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Islam in Turkey

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The established presence of Islam in the region that now constitutes modern Turkey dates back to the latter half of the 11th century, when the Seljuks started expanding into eastern Anatolia. According to religiosity polls, 99.8% of the population identifies as Muslim,[1] and only 2% is non-religious.[2] Most Muslims in Turkey are Sunnis, forming about 75% of the overall Muslim denominations. The remaining Ithna'ashari-Shia Muslim sects forming about 20%[3] of the overall Muslim population consist of Alevis, Ja'faris (representing 4%[4][5]) and Alawites (with an estimated population of around 1 million) which is about 1% of the overall Muslim population in Turkey.[6][7]

Islamic empires[edit]

Islamic conquest extended to Anatolia during later Abbasid period.

During the Muslim conquests of the 7th and early 8th centuries, Arab armies established the Islamic Empire. The Islamic Golden Age was soon inaugurated by the middle of the 8th century by the ascension of the Abbasid Caliphate and the transfer of the capital from Damascus to Baghdad.[8]

The later period saw initial expansion and the capture of Crete (840). The Abbasids soon shifted their attention towards the East. During the later fragmentation of the Abbasid rule and the rise of their Shiite rivals the Fatimids and Buyids, a resurgent Byzantium recaptured Crete and Cilicia in 961, Cyprus in 965, and pushed into the Levant by 975. The Byzantines successfully contested with the Fatimids for influence in the region until the arrival of the Seljuk Turks who first allied with the Abbasids and then ruled as the de facto rulers.

Extension by 1210.

In 1068 Alp Arslan and allied Turkmen tribes recaptured many Abbasid lands and even invaded Byzantine regions, pushing further into eastern and central Anatolia after a major victory at the Battle of Manzikert in 1071. The disintegration of the Seljuk dynasty, the first unified Turkic dynasty, resulted in the rise of subsequent, smaller, rival Turkic kingdoms such as the Danishmends, the Sultanate of Rum, and various Atabegs who contested the control of the region during the Crusades and incrementally expanded across Anatolia until the rise of the Ottoman Empire.

Ottoman Caliphate[edit]

Beginning in the twelfth century, new waves of Turkic migrants many of whom belonged to Sufi orders, some of which later incorporated heterodox beliefs. One Sufi order that appealed to Turks in Anatolia after 1300 was the Safaviyya, an order that was originally Sunni and non-political but later became both Shi'a and political based in northwest Iran. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Safavid and similar orders such as the Bektaşi became rivals of the Ottomans—who were orthodox Sunni Muslims—for political control of eastern Anatolia. Although the Bektaşi order became accepted as a sect of orthodox Sunni Muslims, they did not abandon their heterodox beliefs. In contrast, the Safavids eventually conquered Iran, shed their heterodox religious beliefs, and became proponents of orthodox Twelver Shi'a Islam. The conquest of the Byzantine capital of Constantinople—which the Turks called Istanbul—in 1453 enabled the Ottomans to consolidate their empire in Anatolia and Thrace. The Ottomans later revived the title of caliph during the reign of Sultan Selim. Despite the absence of a formal institutional structure, Sunni religious functionaries played an important political role. Justice was dispensed by religious courts; in theory, the codified system of şeriat regulated all aspects of life, at least for the Muslim subjects of the empire. The head of the judiciary ranked directly below the sultan and was second in power only to the grand vizier. Early in the Ottoman period, the office of grand mufti of Istanbul evolved into that of Şeyhülislam (shaykh, or leader of Islam), which had ultimate jurisdiction over all the courts in the empire and consequently exercised authority over the interpretation and application of şeriat. Legal opinions pronounced by the Şeyhülislam were considered definitive interpretations.

Secularization era[edit]

The secularization of Turkey started in the society during the last years of the Ottoman Empire and it was the most prominent and most controversial feature of Atatürk's reforms. Under his leadership, the caliphate—the supreme politico-religious office of Islam, and symbol of the sultan's claim to world leadership of all Muslims—was abolished. The secular power of the religious authorities and functionaries was reduced and eventually eliminated. The religious foundations were nationalized, and religious education was restricted and for a time prohibited. The influential and popular mystical orders of the dervish brotherhoods (Tariqa) also were suppressed.

Republic period: 1923-present[edit]

The withdrawal of Turkey, heir to the Ottoman Empire, as the presumptive leader of the world Muslim community was symbolic of the change in the government's relationship to Islam. Indeed, secularism (or laiklik) became one of the "Kemalist ideology" of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's anti-clerical program for remaking Turkey. Whereas Islam had formed the identity of Muslims within the Ottoman Empire, secularism was seen as molding the new Turkish nation and its citizens.

Atatürk's Reforms[edit]

In 1922 the new nationalist regime abolished the Ottoman sultanate, and in 1924 it abolished the caliphate, the religious office that Ottoman sultans had held for four centuries. Thus, for the first time in Islamic history, no ruler claimed spiritual leadership of Islam.

Atatürk and his associates not only abolished certain religious practices and institutions but also questioned the value of religion, preferring to place their trust in science. They regarded organized religion as an anachronism and contrasted it unfavorably with "civilization," which to them meant a rationalist, secular culture. Establishment of secularism in Turkey was not, as it had been in the West, a gradual process of separation of church and state. In the Ottoman Empire, all spheres of life, at least theoretically, had been subject to traditional religious law, and Sunni religious organizations had been part of the state structure. However, usually state had authority over the clergy and religious law, even at the Ottoman period (e.g.many Sultans are known to change Şeyhülislams, who do not approve state politics). When the reformers of the early 1920s opted for a secular state, they removed religion from the sphere of public policy and restricted it exclusively to that of personal morals, behavior, and faith. Although private observance of religious rituals could continue, religion and religious organization were excluded from public life.

The policies directly affecting religion were numerous and sweeping. In addition to the abolition of the caliphate, new laws mandated abolition of the office of Şeyhülislam ; abolition of the religious hierarchy; the closing and confiscation of Sufi lodges, meeting places, and monasteries and the outlawing of their rituals and meetings; establishment of government control over the vakıfs, which had been inalienable under Sharia; replacement of sharia with adapted European legal codes; the closing of religious schools; abandonment of the Islamic calendar in favor of the Gregorian calendar used in the West; restrictions on public attire that had religious associations, with the fez outlawed for men and the veil discouraged for women; and the outlawing of the traditional garb of local religious leaders.

Atatürk and his colleagues also attempted to Turkify Islam through official encouragement of such practices as using Turkish rather than Arabic at devotions, substituting the Turkish word Tanri for the Arabic word Allah, and introducing Turkish for the daily calls to prayer. These changes in devotional practices deeply disturbed many Muslims and caused widespread resentment, which led in 1950 to a return to the Arabic version of the call to prayer, after the opposition party DP won the elections. Of longer-lasting effect were the regime's measures prohibiting religious education, restricting the building of new mosques, and transferring existing mosques to secular purposes. Most notably, the Hagia Sophia (Justinian's sixth-century Christian basilica, which had been converted into a mosque by Mehmet II) was made a museum in 1935. The effect of these changes was to make religion, or more correctly Islam, subject to the control of the state. Muftis and imams (prayer leaders) were appointed by the government, and religious instruction was taken over by the Ministry of National Education. As a result of these policies, the Turkish Republic was judged negatively by some sections of the Muslim world.

The expectation of the secular ruling elite that the policies of the 1920s and 1930s would diminish the role of religion in public life did not materialize. As early as 1925, religious grievances were one of the principal causes of the Şeyh Sait rebellion, an uprising in southeastern Turkey that may have claimed as many as 30,000 lives before being suppressed.

Although Turkey was secularized at the official level, religion remained a strong force at the popular level. After 1950 some political leaders tried to benefit from popular attachment to religion by espousing support for programs and policies that appealed to the religiously inclined. Such efforts were opposed by most of the state elite, who believed that secularism was an essential principle of Kemalist Ideology. This disinclination to appreciate religious values and beliefs gradually led to a polarization of society. The polarization became especially evident in the 1980s as a new generation of educated but religiously motivated local leaders emerged to challenge the dominance of the secularized political elite. These new leaders have been assertively proud of Turkey's Islamic heritage and generally have been successful at adapting familiar religious idioms to describe dissatisfaction with various government policies. By their own example of piety, prayer, and political activism, they have helped to spark a revival of Islamic observance in Turkey. By 1994 slogans promising that a return to Islam would cure economic ills and solve the problems of bureaucratic inefficiencies had enough general appeal to enable avowed religious candidates to win mayoral elections in Istanbul and Ankara, the country's two largest cities.

Multiparty Period[edit]
An İsmailağa-Qur'anic school in the Fener neighborhood of Istanbul.

Following the relaxation of authoritarian political controls in 1946, large numbers of people began to call openly for a return to traditional religious practice. During the 1950s, even certain political leaders found it expedient to join religious leaders in advocating more state respect for religion.

A more direct manifestation of the growing reaction against secularism was the revival of the Sufi brotherhoods. Not only did suppressed Sufi orders such as the Kadiri, Mevlevi, Nakşibendi, Khālidiyyā and Al-Ṭarīqah al-Tijāniyyah reemerge, but new movements were formed, including the Nur Cemaati, Gülen movement, Sülaymānīyyā, Community of İskenderpaşa and İsmailağa. The Tijāni became especially militant in confronting the state. For example, Tijāni damaged monuments to Atatürk to symbolize their opposition to his policy of secularization. This was however a very isolated incident and only involved one particular Sheikh of the order. Throughout the 1950s, there were numerous trials of Ticani and other Sufi leaders for antistate activities. Simultaneously, however, some movements, notably the Süleymancı and Nurcular, cooperated with those politicians perceived as supportive of pro-Islamic policies. The Nurcular eventually advocated support for Turkey's multiparty political system, and one of its offshoots, the Gülen movement, had supported the True Path Party while the Işıkçılar and Enver Ören had openly supported the Motherland Party since the mid-1980s.

The demand for restoration of religious education in public schools began in the late 1940s. The government initially responded by authorizing religious instruction in state schools for those students whose parents requested it. Under Democrat Party rule during the 1950s, religious education was made compulsory in secondary schools unless parents made a specific request to have their children excused. Religious education was made compulsory for all primary and secondary school children in 1982.

