, along with stronger generalization and improved performance on long-tail scenarios. Code is available at: https://github.com/SEU-zxj/CoIRL-AD.

Drug shortages pose critical risks to patient care and healthcare systems worldwide, yet the effectiveness of regulatory interventions remains poorly understood due to information asymmetries in pharmaceutical supply chains. We propose ShortageSim, addresses this challenge by providing the first simulation framework that evaluates the impact of regulatory interventions on competition dynamics under information asymmetry. Using Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents, the framework models the strategic decisions of drug manufacturers and institutional buyers, in response to shortage alerts given by the regulatory agency. Unlike traditional game theory models that assume perfect rationality and complete information, ShortageSim simulates heterogeneous interpretations on regulatory announcements and the resulting decisions. Experiments on self-processed dataset of historical shortage events show that ShortageSim reduces the resolution lag for production disruption cases by up to 84\%, achieving closer alignment to real-world trajectories than the zero-shot baseline. Our framework confirms the effect of regulatory alert in addressing shortages and introduces a new method for understanding competition in multi-stage environments under uncertainty. We open-source ShortageSim and a dataset of 2,925 FDA shortage events, providing a novel framework for future research on policy design and testing in supply chains under information asymmetry.

A successful tactic that is followed by the scientific community for advancing AI is to treat games as problems, which has been proven to lead to various breakthroughs. We adapt this strategy in order to study Rocket League, a widely popular but rather under-explored 3D multiplayer video game with a distinct physics engine and complex dynamics that pose a significant challenge in developing efficient and high-performance game-playing agents. In this paper, we present Lucy-SKG, a Reinforcement Learning-based model that learned how to play Rocket League in a sample-efficient manner, outperforming by a notable margin the two highest-ranking bots in this game, namely Necto (2022 bot champion) and its successor Nexto, thus becoming a state-of-the-art agent. Our contributions include: a) the development of a reward analysis and visualization library, b) novel parameterizable reward shape functions that capture the utility of complex reward types via our proposed Kinesthetic Reward Combination (KRC) technique, and c) design of auxiliary neural architectures for training on reward prediction and state representation tasks in an on-policy fashion for enhanced efficiency in learning speed and performance. By performing thorough ablation studies for each component of Lucy-SKG, we showed their independent effectiveness in overall performance. In doing so, we demonstrate the prospects and challenges of using sample-efficient Reinforcement Learning techniques for controlling complex dynamical systems under competitive team-based multiplayer conditions.

We investigate factors contributing to LLM agents' success in competitive multi-agent environments, using auctions as a testbed where agents bid to maximize profit. The agents are equipped with bidding domain knowledge, distinct personas that reflect item preferences, and a memory of auction history. Our work extends the classic auction scenario by creating a realistic environment where multiple agents bid on houses, weighing aspects such as size, location, and budget to secure the most desirable homes at the lowest prices. Particularly, we investigate three key questions: (a) How does a persona influence an agent's behavior in a competitive setting? (b) Can an agent effectively profile its competitors' behavior during auctions? (c) How can persona profiling be leveraged to create an advantage using strategies such as theory of mind? Through a series of experiments, we analyze the behaviors of LLM agents and shed light on new findings. Our testbed, called HARBOR, offers a valuable platform for deepening our understanding of multi-agent workflows in competitive environments.

Solving the problem of cooperation is fundamentally important for the creation and maintenance of functional societies. Problems of cooperation are omnipresent within human society, with examples ranging from navigating busy road junctions to negotiating treaties. As the use of AI becomes more pervasive throughout society, the need for socially intelligent agents capable of navigating these complex cooperative dilemmas is becoming increasingly evident. Direct punishment is a ubiquitous social mechanism that has been shown to foster the emergence of cooperation in both humans and non-humans. In the natural world, direct punishment is often strongly coupled with partner selection and reputation and used in conjunction with third-party punishment. The interactions between these mechanisms could potentially enhance the emergence of cooperation within populations. However, no previous work has evaluated the learning dynamics and outcomes emerging from Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) populations that combine these mechanisms. This paper addresses this gap. It presents a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the behaviors and learning dynamics associated with direct punishment, third-party punishment, partner selection, and reputation. Finally, we discuss the implications of using these mechanisms on the design of cooperative AI systems.