Inevitably, the reintroduction of religion into the school curriculum raised the question of religious higher education. The secular elites, who tended to distrust traditional religious leaders, believed that Islam could be "reformed" if future leaders were trained in state-controlled seminaries. To further this goal, the government in 1949 established a faculty of divinity at Ankara University to train teachers of Islam and imams. In 1951 the Democrat Party government set up special secondary schools (İmam Hatip schools) for the training of imams and preachers. Initially, the imam hatip schools grew very slowly, but their numbers expanded rapidly to more than 250 during the 1970s, when the pro-Islam National Salvation Party participated in coalition governments. Following the 1980 coup, the military, although secular in orientation, viewed religion as an effective means to counter socialist ideas and thus authorized the construction of ninety more İmam Hatip high schools.

Sabancı Merkez Camii, Adana, built in 1998, is the largest mosque in Turkey.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Islam experienced a kind of political rehabilitation because right-of-center secular leaders perceived religion as a potential bulwark in their ideological struggle with left-of-center secular leaders. A small advocacy group that became extremely influential was the Hearth of Intellectuals (Aydınlar Ocağı), an organization that maintains that true Turkish culture is a synthesis of the Turks' pre-Islamic traditions and Islam. According to the Hearth, Islam not only constitutes an essential aspect of Turkish culture but is a force that can be regulated by the state to help socialize the people to be obedient citizens acquiescent to the overall secular order. After the 1980 military coup, many of the Hearth's proposals for restructuring schools, colleges, and state broadcasting were adopted. The result was a purge from these state institutions of more than 2,000 intellectuals perceived as espousing leftist ideas incompatible with the Hearth's vision of Turkey's national culture.

The state's more tolerant attitude toward Islam encouraged the proliferation of private religious activities, including the construction of new mosques and Qur'an schools in the cities, the establishment of Islamic centers for research on and conferences about Islam and its role in Turkey, and the establishment of religiously oriented professional and women's journals. The printing of newspapers, the publication of religious books, and the growth of innumerable religious projects ranging from health centers, child-care facilities, and youth hostels to financial institutions and consumer cooperatives flourished. When the government legalized private broadcasting after 1990, several Islamic radio stations were organized. In the summer of 1994, the first Islamic television station, Kanal 7, began broadcasting, first in Istanbul and subsequently in Ankara.

Although the tarikah (the term can sometimes be used to refer to any 'group or sect' some of whom may not even be Muslim) have played a seminal role in Turkey's religious revival and in the mid-1990s still published several of the country's most widely circulated religious journals and newspapers, a new phenomenon, İslamcı Aydın (the Islamist intellectual) unaffiliated with the traditional Sufi orders, emerged during the 1980s. Prolific and popular writers such as Ali Bulaç, Rasim Özdenören, and Ismet Özel have drawn upon their knowledge of Western philosophy, Marxist sociology, and radical Islamist political theory to advocate a modern Islamic perspective that does not hesitate to criticize genuine societal ills while simultaneously remaining faithful to the ethical values and spiritual dimensions of religion. Islamist intellectuals are harshly critical of Turkey's secular intellectuals, whom they fault for trying to do in Turkey what Western intellectuals did in Europe: substitute worldly materialism, in its capitalist or socialist version, for religious values.

Status of religious freedom[edit]

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; however, the Government imposes some restrictions on all religious expression in government offices and state-run institutions, including universities, usually for the stated reason of preserving the secular state, and distance of state to all kinds of beliefs. The Constitution establishes the country as a secular state and provides for freedom of belief, freedom of worship, and the private dissemination of religious ideas. However, other constitutional provisions regarding the integrity and existence of the secular state restrict these rights. The secularity, bearing a meaning of a protection of believers, plays an important role to protect the state.

While most of the secular countries have religious schools and educational system, one in Turkey can only have religious teachings after a state decided age; which is considered as a necessity given the fact that Turkey is the only considerably secular country in the Muslim world, i.e. it is claimed that conditions to establish secularism on are different than those in Christian world. The establishment of private religious schools and universities (regardless of what religion) is forbidden. Only the state controlled Imam Hatip Lisesi is allowed which benefits only Islamic community in Turkey. This type of high schools teach religious subjects with modern positive science. However, graduates of these schools cannot go to the university to seek higher education in another field of study for example medicine, law, engineering etc.; because graduates of these schools are intended to be clerics, rather than being doctors or lawyers.

Circle frame.svg

Islam in Turkey[3]

  Sunni (Hanafi) Islam (72%)
  Sunni (Shafi'i) Islam (6.2%)
  Twelver Shia (Alevis) (14.5%)
  Twelver Shia (Ja'faris) (4%)
  Nosairis (1.3%)

The Government oversees Muslim religious facilities and education through its Ministry of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı), which reports directly to the Prime Ministry. The Diyanet has responsibility for regulating the operation of the country's 75,000 registered mosques and employing local and provincial imams, who are civil servants. Some groups, particularly Alevis, claim that the Diyanet reflects mainstream Islamic beliefs to the exclusion of other beliefs. The government asserts that the Diyanet treats equally all who request services. However, Alevis do not utilize Mosques or the imams for their worship ceremonies. Alevi ceremonies take place in Cem Houses and led by Dedes who do not benefit from the large budget of the Religious Affairs.

Diyanet and secularism[edit]

Reforms going in the direction of secularism have been completed under Atatürk (abolition of the Caliphate, etc..).
However, Turkey is not strictly a secular state:

  • there is no separation between religion and State
  • there is a tutelage of religion by the state

However, each is free of his religious beliefs.

Religion is mentioned on the identity documents and there is an administration called "Presidency of Religious Affairs" or Diyanet[9] which exploits Islam to legitimize sometimes State and manages 77,500 mosques. This state agency, established by Ataturk (1924), finance only Sunni Muslim worship. Other religions must ensure a financially self-sustaining running and they face administrative obstacles during operation.[10]

When harvesting tax, all Turkish citizens are equal. The tax rate is not based on religion. However, through the Diyanet, Turkish citizens are not equal in the use of revenue. The Presidency of Religious Affairs, which has a budget over U.S. $2.5 billion in 2012, finance only Sunni Muslim worship.

This situation presents a theological problem, insofar as Islam stipulates, through the notion of haram (Qur'an, Surah 6, verse 152), that we must "give full measure and full weight in all justice”.

However, since it was set up, Diyanet, through taxation, uses the resources of non-Sunni citizens to fund its administration and only Sunni places of worship.

For example, Câferî Muslims (mostly Azeris) and Alevi Bektashi (mostly Turkmen) participate in the financing of the mosques and the salaries of Sunni imams, while their places of worship, which are not officially recognized by the State, don't receive any funding.

Sufi orders like Alevi-Bektashi, Bayrami-Jelveti, Halveti (Gulshani, Jerrahi, Nasuhi, Rahmani, Sunbuli, Ussaki), Hurufi-Rüfai, Malamati, Mevlevi, Nakşibendi (Halidi, Haqqani), Qadiri-Galibi and Ja'fari Muslims[11] are not officially recognized.

Situation of the denominations of Islam in Turkey
Religions Estimated population Expropriation
Official recognition through the Constitution or international treaties Government Financing of places of worship and religious staff
Sunni Islam - Hanafi & Shafi'i 78.2 to 84.7% (60 to 64 millions) No Yes through the Diyanet mentioned in the Constitution (art.136) [13] Yes through the Diyanet [14]
Shia Islam - Alevi[15] 9 to 14.5% (7 to 11 millions) Yes[11] No.[16] In the early fifteenth century,[17] due to the unsustainable Ottoman oppression, Alevis supported Shah Ismail I who had Turkmen origins. Shah Ismail I supporters, who wear a red cap with twelvefolds in reference to the 12 Imams were called Qizilbash. Ottomans who were Arabized[verification needed] and persanised considered Qizilbash (Alevi) as enemies because of their Turkmen origins.[17] [unreliable source?] Today, Cemevi, places of worship of Alevi-Bektashi have no official recognition. No [14]
Shia Islam - Bektashi[15] No.[16] In 1826 with the abolition of the Janissary corps, the Bektashi tekke (dervish convent) were closed.[11][18]
Shia Islam - Ja'fari 4%
(3 millions) [19]
No [16] No [14]
Shia Islam - Nusayrīya[15] around
1 million [6]
No [16] No [14]
Ghair Muqallid and Quranist Muslim 2%
(1.5 millions)[5]
- - -

In 2013, with over 4.6 billion TL (Turkish Lira), Diyanet or Ministry of Religious Affairs, occupies the 16th position of central government expenditure.
The budget allocated to Diyanet is:

Diyanet's Budget in 2013 - Source : TBMM, Turkish Parliament, 2013.
  • 1.6 times larger than the budget allocated to the Ministry of the Interior[20]
  • 1.8 times larger than the budget allocated to the Ministry of Health[20]
  • 1.9 times larger than the budget allocated to the Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology[20]
  • 2.4 times larger than the budget allocated to the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning[20]
  • 2.5 times larger than the budget allocated to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism[20]
  • 2.9 times larger than the budget allocated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs[20]
  • 3.4 times larger than the budget allocated to the Ministry of Economy[20]
  • 3.8 times larger than the budget of the Ministry of Development[20]
  • 4.6 times larger than the budget allocated to MIT – Secret Services [20]
  • 5,0 times larger than the budget allocated to the Department of Emergency and Disaster Management[20]
  • 7.7 times larger than the budget allocated to the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources[20]
  • 9.1 times larger than the budget allocated to the Ministry of Customs and Trade[20]
  • 10.7 times greater than the budget allocated to Coast Guard[20]
  • 21.6 times greater than the budget allocated to the Ministry of the European Union[20]
  • 242 times larger than the budget for the National Security Council[20]
  • 268 times more important than the budget allocated to the Ministry of Public Employee[20]

Diyanet's budget represents:

  • 79% of the budget of the Police[20]
  • 67% of the budget of the Ministry of Justice[20]
  • 57% of the budget of the Public Hospitals[20]
  • 31% of the budget of the National Police[20]
  • 23% of the budget of the Turkish Army, that is 23% of the budget of NATO's second army.[20]

The Sultan Ahmed Mosque, Istanbul, built in 1616.

Sunni Islam[edit]

The vast majority of the present-day Turkish people are Muslim and the most popular school of law is the Hanafite madh'hab of Sunni Islam according to the KONDA Research and Consultancy survey carried out throughout Turkey in 2007.[1] The Hanafi madhhab was the official school of Islamic jurisprudence espoused by the Ottoman Empire[21][22] and a 2013 survey conducted by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs indicates that 77.5 percent of Turkish Muslims identify themselves as Hanafis.[23] Although the Maturidi and Ash'ari schools of Islamic theology (which apply Ilm al-Kalam or rational thought to understand the Quran and the hadith) have been the dominant creeds in Turkey due to their widespread acceptance and propagation since the beginning of the Ottoman Empire,[21] the Athari (literalist) creed[24] of the Salafi movement has seen increasing acceptance.[22]

In Turkey, Prophet Muhammad is often called "Hazret-i Muhammed" or "Peygamber Efendimiz".[25]

Shia Islam[edit]

Twelver branch of Shia Islam Muslim population of Turkey is composed of Mu'tazila aqidah of Ja'fari jurisprudence madhhab, Batiniyya-Sufism aqidah of Maymūn’al-Qāddāhī fiqh of the Alevīs, and Cillī aqidah of Maymūn ibn Abu’l-Qāsim Sulaiman ibn Ahmad ibn at-Tabarānī fiqh of the Alawites,[26][27] who altogether constitutes nearly one third of the whole population of the country. (An estimate for the Turkish Alevi population varies between Seven and Eleven Millions.[28][29] Over 75% of the population, on the other hand, overwhelmingly constitute Maturidi aqidah of the Hanafi fiqh and Ash'ari aqidah of the Shafi'i fiqh of the Sunni followers.)

Unlike the common usage of the term "Shi'a" in other languages, Aleviler instead is being frequently used to represent all the Shi'a Muslim sects in Turkish language. Furthermore, the term Kızılbaş in the history was used pejoratively for all Shi'ites in Anatolia.

There are an estimated 16-17 million Alevi in Turkey.[3][30]

The Alevi ʿaqīdah

The followers of the Ja'fari jurisprudence constitute the third sizable community with their more than three million members and most of them lives in the eastern provinces neighboring to Azerbaijan, more particularly in the Iğdır Province. They have 70 mosques in Istanbul and some 300 throughout the country and receive no state funding for their mosques and imams as the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) is exclusively Sunni.[33]

The majority of the Alawite community in Turkey with an estimated population of around 1,000,000[6] lives in the Province of Hatay, where they nearly represent half of the total population,[34] primarily in the districts of Arsuz,[35] Defne and Samandağ,[6] where Alawites constitute the majority and in Iskenderun and Antakya where they constitute a significant minority of the population. Larger Alawite communities can also be found in the Çukurova region, mostly in and around the cities of Adana, Tarsus and Mersin.[7]

Turkish Sufi whirling dervishes.

Folk Islam in Turkey has derived many of its popular practices from Sufism which has good presence in Turkey and Egypt. Particular Sufi shaikhs – and occasionally other individuals reputed to be pious – were regarded after death as saints having special powers. Veneration of saints (both male and female) and pilgrimages to their shrines and graves represent an important aspect of popular Islam in the country. Folk Islam has continued to embrace such practices although the veneration of saints officially has been discouraged since the 1930s. Plaques posted in various sanctuaries forbid the lighting of candles, the offering of votive objects, and related devotional activities in these places. Modern day Sufi shaykhs with large adherents in Turkey include Shaykh Mehmet Efendi[who?] (residing in Istanbul) and Mawlana Sheikh Nazim Al-Haqqani who resided in Lefka, North Cyprus, until his death in May, 2014.

Those who reject the authority of hadith, known as Quranists, Quraniyoon, or Ahl al-Quran, are also present in Turkey.[36][37][38] Notable Turkish Quranists include scholars like Yasar Nuri Ozturk[39] and Caner Taslaman.[40]

Headscarf issue[edit]

Although intellectual debates on the role of Islam attracted widespread interest, they did not provoke the kind of controversy that erupted over the issue of appropriate attire for Muslim women. During the early 1980s, female college students who were determined to demonstrate their commitment to Islam began to cover their heads and necks with scarves and wear long, shape-concealing overcoats. The appearance of these women in the citadels of Turkish secularism shocked those men and women who tended to perceive such attire as a symbol of the Islamic traditionalism they rejected. Militant secularists persuaded the Higher Education Council to issue a regulation in 1987 forbidding female university students to cover their heads in class. Protests by thousands of religious students and some university professors forced several universities to waive enforcement of the dress code. The issue continued to be seriously divisive in the mid-1990s. Throughout the first half of the 1990s, highly educated, articulate but religiously pious women have appeared in public dressed in Islamic attire that conceals all but their faces and hands. Other women, especially in Ankara, Istanbul, and İzmir, have demonstrated against such attire by wearing revealing fashions and Atatürk badges. The issue is discussed and debated in almost every type of forum – artistic, commercial, cultural, economic, political, and religious. For many citizens of Turkey, women's dress has become the issue that defines whether a Muslim is secularist or religious. In 2010, the Turkish Higher Educational council (YÖK) lifted the ban on headscarves at the universities.

Turkey's role in the Islamic World[edit]

Turkey is a founding member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC, formerly the Organisation of the Islamic Conference). The headquarters of some Islamic organizations are located in Turkey:

  1. ^ a b KONDA Research and Consultancy (2007-09-08). "Religion, Secularism and the Veil in daily life" (PDF). Milliyet. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2009-03-25.
  2. ^
  3. ^ a b c "Turkey: International Religious Freedom Report 2007". Retrieved 22 September 2016.
  4. ^ "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2011-01-10. Retrieved 2016-01-31.
  5. ^ a b "Pew Forum on Religious & Public life".
  6. ^ a b c d Cassel, Matthew. "Syria strife tests Turkish Alawites". Retrieved 23 February 2017.
  7. ^ a bÇukurova_The_transformation_of_a_linguistic_into_a_purely_religious_minority
  8. ^ Gregorian, Vartan. "Islam: A Mosaic, Not a Monolith", Brookings Institution Press, 2003, pg 26-38 ISBN 0-8157-3283-X
  9. ^
  10. ^ Samim Akgönül - Religions de Turquie, religions des Turcs: nouveaux acteurs dans l'Europe élargie - L'Harmattan - 2005 - 196 pages
  11. ^ a b c The World of the Alevis: Issues of Culture and Identity, Gloria L. Clarke
  12. ^ "Le gouvernement turc va restituer des biens saisis à des minorités religieuses". 29 August 2011. Retrieved 23 February 2017 – via
  13. ^
  14. ^ a b c d
  15. ^ a b c Not recognized as an Islamic fiqh madh'hab by the Amman Message.
  16. ^ a b c d "Les minorités non musulmanes en Turquie : «certains rapports d'ONG parlent d'une logique d'attrition», observe Jean-Paul Burdy". Retrieved 23 February 2017.
  17. ^ a b Bacqué-Grammont, Jean-Louis. "Notes et documents sur les Ottomans, les Safavides et la Géorgie, 1516-1521". 20 (2): 239–272. doi:10.3406/cmr.1979.1359. Retrieved 23 February 2017.
  18. ^ "Blog Hautetfort : Erreur 404". Retrieved 23 February 2017.
  19. ^ Rapport Minority Rights Group Bir eşitlik arayışı: Türkiye’de azınlıklar Uluslararası Azınlık Hakları Grubu 2007 Dilek Kurban
  20. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u
  21. ^ a b Gunduz, Sinasi Change And Essence: Dialectical Relations Between Change And Continuity in the Turkish Intellectual Traditions Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change. Series IIA, Islam, V. 18, p.104-105
  22. ^ a b Middle East Institute: "Salafism Infiltrates Turkish Religious Discourse" By Andrew Hammond - Middle East Policy Fellow - European Council on Foreign Relations July 22, 2015
  23. ^ Today's Zaman: "Can Turkey be ISIL’s next stage" by AYDOĞAN VATANDAŞ Archived 2015-10-25 at the Wayback Machine. October 16, 2015
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  25. ^ Schimmel, Annemarie (1990). Islamic Names: An Introduction (Islamic Surveys). Edinburgh University Press. p. 30. ISBN 978-0-85224-563-7.
  26. ^ "Muhammad ibn Āliyy’ūl Cillī aqidah" of "Maymūn ibn Abu’l-Qāsim Sulaiman ibn Ahmad ibn at-Tabarānī fiqh" (Sūlaiman Affandy, Al-Bākūrat’ūs Sūlaiman’īyyah - Family tree of the Nusayri Tariqat, pp. 14-15, Beirut, 1873.)
  27. ^ Both Muhammad ibn Āliyy’ūl Cillī and Maymūn ibn Abu’l-Qāsim’at-Tabarānī were the murids of "Al-Khaṣībī", the founder of the Nusayri tariqa.
  28. ^ "Religions". CIA World Factbook.
  29. ^ "Mapping the Global Muslim Population". Pew Research Center. 7 October 2009.
  30. ^ "Turkey's Alevi strive for recognition". Asia Times Online. 18 February 2010. Retrieved 9 August 2011.
  31. ^ Halm, Heinz (2004-07-21). Shi'ism. Edinburgh University Press. p. 154. ISBN 978-0-7486-1888-0.
  32. ^ Yaşar Nuri Öztürk, Kur'an'daki İslam.
  33. ^ Pinar Tremblay, "Turkish Shiites fear growing hate crimes", Al-Monitor, 11 July 2014
  34. ^ Sotloff, Steven. "The Alawite Towns That Support Syria's Assad — in Turkey". Retrieved 23 February 2017 – via
  35. ^ simitincilicia (30 September 2012). "A Weekend in Arsuz". Retrieved 23 February 2017.
  36. ^ Aisha Y. Musa, The Qur'anists,, Retrieved July 6, 2013.
  37. ^ Mustafa Akyol, Welcome to Islamic Reformation 101, Hurriyet Daily News, Retrieved January 26, 2013
  38. ^ Jamie Glazov. From Radical to Reformed Muslim., Retrieved December 04, 2007.
  39. ^ Mustafa Akyol, Islam without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty, W.W. Norton & Company, 2011, pg. 234
  40. ^

Further reading[edit]


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Real estate trends

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search

A real estate trend is any consistent pattern or change in the general direction of the real estate industry which, over the course of time, causes a statistically noticeable change. This phenomenon can be a result of the economy, a change in mortgage rates, consumer speculations, or other fundamental and non-fundamental reasons.