The entropic fictitious play (EFP) is a recently proposed algorithm that minimizes the sum of a convex functional and entropy in the space of measures -- such an objective naturally arises in the optimization of a two-layer neural network in the mean-field regime. In this work, we provide a concise primal-dual analysis of EFP in the setting where the learning problem exhibits a finite-sum structure. We establish quantitative global convergence guarantees for both the continuous-time and discrete-time dynamics based on properties of a proximal Gibbs measure introduced in Nitanda et al. (2022). Furthermore, our primal-dual framework entails a memory-efficient particle-based implementation of the EFP update, and also suggests a connection to gradient boosting methods. We illustrate the efficiency of our novel implementation in experiments including neural network optimization and image synthesis.

Online display advertising platforms service numerous advertisers by providing real-time bidding (RTB) for the scale of billions of ad requests every day. The bidding strategy handles ad requests cross multiple channels to maximize the number of clicks under the set financial constraints, i.e., total budget and cost-per-click (CPC), etc. Different from existing works mainly focusing on single channel bidding, we explicitly consider cross-channel constrained bidding with budget allocation. Specifically, we propose a hierarchical offline deep reinforcement learning (DRL) framework called ``HiBid'', consisted of a high-level planner equipped with auxiliary loss for non-competitive budget allocation, and a data augmentation enhanced low-level executor for adaptive bidding strategy in response to allocated budgets. Additionally, a CPC-guided action selection mechanism is introduced to satisfy the cross-channel CPC constraint. Through extensive experiments on both the large-scale log data and online A/B testing, we confirm that HiBid outperforms six baselines in terms of the number of clicks, CPC satisfactory ratio, and return-on-investment (ROI). We also deploy HiBid on Meituan advertising platform to already service tens of thousands of advertisers every day.

A prevailing view in Reinforcement Learning for Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) interprets recent progress through the lens of an exploration-exploitation trade-off, a perspective largely shaped by token-level metrics. We re-examine this perspective, proposing that this perceived trade-off may not be a fundamental constraint but rather an artifact of the measurement level. To investigate this, we shift the analysis to the semantically rich hidden-state space, adopting Effective Rank (ER) to quantify exploration and proposing its novel first- and second-order derivatives, named Effective Rank Velocity (ERV) and Effective Rank Acceleration (ERA), to capture exploitation dynamics. Our analysis reveals that at the hidden-state level, exploration and exploitation could be decoupled (Sec. 4). This finding reveals an opportunity to enhance both capacities simultaneously. This insight motivates our method, Velocity-Exploiting Rank-Learning (VERL), the first to operationalize the principle of synergistic exploration-exploitation enhancement by directly shaping the RL advantage function. The key innovation is leveraging the theoretically stable ERA as a predictive meta-controller to create a synergistic, dual-channel incentive structure. Instead of forcing a trade-off, VERL prospectively amplifies rewards for exploration to preempt overconfidence and reinforces exploitative gains to consolidate reasoning. Experiments across diverse LLMs and reasoning benchmarks show consistent gains, including up to 21.4% absolute accuracy improvement on the challenging Gaokao 2024 dataset.

Modern large language models (LLMs) often struggle to dynamically adapt their reasoning depth to varying task complexities, leading to suboptimal performance or inefficient resource utilization. To address this, we introduce DynamicMind, a novel tri-mode thinking system. DynamicMind empowers LLMs to autonomously select between Fast, Normal, and Slow thinking modes for zero-shot question answering (ZSQA) tasks through cognitive-inspired prompt engineering. Our framework's core innovations include: (1) expanding the established dual-process framework of fast and slow thinking into a tri-mode thinking system involving a normal thinking mode to preserve the intrinsic capabilities of LLM; (2) proposing the Thinking Density metric, which aligns computational resource allocation with problem complexity; and (3) developing the Thinking Mode Capacity (TMC) dataset and a lightweight Mind Router to predict the optimal thinking mode. Extensive experiments across diverse mathematical, commonsense, and scientific QA benchmarks demonstrate that DynamicMind achieves superior ZSQA capabilities while establishing an effective trade-off between performance and computational efficiency.