Property values declining instead of rising[edit]

MSN reports that home prices have dropped by a record amount[1] and illustrates with a chart of historical real estate prices.[2] Real estate property values have trended upward in the range of 2-5% almost every year since World War II, but since 2006 they have declined. From 2007 to 2008 prices declined as much as 39% per year -though the average decline appears to be lower.[3]

Buyer agency growth[edit]

At one time, all real estate brokers and agents, or Realtors, practiced "single agency," meaning they represented only the buyer or the seller. In the 1990s, the concept of buyer agency became popular, allowing a buyer to retain an agent who would represent the best interests of the buyer alone. The first national company to provide this service was The Buyer's Agent, Inc. A 2008 study by Consumer Reports indicates that prior to this development, a Realtor was presumed by state law to be working for the seller. The same study shows that buyers using buyer agents obtained a savings of $5000 in the price of the home as compared to prices paid by unrepresented buyers.[4] It remains true that an unrepresented real estate buyer can still call the sellers agent to arrange a showing of the property. In such cases, the buyer should be advised by Agency Disclosure Laws (a state law in every state in the U.S.) that any information obtained, as well as all conversations and negotiations undertaken, will be for the benefit of the seller.

Lower commission rates[edit]

Historical rates are presented in a report by the Government Accountability Office, Congress's investigative arm. A 2005 study[5] of real estate commission rates, reported that realtors tended to charge, "about 5 percent to 7 percent of a property's selling price...". More recently, CBS News, "60 Minutes" television news magazine reported in 2007 that competitive pressure resulting from a record number of licensed agents has driven down the average sales commission rates paid by sellers.[6] A new breed of marketplaces that enable agents to compete for sellers further adds pressure to the commission rate structure.[citation needed]

Another trend is the emergence of alternatives to the commission model, including flat-fee, hourly home selling, and for sale by owner tools.

Marketing trends[edit]

The Internet has become major lead generation method real estate marketing, eclipsing local newspapers and all other sources as the consumers most preferred method to learn about homes for sale.[7] "An overwhelming majority (87%) of recent home buyers in the US say they used the internet as an information resource during their home-buying process, and nearly one-third say they first learned about their newly purchased home from an online channel, according to a study by the National Association of Realtors (NAR). Majority of real estate companies use popular internet marketing methods like SEO, advertising and social media.

Websites like Craigslist (United States), (Republic of Ireland) and Gumtree (UK) became in 21st century main sources for both buyers and sellers. Rapid changes in market environment forced some countries to introduce new laws regulating real property market in the web.

Even with introduction of internet, traditional media and methods of generating leads were still an important part of Real Estate trade:

Though the internet was the most popular source, buyers also cited information from real-estate agents (85%), yard signs (62%), open houses (48%) and print or newspaper ads (47%). Fewer buyers relied on home books or magazines, home builders, television, billboards and relocation companies.[8]

Mobile applications are also changing the way real estate agents conduct business.[9] Apps like Zillow, Trulia, and Houzz are primarily accessed via mobile devices and have become very popular sources for listing properties for sale or rent. These applications function similarly to websites like Craigslist in that they allow agents or private sellers to list a property like they would in a classified ad albeit with more a more dynamic display as well as mechanisms for users browsing a listing to contact the seller directly from the app. Mobile applications are particular prominent with millennial real estate customers.

US government involvement[edit]

The United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division announced the launch of a new website in October 2007 to "educate consumers and policymakers about the potential benefits that competition can bring to consumers of real estate brokerage services and the barriers that inhibit that competition."[citation needed] Among other findings, they report that certain new sales models can reduce consumer home sales costs "by thousands of dollars. For example, in states that allow open competition, some buyer's brokers rebate up to two-thirds of their commission to the customer, and some seller's brokers offer limited-service packages that let sellers list their homes on the local Multiple Listing Service (MLS) for as little as a few hundred dollars."[10]

See also[edit]

External links[edit]

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West, Texas

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
West, Texas
Top: Czech Stop & Little Czech Bakery, Bottom Left: Aerial view of the town of West, Texas — looking northeast, Bottom Right: View from Oak Street
Top: Czech Stop & Little Czech Bakery, Bottom Left: Aerial view of the town of West, Texas — looking northeast, Bottom Right: View from Oak Street
Nickname(s): Home of the Official Kolache of the Texas Legislature
Location of West, Texas
Location of West, Texas
McLennan County West.svg
Coordinates: 31°48′12″N 97°5′35″W / 31.80333°N 97.09306°W / 31.80333; -97.09306Coordinates: 31°48′12″N 97°5′35″W / 31.80333°N 97.09306°W / 31.80333; -97.09306
Country United States
State Texas
County McLennan
Incorporated 1892
 • Mayor Tommy Muska
 • Total 1.6 sq mi (4.0 km2)
 • Land 1.6 sq mi (4.0 km2)
 • Water 0.0 sq mi (0.0 km2)
Elevation 650 ft (198 m)
Population (2010)[1]
 • Total 2,807
 • Density 1,754.3/sq mi (701.7/km2)
Time zone Central (CST) (UTC-6)
 • Summer (DST) CDT (UTC-5)
ZIP code 76691 [2]
Area code(s) 254, exchange 826
FIPS code 48-77332 [3]
GNIS feature ID 1349669 [4]
Website City Website

West is a city in McLennan County, Texas, United States.[5] As of the 2010 census, the city population was 2,807.[1][6] It is named after T.M. West, the first postmaster of the city.[7]

The city is located in the north-central part of Texas, approximately 70 miles south of the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex, 20 miles north of Waco and 120 miles north of Austin, Texas, the state's capital.

The first settlers of northern McLennan County arrived in the 1840s. They were farm and ranch families drawn from the east by the rich lands made available by the government sale of land to build schools in Texas. The area farmers cultivated the land and grew cotton, wheat, and grain sorghum, and raised cattle. The farming community centered around a freshwater spring that became known as Bold Springs. In 1860, Bold Springs had a population of about 300 and provided services such as a blacksmith, churches, and a post office.[7]

The Missouri–Kansas–Texas Railroad was laid between Hillsboro and Waco in the fall of 1881. The path of the railroad passed through land owned by Thomas West, who had moved to the area in 1859. He farmed land that he had purchased and served as postmaster of Bold Springs. A train depot was built on the land he sold to the railroad company and the land running beside the tracks was divided into small sections and sold to people wanting to start businesses. The new depot included a post office, and from that time forward it was known as the West Post Office. Mr. West served as postmaster and opened the first general store. He became a successful businessman and later owned a hotel, a furniture store, and a bank.[7]

The railroad brought prosperity to the area during the 1880s. More businesses were opened and more surrounding land was purchased. Czech immigrants came to the area, purchasing the rich lands to farm and start a fresh life in the new world. They also opened businesses, sharing their European culture. By the 1890s, the Czech businesses flourished in West.[7] On June 11, 1892, West was officially organized into a town. It had become the center of commerce for the area. There were cotton gins, grocery stores, churches, schools, and doctors' offices.[7]

The temporary city Crush, Texas, located just three miles (5 km) south of West, was the location of The Crash at Crush,[8] a head-on collision between two locomotives that was staged on September 15, 1896, as a publicity stunt for the Missouri–Kansas–Texas Railroad. Over 30,000 spectators gathered at the crash site, named "crush" for MKT passenger agent William Crush, who conceived the idea. About 4 p.m. the trains were sent speeding toward each other. Contrary to mechanics' predictions, the steam boilers exploded on impact, propelling pieces of metal into the crowd. Two people were killed and many others injured, including Jarvis Deane of Waco, who was photographing the event and lost an eye. Texas Historical Marker 5315, located on Interstate 35 northbound frontage road, between Mangrum and Wiggins Road, commemorates the event.[9]

The turn of the century brought electricity, running water, and natural gas. The population of West and surrounding area grew. Many of the descendants of the original settlers continue to farm the lands and run the businesses today. Czech is still spoken by some of the older residents.[10]

2013 explosion[edit]

On April 17, 2013, a fire broke out at West Fertilizer Co., a fertilizer plant on the north side of town that stored ammonium nitrate, a fertilizer that can be used as an explosive. The fire triggered two explosions milliseconds apart from one another. The massive blast killed 15 people,[11] including 12 first responders, and injured at least 200. It destroyed nearby schools, an apartment complex, and a nursing home and damaged hundreds of homes in the surrounding area.

The explosion, which measured as a 2.1 magnitude earthquake,[12] launched the small Texas town onto the national radar, drawing media and volunteer from across the nation. President Barack Obama and Texas Gov. Rick Perry attended the memorial for first responders.[13]

A month-long investigation ruled the cause of the explosion undetermined because multiple possible causes could not be ruled out. The lingering possibilities include arson, an electrical glitch or a golf cart that overheated.[14]

On May 11, 2016, authorities announced that the explosion was the result of arson.[15] No persons have yet been arrested for this crime.

West is located at 31°48′12″N 97°5′35″W / 31.80333°N 97.09306°W / 31.80333; -97.09306 (31.803369, -97.093106).[16] According to the United States Census Bureau, the city has a total area of 4.0 sq mi (10 km2), all land. Most of the city is located on the east side of Interstate 35.

The climate in this area is characterized by hot, humid summers and generally mild to cool winters. According to the Köppen Climate Classification system, West has a humid subtropical climate, abbreviated "Cfa" on climate maps.[17]

Historical population
Census Pop.
1900 851
1910 1,645 93.3%
1920 1,629 −1.0%
1930 1,807 10.9%
1940 1,979 9.5%
1950 2,130 7.6%
1960 2,352 10.4%
1970 2,406 2.3%
1980 2,485 3.3%
1990 2,515 1.2%
2000 2,692 7.0%
2010 2,807 4.3%
Est. 2015 2,883 [18] 2.7%
U.S. Decennial Census

As of the census of 2010, 2,807 people, 1,045 households, and 698 families resided in the city.[1] The population density was 1,754.3 people per square mile (701.7/km). There were 1,219 housing units at an average density of 761.8 per square mile (304.7/km²).[19] The racial makeup of the city was 89.0% White, 3.9% African American, 0.9% Native American, 0.2% Asian, 6.9% from other and two or more races.[19] Hispanics or Latinos of any race were 13.8% of the population.[19] The majority of the White population is of Czech descent (and West was officially designated "Home of the Official Kolache of the Texas Legislature" in 1997).[20]

Of the 1,045 households, 35.6% had children under the age of 18 living with them, 45.6% were married couples living together, 15.0% had a female householder with no husband present, and 34.9% were non family households.[19] About 31.7% of all households were made up of individuals living alone, and 33.0% were households with an individual who was 65 years of age or older. The average household size was 2.45 and the average family size was 3.1.[19]

In the city, the population was distributed as 28.3% of those who are 19 years and younger, 10.8% from 20 to 29, 25.0% from 30 to 49, 14.8% from 50 to 64, and 21.0% who were 65 years of age or older.[19] The median age was 38.9 years.[19] West has a 53% female and 47% male population.[19]

The median income for a household in the city was $35,929, and for a family was $44,485.[21] Males had a median income of $31,055 versus $27,917 for females. The per capita income for the city was $18,850.[21] About 13.8% of families and 18.3% of the population were below the poverty line, including 28.0% of those under age 18 and 13.9% of those age 65 or over.[21]

It is part of the Waco Metropolitan Statistical Area.

Area events[edit]

Westfest[22] is a festival celebrating the city's large Czech population and their heritage. There are several bakeries (such as the Czech Stop and Little Czech Bakery) and a nearby hotel named The Czech Inn.[23]

The city of West is served by the West Independent School District, and is home to the West High School Trojans.

Interstate 35 and Union Pacific Railroad pass through the city.

Notable people[edit]

See also[edit]

  1. ^ a b c United States Census Bureau (2011). "West, TX Census". census.gov.
  2. ^ United States Postal Service (2012). "USPS — Look Up a ZIP Code". Retrieved 2012-02-15.
  3. ^ "American FactFinder". United States Census Bureau. Retrieved 2008-01-31.
  4. ^ "US Board on Geographic Names". United States Geological Survey. 2007-10-25. Retrieved 2008-01-31.
  5. ^ "Geographic Names Information System". United States Geological Survey. Retrieved 2008-01-31.
  6. ^ "American FactFinder". United States Census Bureau. Retrieved 2011-05-14.
  7. ^ a b c d e "History of West". Archived from the original on March 16, 2012.
  8. ^ "The Crash at Crush". hmdb.org. Retrieved 2011-01-05.
  9. ^ "Crash at Crush, The". Texas Historical Commission. 1976. Retrieved 2011-01-05.
  10. ^ http://www.west-tx.com/history.asp
  11. ^ "West plant explosion victims known for willingness to help others".
  12. ^ "Day 1: Massive explosion at fertilizer plant shakes West, leaving dozens injured, trapped".
  13. ^ "Obama honors fallen firefighters at West memorial service".
  14. ^ "Monthlong probe of West blast finds 3 potential causes".
  15. ^ Ellis, Ralph. "Fire that led to Texas fertilizer blast set on purpose, officials say". cnn.com. CNN. Retrieved May 11, 2016.
  16. ^ "US Gazetteer files: 2010, 2000, and 1990". United States Census Bureau. 2011-02-12. Retrieved 2011-04-23.
  17. ^ "Climate Summary for West, Texas". Weatherbase.
  18. ^ "Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Incorporated Places: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2015". Retrieved July 2, 2016.
  19. ^ a b c d e f g h United States Census Bureau (2011). "Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics: 2010 2010 Demographic Profile Data". census.gov.
  20. ^ In House Concurrent Resolution No. 185, 75th Legislature, Regular Session (1997), as documented by Official Capital Designations, Texas State Library and Archives Commission, January 15, 2013.
  21. ^ a b c United States Census Bureau (2011). "SELECTED ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates". census.gov.
  22. ^ WestFest
  23. ^ "Czech Inn of West".

External links[edit]


text:
Leoš Janáček

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Leoš Janáček (1854 – 1928) was a Czech composer.

  • The melodic curves of speech are an expression of the complete organism and of all phases of its spiritual activities. They demonstrate whether a man is stupid or intelligent, sleepy or awake, tired or alert. They tell us whether he is a child or an old man, whether it is morning or evening, light or darkness, heat or frost, and disclose whether a person is alone or in company. The art of dramatic writing is to compose a melodic curve that will, as if by magic, reveal immediately a human being in one definite phase of his existence.
    • Leoš Janáček: Letters and Reminiscences (Stedron, Bohumir, ed. Translated by Geraldine Thomsen. Prague: Artia, 1995).

External links[edit]

Wikipedia has an article about:


text:
March 19

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Quotes of the day from previous years:

Education: That which discloses to the wise and disguises from the foolish their lack of understanding. ~ Ambrose Bierce in The Devil's Dictionary
The man of character, sensitive to the meaning of what he is doing, will know how to discover the ethical paths in the maze of possible behavior. ~ Earl Warren (born 19 March 1891)
Who save the madman dares to cry: "'Tis I am right, you all are wrong"?
"You all are right, you all are wrong," we hear the careless Soofi say,
"For each believes his glimm'ering lamp to be the gorgeous light of day."

~ Sir Richard Francis Burton ~ (born 19 March 1821)
All Faith is false, all Faith is true: Truth is the shattered mirror strown
In myriad bits; while each believes his little bit the whole to own.

~ Sir Richard Francis Burton ~
Do what thy manhood bids thee do, from none but self expect applause;
He noblest lives and noblest dies who makes and keeps his self-made laws.

~ Sir Richard Francis Burton ~
"Fools rush where Angels fear to tread!" Angels and Fools have equal claim
To do what Nature bids them do, sans hope of praise, sans fear of blame!

~ Sir Richard Francis Burton ~

Cease, Man, to mourn, to weep, to wail; enjoy thy shining hour of sun;
We dance along Death's icy brink, but is the dance less full of fun?

~ Richard Francis Burton
Reason is Life's sole arbiter, the magic Laby'rinth's single clue:
Worlds lie above, beyond its ken; what crosses it can ne'er be true.

~ Sir Richard Francis Burton ~
How shall the Shown pretend to ken aught of the Showman or the Show?
Why meanly bargain to believe, which only means thou ne'er canst know?
How may the passing Now contain the standing Now — Eternity? —
An endless is without a was, the be and never the to-be?

~ Sir Richard Francis Burton ~
The humblest citizen in all the land, when clad in the armor of a righteous cause, is stronger than all the hosts of error.
~ William Jennings Bryan ~
I am an individual … a circle touching and intersecting my neighbours at certain points, but nowhere corresponding, nowhere blending. … But my individuality, however all-sufficient for myself, is an infinitesimal point, an atom subject in all things to the Law of Storms called Life. I feel, I know that Fate is. But I cannot know what is or what is not fated to befall me. Therefore in the pursuit of perfection as an individual lies my highest, and indeed my only duty, the "I" being duly blended with the "We." … I am bound to take careful thought concerning the consequences of every word and deed. When, however, the Future has become the Past, it would be the merest vanity for me to grieve or to repent over that which was decreed by universal Law.
~ Richard Francis Burton ~
I believe the preservation of our civil liberties to be the most fundamental and important of all our governmental problems, because it always has been with us and always will be with us and if we ever permit those liberties to be destroyed, there will be nothing left in our system worthy of preservation.
~ Earl Warren ~
Destiny is not a matter of chance; it is a matter of choice. It is not a thing to be waited for; it is a thing to be achieved.
~ William Jennings Bryan ~
Many people consider the things government does for them to be social progress but they regard the things government does for others as socialism.
~ Earl Warren ~
Rank or add further suggestions…

Ranking system:

4 : Excellent - should definitely be used. (This is the utmost ranking and should be used only for one quote at a time, per person, for each date.)
3 : Very Good - strong desire to see it used.
2 : Good - some desire to see it used.
1 : Acceptable - but with no particular desire to see it used.
0 : Not acceptable - not appropriate for use as a quote of the day.

DOB: William Jennings Bryan · Richard Francis Burton · Philip Roth · Earl Warren · Bruce Willis

"He who wants to protect everything, protects nothing," is one of the fundamental rules of defense. ~ Adolf Galland (born March 19)

  • 3 because it is very true. Basically, he who tries to do everything all at once, fails miserably. Time and patience are virtues. And protection works well as a perfect example to this fundamental military practice. Zarbon 04:30, 18 April 2008 (UTC)
    • SOURCE: The First and the Last: The Rise and Fall of the German Fighter Forces - Page 165 by Adolf Galland - World War, 1939-1945 - 1954
  • 1 Kalki 16:07, 28 February 2009 (UTC)
  • 2 UDScott 20:29, 10 March 2009 (UTC)
  • 2 InvisibleSun 22:37, 18 March 2009 (UTC)

The more I study religions the more I am convinced that man never worshipped anything but himself. ~ Richard Francis Burton

  • 3 because man truly has shamelessly used religion as an excuse to further man's own purposes. Zarbon 05:51, 2 May 2008 (UTC)
  • 2 Kalki 16:07, 28 February 2009 (UTC)
  • 3 UDScott 20:29, 10 March 2009 (UTC)
  • 3 InvisibleSun 22:37, 18 March 2009 (UTC)
  • 3 bystander (talk) 15:47, 18 March 2012 (UTC)

Listen: if there is war down there — and if you think me worthy of it, and capable — you ought to grant me the honor of conducting the campaign. Surely, you don't think me too old? ~ Emilio De Bono

  • 2 Zarbon 04:40, 17 June 2008 (UTC)
  • 1 Kalki 16:07, 28 February 2009 (UTC)
  • 2 UDScott 20:29, 10 March 2009 (UTC)
  • 1 InvisibleSun 22:37, 18 March 2009 (UTC)

Forgive me, that was the soldier speaking. Now this is the man speaking again. And the man is more than the soldier. I can bear anything. Death is a more solemn thing than all the earthly trash. ~ Emilio De Bono

  • 3 Zarbon 04:40, 17 June 2008 (UTC)
  • 1 Kalki 16:07, 28 February 2009 (UTC)
  • 2 UDScott 20:29, 10 March 2009 (UTC)
  • 1 InvisibleSun 22:37, 18 March 2009 (UTC)