Generative language models are increasingly used for contract drafting and enhancement, creating a scenario where competing parties deploy different language models against each other. This introduces not only a game-theory challenge but also significant concerns related to AI safety and security, as the language model employed by the opposing party can be unknown. These competitive interactions can be seen as adversarial testing grounds, where models are effectively red-teamed to expose vulnerabilities such as generating biased, harmful or legally problematic text. Despite the importance of these challenges, the competitive robustness and safety of these models in adversarial settings remain poorly understood. In this small study, we approach this problem by evaluating the performance and vulnerabilities of major open-source language models in head-to-head competitions, simulating real-world contract negotiations. We further explore how these adversarial interactions can reveal potential risks, informing the development of more secure and reliable models. Our findings contribute to the growing body of research on AI safety, offering insights into model selection and optimisation in competitive legal contexts and providing actionable strategies for mitigating risks.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

Symbolic world modeling requires inferring and representing an environment's transitional dynamics as an executable program. Prior work has focused on largely deterministic environments with abundant interaction data, simple mechanics, and human guidance. We address a more realistic and challenging setting, learning in a complex, stochastic environment where the agent has only "one life" to explore a hostile environment without human guidance. We introduce OneLife, a framework that models world dynamics through conditionally-activated programmatic laws within a probabilistic programming framework. Each law operates through a precondition-effect structure, activating in relevant world states. This creates a dynamic computation graph that routes inference and optimization only through relevant laws, avoiding scaling challenges when all laws contribute to predictions about a complex, hierarchical state, and enabling the learning of stochastic dynamics even with sparse rule activation. To evaluate our approach under these demanding constraints, we introduce a new evaluation protocol that measures (a) state ranking, the ability to distinguish plausible future states from implausible ones, and (b) state fidelity, the ability to generate future states that closely resemble reality. We develop and evaluate our framework on Crafter-OO, our reimplementation of the Crafter environment that exposes a structured, object-oriented symbolic state and a pure transition function that operates on that state alone. OneLife can successfully learn key environment dynamics from minimal, unguided interaction, outperforming a strong baseline on 16 out of 23 scenarios tested. We also test OneLife's planning ability, with simulated rollouts successfully identifying superior strategies. Our work establishes a foundation for autonomously constructing programmatic world models of unknown, complex environments.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures achieve parameter efficiency through conditional computation, yet contemporary designs suffer from two fundamental limitations: structural parameter isolation that causes catastrophic forgetting, and instruction-overfitting that degrades performance in instruction-free scenarios. We propose CDSP-MoE (Conflict-Driven Subspace Pruning MoE), a framework that addresses these issues through a paradigm shift from isolated expert containers to dynamic expert instantiation within a shared physical subspace. Grounded in the Universal Weight Subspace Hypothesis, CDSP-MoE maintains a super-complete parameter backbone where logical experts are carved out via learnable topology masks. Unlike prior work that uses gradient conflict for token reassignment or optimization surgery, we leverage it as a structural supervisory signal: a Lagged Gradient Game penalizes interfering connections in the shared manifold, enabling the topology to spontaneously prune conflicting pathways and evolve interpretable modular structures. Experimental results demonstrate that CDSP-MoE achieves robust content-driven routing without human-defined task labels, maintaining semantic specialization even under strict blind inference protocols where explicit instructions are absent. Code is available at: https://github.com/konodiodaaaaa1/Conflict-Driven-Subspace-Pruning-Mixture-of-Experts

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

The categories of open learners (due to Fong, Spivak and Tuy\'eras) and open games (due to the present author, Ghani, Winschel and Zahn) bear a very striking and unexpected similarity. The purpose of this short note is to prove that there is a faithful symmetric monoidal functor from the former to the latter, which means that any supervised neural network (without feedback or other complicating features) can be seen as an open game in a canonical way. Roughly, each parameter is controlled by a different player, and the game's best response relation encodes the dynamics of gradient descent. We suggest paths for further work exploiting the link.