We look on seriously, but serenely. ~ Emilio De Bono

  • 3 Zarbon 04:40, 17 June 2008 (UTC)
  • 2 Kalki 16:07, 28 February 2009 (UTC)
  • 2 UDScott 20:29, 10 March 2009 (UTC)
  • 2 InvisibleSun 22:37, 18 March 2009 (UTC)

When you publish a book, it's the world's book. The world edits it. ~ Philip Roth

Scarcely a tear to shed;
Hardly a word to say;
The end of a Summer's day;
Sweet Love is dead.
~ William Allingham

Winds and waters keep
A hush more dead than any sleep.
~ William Allingham

You can't undo the past but you can certainly not repeat it. ~ Bruce Willis

In war, science has proven itself an evil genius; it has made war more terrible than it ever was before. Man used to be content to slaughter his fellowmen on a single plane — the earth's surface. Science has taught him to go down into the water and shoot up from below and to go up into the clouds and shoot down from above, thus making the battlefield three times a bloody as it was before; but science does not teach brotherly love. Science has made war so hellish that civilization was about to commit suicide; and now we are told that newly discovered instruments of destruction will make the cruelties of the late war seem trivial in comparison with the cruelties of wars that may come in the future. ~ William Jennings Bryan

I cannot and do not live in the world of discretion, not as a writer, anyway. I would prefer to, I assure you — it would make life easier. But discretion is, unfortunately, not for novelists. ~ Philip Roth

  • 3 Kalki 09:55, 13 March 2009 (UTC) with a lean toward 4.
  • 2 Zarbon 02:47, 14 March 2009 (UTC)
  • 3 InvisibleSun 22:37, 18 March 2009 (UTC)

I write fiction and I’m told it’s autobiography, I write autobiography and I’m told it’s fiction, so since I’m so dim and they’re so smart, let them decide what it is or it isn’t. ~ Philip Roth

All I can tell you with certainty is that I, for one, have no self, and that I am unwilling or unable to perpetrate upon myself the joke of a self.... What I have instead is a variety of impersonations I can do, and not only of myself — a troupe of players that I have internalised, a permanent company of actors that I can call upon when a self is required.... I am a theater and nothing more than a theater. ~ Philip Roth

  • 3 Kalki 09:55, 13 March 2009 (UTC) with very strong lean toward 4.
  • 1 Zarbon 02:47, 14 March 2009 (UTC)
  • 3 InvisibleSun 22:37, 18 March 2009 (UTC)

Implicit in the term "national defense" is the notion of defending those values and ideals which set this Nation apart. For almost two centuries, our country has taken singular pride in the democratic ideals enshrined in its Constitution, and the most cherished of those ideals have found expression in the First Amendment. It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties — the freedom of association — which make the defense of our nation worthwhile. ~ Earl Warren

Obviously the facts are never just coming at you but are incorporated by an imagination that is formed by your previous experience. Memories of the past are not memories of facts but memories of your imaginings of the facts. ~ Philip Roth

The English language is a form of communication! Conversation isn’t just crossfire where you shoot and get shot at! Where you’ve got to duck for your life and aim to kill! Words aren’t only bombs and bullets — no, they’re little gifts, containing meanings! ~ Philip Roth

Success is brought by continued labor and continued watchfulness. We must struggle on, not for one moment hesitate, nor take one backward step. ~ William Jennings Bryan

[W]e are called upon to give but little in return for the advantages which we receive. Shall we give that little grudgingly? Our definition of patriotism is often too narrow… Patriotism calls for the faithful and conscientious performance of all of the duties of citizenship, in small matters as well as great… ~ William Jennings Bryan


text:
1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Barlaam and Josaphat

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Barlaam and Josaphat, one of the most popular and widely disseminated of medieval religious romances, which owes its importance and interest to the fact that it is a Christianized version of the story of Gautama Siddharta, the Buddha, with which it agrees not only in broad outline but in essential details.

The Christian story first appears in Greek among the works of John (q.v.) of Damascus, who flourished in the early part of the 8th century, and who, before he adopted the monastic life, had held high office at the court of the caliph Abū Ja‛far al-Mansūr, as his father Sergius is said to have done before him.

The outline of the Greek story is as follows:—St Thomas had converted the people of India, and after the eremitic life originated in Egypt, many Indians adopted it. But a powerful pagan king arose who hated and persecuted the Christians, especially the ascetics. After this king, Abenner by name, had long been childless, a boy greatly desired and matchless in beauty, was born to him and received the name of Josaphat. The king, in his joy, summons astrologers to predict the child's destiny. They foretell glory and prosperity beyond those of all his predecessors. One sage, most learned of all, assents, but intimates that the scene of this glory will be, not the paternal kingdom, but another infinitely more exalted, and that the child will adopt the faith which his father persecutes.

The boy shows a thoughtful and devout turn. King Abenner, troubled by this and by the remembrance of the prediction, selects a secluded city, in which he causes a splendid palace to be built, where his son should abide, attended only by tutors and servants in the flower of youth and health. No stranger was to have access, and the boy was to be cognizant of none of the sorrows of humanity, such as poverty, disease, old age or death, but only of what was pleasant, so that he should have no inducement to think of the future life; nor was he ever to hear a word of Christ and His religion.

Prince Josaphat grows up in this seclusion, acquires all kinds of knowledge and exhibits singular endowments. At length, on his urgent prayer, the king reluctantly permits him to pass the limits of the palace, after having taken all precautions to keep painful objects out of sight. But through some neglect of orders, the prince one day encounters a leper and a blind man, and asks of his attendants with pain and astonishment what such a spectacle should mean. These, they tell him, are ills to which man is liable. Shall all men have such ills? he asks. And in the end he returns home in deep depression. Another day he falls in with a decrepit old man, and stricken with dismay at the sight, renews his questions and hears for the first time of death. And in how many years, continues the prince, does this fate befall man? and must he expect death as inevitable? Is there no way of escape? No means of eschewing this wretched state of decay? The attendants reply as may be imagined; and Josaphat goes home more pensive than ever, dwelling on the certainty of death and on what shall be thereafter.

At this time Barlaam, an eremite of great sanctity and knowledge, dwelling in the wilderness of Sennaritis, divinely warned, travels to India in the disguise of a merchant, and gains access to Prince Josaphat, to whom he imparts the Christian doctrine and commends the monastic life. Suspicion arises and Barlaam departs. But all attempts to shake the prince's convictions fail. As a last resource the king sends for Theudas, a magician, who removes the prince's attendants and substitutes seductive girls; but all their blandishments are resisted through prayer. The king abandons these efforts and associates his son in the government. The prince uses his power to promote religion, and everything prospers in his hands. At last Abenner himself yields to the faith, and after some years of penitence dies. Josaphat surrenders the kingdom to a friend called Barachias and departs for the wilderness. After two years of painful search and much buffeting by demons he finds Barlaam. The latter dies, and Josaphat survives as a hermit many years. King Barachias afterwards arrives, and transfers the bodies of the two saints to India, where they are the source of many miracles.

Now this story is, mutatis mutandis, the story of Buddha. It will suffice to recall the Buddha's education in a secluded palace, his encounter successively with a decrepit old man, with a man in mortal disease and poverty, with a dead body, and, lastly, with a religious recluse radiant with peace and dignity, and his consequent abandonment of his princely state for the ascetic life in the jungle. Some of the correspondences in the two stories are most minute, and even the phraseology, in which some of the details of Josaphat's history are described, almost literally renders the Sanskrit of the Lalita Vistara. More than that, the very word Joasaph or Josaphat (Arabic, Yūdasatf) is a corruption of Bodisat due to a confusion between the Arabic letters for Y and B, and Bodisatva is a common title for the Buddha in the many birth-stories that clustered round the life of the sage. There are good reasons for thinking that the Christian story did not originate with John of Damascus, and a strong case has been made out by Zotenberg that it reflects the religious struggles and disputes of the early 7th century in Syria, and that the Greek text was edited by a monk of Saint Saba named John, his version being the source of all later texts and translations. How much older than this the Christian story is, we cannot tell, but it is interesting to remember that it embodies in the form of a speech the "Apology" of the 2nd-century philosopher Aristides. After its appearance among the writings of John of Damascus, it was incorporated with Simeon Metaphrastes' Lives of the Saints (c. 950), and thence gained great vogue, being translated into almost every European language. A famous Icelandic version was made for Prince Hakon early in the 13th century. In the East, too, it took on new life and Catholic missionaries freely used it in their propaganda. Thus a Tagala (Philippine) translation was brought out at Manila in 1712. Besides furnishing the early playwrights with material for miracle plays, it has supplied episodes and apologues to many a writer, including Boccaccio, John Gower and Shakespeare. Rudolph of Ems about 1220 expanded it into a long poem of 16,000 lines, celebrating the victory of Christian over heathen teaching. The heroes of the romance have even attained saintly rank. Their names were inserted by Petrus de Natalibus in his Catalogus Sanctorum (c. 1380), and Cardinal Baronius included them in the official Martyrologium authorized by Sixtus V. (1585-1590) under the date of the 27th of November. In the Orthodox Eastern Church "the holy Josaph, son of Abener, king of India" is allotted the 26th of August. Thus unwittingly Gautama the Buddha has come to official recognition as a saint in two great branches of the Catholic Church, and no one will say that he does not deserve the honour. A church dedicated Divo Josaphat in Palermo is probably not the only one of its kind.

The identity of the stories of Buddha and St Josaphat was recognized by the historian of Portuguese India, Diogo do Couto (1542-1616), as may be seen in his history (Dec. v. liv. vi. cap. 2). In modern times the honour belongs to Laboulaye (1859), Felix Liebrecht in 1860 putting it beyond dispute. Subsequent researches have been carried out by Zotenberg, Max Müller, Rhys Davids, Braunholtz and Joseph Jacobs, who published his Barlaam and Josaphat in 1896.


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Author:Simeon Pease Cheney

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Simeon Pease Cheney

Articles in Popular Science Monthly[edit]

Works by this author published before January 1, 1923 are in the public domain worldwide because the author died at least 100 years ago. Translations or editions published later may be copyrighted. Posthumous works may be copyrighted based on how long they have been published in certain countries and areas.