We propose Chain-of-Experts (CoE), a new Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architecture that introduces sequential expert communication within each layer. Unlike traditional MoE models, where experts operate independently in parallel, CoE processes tokens iteratively across a chain of experts inside a layer. To support dynamic expert selection across iterations, CoE employs a dedicated router at each iteration step within a layer. This design allows tokens to re-evaluate and select different experts during each iteration, rather than being statically assigned. As a result, CoE introduces a flexible routing mechanism that increases the diversity of expert combinations and enriches the model's representational capacity. CoE demonstrates improved performance under fixed compute: on math reasoning tasks, it reduces validation loss from 1.20 to 1.12 compared to a standard MoE. Beyond performance, CoE offers a new scaling axis: depth through expert iteration, which complements conventional width/depth scaling. For example, using 2x iterations matches the performance of 3x expert selections (in width), while reducing memory usage by 17.6-42% relative to other scaling strategies. Our analysis reveals that CoE's benefits stem from its iterative residual structure and enhanced expert specialization empowered by iterative routing, which together unlock more expressive representations. Code is available at https://github.com/ZihanWang314/coe.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

Societies are complex. Properties of social systems can be explained by the interplay and weaving of individual actions. Incentives are key to understand people's choices and decisions. For instance, individual preferences of where to live may lead to the emergence of social segregation. In this paper, we combine Reinforcement Learning (RL) with Agent Based Models (ABM) in order to address the self-organizing dynamics of social segregation and explore the space of possibilities that emerge from considering different types of incentives. Our model promotes the creation of interdependencies and interactions among multiple agents of two different kinds that want to segregate from each other. For this purpose, agents use Deep Q-Networks to make decisions based on the rules of the Schelling Segregation model and the Predator-Prey model. Despite the segregation incentive, our experiments show that spatial integration can be achieved by establishing interdependencies among agents of different kinds. They also reveal that segregated areas are more probable to host older people than diverse areas, which attract younger ones. Through this work, we show that the combination of RL and ABMs can create an artificial environment for policy makers to observe potential and existing behaviors associated to incentives.

When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s). Unfortunately, agents may try to manipulate such an election by misreporting their preferences. Fortunately, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. To address this issue, I suggest studying empirically if computational complexity is in practice a barrier to manipulation. The basic tool used in my investigations is the identification of computational "phase transitions". Such an approach has been fruitful in identifying hard instances of propositional satisfiability and other NP-hard problems. I show that phase transition behaviour gives insight into the hardness of manipulating voting rules, increasing concern that computational complexity is indeed any sort of barrier. Finally, I look at the problem of computing manipulation of other, related problems like stable marriage and tournament problems.

In this paper, we evaluate whether LLMs learn to make human-like preference judgements in strategic scenarios as compared with known empirical results. Solar and Mistral are shown to exhibit stable value-based preference consistent with humans and exhibit human-like preference for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma (including stake-size effect) and traveler's dilemma (including penalty-size effect). We establish a relationship between model size, value-based preference, and superficiality. Finally, results here show that models tending to be less brittle have relied on sliding window attention suggesting a potential link. Additionally, we contribute a novel method for constructing preference relations from arbitrary LLMs and support for a hypothesis regarding human behavior in the traveler's dilemma.

QWOP is a browser-based, 2-dimensional flash game in which the player controls an Olympic sprinter competing in a simulated 100-meter race. The goal of the game is to advance the runner to the end of the 100-meter race as quickly as possible using the Q, W, O, and P keys, which control the muscles in the sprinters legs. Despite the game simple controls and straightforward goal, it is renowned for its difficulty and unintuitive gameplay. In this paper, we attempt to automatically discover effective QWOP gaits. We describe a programmatic interface developed to play the game, and we introduce several variants of a genetic algorithm tailored to solve this problem. We present experimental results on the effectiveness of various representations, initialization strategies, evolution paradigms, and parameter control mechanisms.

In this paper, we present a novel method for dynamically expanding Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) during training, aimed at meeting the increasing demand for efficient and sustainable deep learning models. Our approach, drawing from the seminal work on Self-Expanding Neural Networks (SENN), employs a natural expansion score as an expansion criteria to address the common issue of over-parameterization in deep convolutional neural networks, thereby ensuring that the model's complexity is finely tuned to the task's specific needs. A significant benefit of this method is its eco-friendly nature, as it obviates the necessity of training multiple models of different sizes. We employ a strategy where a single model is dynamically expanded, facilitating the extraction of checkpoints at various complexity levels, effectively reducing computational resource use and energy consumption while also expediting the development cycle by offering diverse model complexities from a single training session. We evaluate our method on the CIFAR-10 dataset and our experimental results validate this approach, demonstrating that dynamically adding layers not only maintains but also improves CNN performance, underscoring the effectiveness of our expansion criteria. This approach marks a considerable advancement in developing adaptive, scalable, and environmentally considerate neural network architectures, addressing key challenges in the field of deep learning.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.