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Collier's New Encyclopedia (1921)/Lafitte, Jean

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LAFITTE, JEAN (lä-fēt'), an American buccaneer; born in France, 1780. He is first authentically known as the chief of an organized and formidable body of desperadoes, having their headquarters on an island in Barataria Bay, in the Gulf of Mexico. Committing various piratical acts, the United States Government sent out an expedition against them in 1814, which captured their stronghold and all vessels lying there at the time, Lafitte and his companions escaping. At the commencement of the war with the United States in 1812, Lafitte was offered by the British Government $30,000, and a naval commission, to co-operate in their expedition against New Orleans. This offer he spurned, and communicating its nature to Governor Claiborne of Louisiana, he offered the services of himself and men against the enemy, on the sole condition of pardon for their past offenses. His offer was accepted, and Lafitte kept his word by rendering efficient aid to the Americans in the battle of Jan. 8, 1815. Lafitte later settled in Galveston, then removed to Yucatan, where he died in 1826.


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The New International Encyclopædia/Seal (mammal)

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SEAL (AS. seol, siol, OHG. selah, selach, seal). A carnivorous aquatic mammal of the suborder Pinnipedia, without tusk-like canines in the upper jaw; any pinniped except the walrus. Seals are specially modified for their aquatic life, particularly in the structure of the limbs. The upper arm and forearm of the front limb, and the two corresponding parts of the hind limb, are very short and more or less imbedded in the tissues of the body, while the hands and feet, especially the latter, are greatly enlarged and fully webbed. Five well-developed digits are present in all cases, but in the hind limbs the outer and inner digits are stouter and often longer than the other three. There are no clavicles in the shoulder girdle, and the limbs are poorly adapted for use on land. The tail is always very short, but the hind limbs often serve the purpose of a rudder. The body is sleek and graceful, tapering posteriorly as in cetaceans (q.v.), but the head is always distinct and well formed. The whole surface of the animal develops a hairy covering, even the palms of the hands and soles of the feet being thus protected in the true seals. There are always fewer than twelve incisor teeth, and usually four premolars and only one molar are present on each side of the head, in each jaw. The brain is large and much convoluted, and seals exhibit much intelligence. The eyes are large and exposed, with flat corneas, and external ears, though small, are often present.

Although so specially adapted to their aquatic life, seals come to shore or upon ice-floes to mate and to bring forth their young. One or two young are produced at a time, not oftener than once a year. Seals are polygamous and the males fight savagely for the possession of the females. As the pairing occurs soon after the birth of the young, the latter, known as ‘pups,’ are often neglected and many die. During the breeding season the males do not eat, and it is said they sometimes endure three months of abstinence. The food consists of various marine animals, chiefly fish, squids, and crustaceans; possibly vegetable food is also used at times. It is a curious fact that seals often swallow pebbles and even large stones, which are frequently found in their stomachs, but the purpose is not clearly understood. They are regurgitated, as are also the indigestible parts of the food, such as fish-bones and squids' beaks. Seals are large eaters, the remains of more than 200 squids having been found in a single fur-seal at one time, although digestion is very rapid. The food is masticated little or not at all, fishes being usually bolted head first. In the capture of their food, as in all their movements in the water, seals are quick and graceful. On land, however, their movements are awkward and progression is chiefly effected by a succession of jerks caused by the upward bending and sudden straightening of the spine, which is remarkably flexible, the limbs being little used by the true seals; the eared seals move mainly by the aid of the limbs. Food is not normally taken on land, and in pursuit of it seals are capable of remaining under water for long periods of time, respiration being very slow.

As regards the intelligence of seals there seems to be considerable difference of opinion, according to the opportunities and point of view of the observer. In captivity some species of seal have shown considerable readiness to learn tricks of more or less difficulty, and trained seals have often been exhibited. On the other hand, observations made on the fur-seal in its native haunts seem to show that while the instincts are strong, there is little real intelligence, and ordinarily stupidity is a marked characteristic. The homing instinct is very strong in most seals, and they will return year after year to their breeding grounds, even though they are sure to meet with slaughter. Most species are also very gregarious, and in their herds they constantly tend to imitate each other, so that they follow their leaders in a perfectly unreasoning way.

Seals are widely distributed in all parts of the oceanic world, but especially in the colder regions. A few species occur in the tropics and temperate regions, but it is in the Arctic and Antarctic parts of the ocean that seals really abound. There they swarm on rocky coasts and on ice-floes during the breeding season, and in the water during the rest of the year. Although seals are normally marine, two species inhabit the Caspian Sea and Lake Baikal.

NIE 1905 Seal.jpg

The classification of the seals and the limits of the species are still much debated subjects and are very perplexing. Two principal groups are recognized—true seals (Phoeidæ) and otaries (Otariidæ), the former without external ears, which the latter possess; there are also differences in dentition. The Phoeidæ are all ‘hair’-seals; that is, they have no thick coating of fur under the outer hairy coat. Some of the otaries are also hair-seals, but all fur-seals are otaries. There are three subfamilies of Phoeidæ—Phocinæ, Monachinæ, and Cystophorinæ, the first having ten incisors, the second eight, and the third only six. The Phocinæ include many of the best-known species, such as the common seal (Phoca vitulina), the harp-seal (Phoca Grœnlandica), the floe-rat or ringed seal (Phoca hispida), and the freshwater seals (Phoca Caspica and Sibirica), already referred to.

The common ‘harbor’ seal is circumpolar in its distribution, and extends in range downward into both the North Atlantic and Pacific oceans. It is locally common along the eastern coast of America, and on the wilder and less frequented parts of the British coast. The pelage is yellowish, variously spotted and marked, with brown above, while underneath it is generally yellowish-white; but there is considerable variability in the coloration. In size the common seal is one of the smaller species, the entire length being from three to five feet. Altho\igh gregarious, this species is not found in large ‘rookeries,’ but small herds are occasionally seen. The skin, which is used for leather and other purposes, and the oil, which is colorless, nearly odorless, and in many ways superior to whale oil, are of sufficient commercial importance to subject these animals to continual slaughter, and their numbers are probably steadily diminishing. The females show some attachment to their young, though their devotion has probably been exaggerated. In captivity the common seal is docile and is said to become attached to its keeper. It is endowed with much curiosity, and there may be some basis for the belief that it is strongly attracted by musical sounds. The sense of smell is very acute and the vocal power ranges from a plaintive bleat to a harsh bark or grunt. The popular name ‘sea-calf,’ and the specific name vitulina, have reference to a supposed resemblance between its voice and that of a calf.

The harp-seal is a much larger and more northern species, reaching a length of eight or nine feet and rarely coming south of Newfoundland. It is extremely gregarious and almost wholly pelagic, resorting to the ice-floes only to breed. It is much sought after by sealing vessels, several hundred thousand being annually slaughtered on the breeding grounds. The floe-rat is one of the smallest seals, although about as long as the common species. It is an Arctic form, and is of great importance to the Eskimos as a source of food and clothing. This is the species which forms a domed cavity in the ice, called by the Eskimos an ‘igloo,’ after the name of their own winter houses; and it also keeps open breathing holes through the ice. The seals of the Caspian Sea and Lake Baikal are near relatives to the floe-rat, which they resemble in size, though differing in some other details. Their presence in Lake Baikal, a fresh-water lake, is not so remarkable when one considers that the seal often ascends rivers for long distances and has been taken in Lake Champlain.

The Monachinæ are a small group of half a dozen species, all Antarctic, except the two species of monk-seal which are tropical. The European monk-seal (Monachus albiventris) occurs in the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent parts of the Atlantic Ocean, while a closely ullied species, the West Indian seal (Monachus tropicalis), of which little seems to be known, is confined to the Gulf of Mexico, where it is nearly extirpated. (See Extinct Animals.) These seals have the first and fifth toes of the hind feet greatly longer than the others, and the nails of both fore and hind feet are very small and rudimentary. The other seals of this subfamily are rare and little known except the sea-leopard (q.v.) of the south temperate and Antarctic seas.

The Cystophorinæ are a small group containing only two or three species, but both of the genera are of considerable interest. The hooded seal (q.v.) is a large Polar species, remarkable for the hood-like distensible sac covering the head of the male and connected with the nostrils. The second genus, Macrorhinus, includes the largest of all seals, the elephant-seals (q.v.), or sea-elephants so called in reference to the proboscis of the male as well as the great size.

Turning to the otaries, or ‘eared seals,’ it is convenient to recognize two principal groups, the ‘sea-lions’ or hair-otaries, and the ‘sea-bears’ or fur-otaries. The former group includes the largest species, some of them attaining a length of fourteen feet. The southern sea-lion (Otaria jubata) occurs commonly on the west coast of South America, while the northern sea-lion (Eumetopias Stelleri) is found throughout the North Pacific from California to Japan. The common sea-lion of California is, however, a much smaller species, called the black sea lion (Zalophus Californianus), and is often seen in menageries and zoölogical gardens. It is famous as the attraction at the Seal Rocks, close by the Cliff House, near San Francisco. The sea-lions are all very timid animals, easily terrified, and may be driven in herds, even far inland, by means of flags or umbrellas. See Colored Plate of Seals.

The Fur-Seals. The last group of seals to be considered are the fur-seals, by far the most important commercially of all marine mammals. The fur-seals of the Southern Hemisphere are now usually placed in a separate genus, Arctocephalus, which ranges as far north in the Pacific as Guadaloupe Island (29° N.), although mainly confined to the south-temperate and antarctic zones. The skin is of considerable value, and these seals have therefore been eagerly sought wherever they resorted for breeding. They have therefore been practically, if not totally, exterminated, except in some small rookeries in New Zealand and on the west coast of Cape Colony, which are under rigid governmental control, and yield about 7000 skins per annum: and especially on Lobos Island, off the mouth of the Rio Plata, which is leased by the Government of Uruguay to a private company, which so controls the slaughter that about 13,000 skins are furnished annually.

The northern fur-seals (genus Callorhinus) are confined to the North Pacific Ocean. At the present day they breed mainly on the Pribilof, Commander, Robben, Bering, and Kurile islands, the first being the most famous resort. The northern fur-seal varies considerably in size, color, and proportions, and specialists recognize at least two and perhaps three species. In size the male is very much larger than the female, the difference being especially noticeable in weight. A full grown male is about 80 inches in length and weighs rather less than 400 pounds, while the female is only about 48 inches long and weighs less than 80 pounds. The color is considerably affected by age, the length of time the seal has been out of water, and the amount of dirt on the fur, but in general the adults are dark gray, with a more or less chestnut or seal-brown cast. The young are black above and brownish-gray beneath, but when three months old have assumed the steel-gray pelage of yearlings. At this stage they are nearly white beneath and the sexes are alike. With increased age the white lower parts become grayish; the female assumes the adult aspect a little more slowly. The pelage in all the fur-otaries consists of the ordinary outer coat of ‘water-hair,’ and a dense, soft under fur. To prepare a pelt for use as ‘fur’ the water-hair is removed and the under fur is cleaned. On account of their exceptional warmth, softness, and beauty, sealskins have long been in great demand, and the wanton destruction of breeding females, literally by the millions, in the nineteenth century, so depleted the seal herds that the supply is always less than the demand. The high prices thus constantly obtainable have led to the continued existence of a considerable fleet of vessels which hunt and slaughter seals, wherever they can find them, regardless of age or sex. Ever since the discovery of the Pribilof Islands in 1786, the competition for the skins of the seals breeding there and elsewhere in the North Pacific has been so keen that the animals have been in imminent danger of extermination. The organization of the Russian-American Company in 1799, however, improved conditions somewhat, as the killing of the seals was legally restricted to the employees of a single corporation, which had the greatest interest in the maintenance of the herd. At first the slaughter was indiscriminate as to age or sex, but regulations protecting the females and young were soon made, so that when the Pribilof fur-seal herd came under the control of the United States in 1867, it was in a prosperous condition. Since then it has been sadly depleted. For a discussion of the Alaskan seal question, see Sealing.

The great evil of pelagic sealing lies in the fact that the nursing mothers wander far in search of food, while the males do not take food during the breeding season, but remain on the islands. Consequently practically all the seals taken by pelagic sealers are nursing females, the death of which ordinarily results in the starvation of the pups. There can be no doubt that pelagic sealing is suicidal, the catch showing an annual decrease since 1894, while it is probable that the profits to each vessel engaged in it are extremely small. Recent calculations based on the most trustworthy figures indicate that the Pribilof herd of breeding seals did not in 1903 exceed 60,000 females, and unless remedial measures be devised and enforced the early extinction of the herd is probable.

The terms used in reference to the fur-otaries present a curious anomaly. The animal so generally called ‘fur-seal’ is properly a sea-bear, and very probably more nearly related to the bears than to the true seals. The male is called a ‘bull’ and the female a ‘cow,’ but the young one is a ‘pup,’ which if a male becomes a ‘bachelor.’ The ‘cows,’ moreover, are gathered in ‘harems’ on a ‘rookery’ and, to cap the climax, the capture of these mammals is commonly designated as a ‘fishery’!

For full particulars, in every detail, regarding the fur-seal and the sealing industry, consult the remarkable four volumes issued by the United States Treasury Department in 1899, designated Report of Fur Seal Investigations.


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Create your own quiz using our Quiz Creator

Many news websites have online polls on their sites. Although polls can be engaging for site visitors, there are downsides. Specifically, some site visitors may believe that online poll results are accurate reflections of public opinion when, in fact, they are not. Further, the widespread use of entertainment-oriented polls may miss valuable opportunities to both entertain and educate site visitors. We have been analyzing reinvigorated formats for online polls.

Recommended practices

  • Ask site visitors to guess a factual result using a quiz format.  You might ask:
    • How many car burglaries occurred in your community in the past year? or
    • What percentage of the public approves of gay marriage, according to a recent Gallup poll?
  • Any numerical data, whether it is the unemployment rate, a tax increase, crime statistics, or opinion poll results, can be used to create online quizzes.
  • Multiple-choice polls with four or five response options have many benefits
  • Slider polls, where there is a bar that allows the site visitor to pick any number between two values (e.g. 0 to 100), also have unique advantages.
  • A series of poll questions on a page can increase engagement.

These quiz-based online poll questions:

  • Increase time on site compared to an article reporting on the same fact without an interactive tool.
  • Are seen as more enjoyable than an article reporting on the same fact without an interactive tool.
  • Help poll participants learn more than presenting static numerical data.

Slider polls also have unique benefits when compared to multiple-choice polls. Specifically, slider polls:

  • Increase time on site compared to multiple-choice polls.
  • Help poll participants learn in diverse ways.  Those completing slider polls were equally able to answer factual questions posed in open-ended formats that did not offer any response options and closed-ended formats that offered respondents four response options.  Those completing multiple-choice polls were better able to answer closed-ended, compared to open-ended, factual knowledge questions.

Academic Presentations

Scacco, J. M., Muddiman, A., & Stroud, N. J. (2013, June). The influence of interactive online poll features on political learning. Paper presented at the International Communication Association, Political Communication Division, London

Stroud, N. J., Scacco, J., & Muddiman, A. (2013, August). Interactive quizzes on news websites. Presented at the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Electronic News Division, Chicago. *Awarded Division’s Top Scholar-to-Scholar Presentation

  • Natalie (Talia) Jomini Stroud

    Natalie (Talia) Jomini Stroud

    Talia Stroud (PhD, University of Pennsylvania) is the Director of the Engaging News Project at the Annette Strauss Institute for Civic Life and Associate Professor of Communication Studies at the University of Texas at Austin. Her book, Niche News (Oxford, 2011), examines likeminded political media use and inspired this project. The book received the 2012 Outstanding Book Award from the International Communication Association. Stroud previously worked at the Annenberg Public Policy Center; the name of this project is a H/T to Kathleen Hall Jamieson’s “E4″ work with local news in the 2002 midterms.

  • Joshua Scacco

    Joshua Scacco
    Faculty Research Associate

    Joshua M. Scacco (PhD, The University of Texas at Austin) is an Assistant Professor of Media Theory & Politics in the Brian Lamb School of Communication at Purdue University. He also serves as a Research Associate for the Engaging News Project (ENP). He is interested broadly in the communicative role elites and organizations, including political leaders, journalists, and news outlets, play in American political life.

  • Ashley Muddiman

    Ashley Muddiman
    Faculty Research Associate

    Ashley Muddiman (PhD, University of Texas at Austin) is an Assistant Professor in the Communication Studies department at the University of Kansas. Ashley is broadly interested in political media effects and specifically interested in political conflict and incivility. Her current research projects study the role media coverage plays in shaping citizens’ perceptions of political incivility, explore how citizens interact with online news depicting incivility, and investigate tactics, such as fact checking, that have the potential to diminish the effects of incivility.


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Global cyberattack affected 200,000 victims in 150 countries.

Major Japanese electronics maker Hitachi says it has come under a cyber-attack which may be the same one that rocked the world. The chief of Europol, the European Union’s police agency, says a global cyberattack has spread to 200,000 victims in at least 150 countries.

Europol Director Rob Wainwright told British TV outlets on Sunday that the cyberattack is unprecedented in scale.

Wainwright said the “ransomware” blocks access to data until money is paid, and replicates itself in order to spread to other computers automatically.

The virus infects computers by invading through a Microsoft Windows defect.

Wainwright warned companies to take precautionary measures as they may find themselves affected on Monday.

Wainwright suspects the cyberattack was carried out by multiple perpetrators, and that Europol is working closely with the US FBI to solve the case.

Hitachi officials say problems were found on part of their in-house computer system on Monday.

They say employees cannot send or receive emails or open attachments. They say similar problems were also found at their group firms abroad.

The officials say they believe their computer system was infected with the same software that locked up computers around the world. They say they are trying to quickly restore the system.

Japanese police say that by Sunday noon, they had confirmed 2 attacks in the country.

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Report: CHC to Shut Down Bergen Base, Shed 100 Jobs

Offshore helicopter operator CHC will shut down its base in Bergen, Norway, and shed around 100 employees, according to a report from local newspaper Bergens Tidende.

This is not an offer to buy or sell securities. Oil investment carries with it very high risks. The information contained within this site has not been nor will it be verified by Envestor First and is subject to change at any time. We are not a United States Securities Dealer or Broker or United States Investment Adviser. Do your own due diligence and consult with a licensed professional before making any investment decisions. Please read our full disclaimer before making any decisions.


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Home > Uncategorized > Gore’s First Confession

Gore’s First Confession

Al Gore ConfessesThis week, while speaking at a green energy business conference in Athens Greece, the world was treated to the first signs that Al Gore is capable of admitting when he’s wrong on Environmental issues. In this case, he said that he made a mistake in supporting corn-based ethanol while he was in office, admitting he was more interested in farm votes for his presidential run than what was best for the environment.

So effectively, even Al Gore can be swayed by short term gains, rather than holding out for a more substantiated positions would include fully factored and truly long-term projections on the impacts of short-sighted policy.  A good question at this point might be…Does All Gore see any difference between political gains and financial gains made at the expense of short-sighted Environmental policy.

Like any good politician Al Gore knows when to dissociate himself from a bad position. Though not in so many words, Gore has now effectively gone on record saying that (so called “first generation”) biofuels from corn are not only a bad idea ecologically, but they in fact are based on a false and wasteful economic model as well.

Some Stats to chew on:

  • Total U.S. ethanol subsidies reached $7.7 billion last year, according to the International Energy Industry, and many of those tax credits will soon be up for renewal.
  • The U.S. ethanol industry will consume about 41 percent of the U.S. corn crop this year, or 15 percent of the global corn crop, according to Goldman Sachs analysts.

Al Gore Confesses

Gore does take time to disclose the most obvious issues with the “first generation” ethanol production as a rather basic, but also very energy intensive process of converting corn to ethanol for use in vehicle engines.

“It is not a good policy to have these massive subsidies for first generation ethanol,” said Gore, speaking at a green energy business conference in Athens, Greece.

“First generation ethanol I think was a mistake. The energy conversion ratios are at best very small,” he said, referring to how much energy is produced in the process.

He also goes on to say that “It is not a good policy to have these massive subsidies for first generation ethanol”

Of course he’d never go so far as to suggest that the petrochemical driven farming methods that produce corn are ecologically unsound as well, since he still has a reputation to protect. By introducing the label of “first generation” to the subject of BioFuels, Gore has effectively created soem sort of upgrade path, where alternate sources of BioFuels weren’t overlooked, they are simply awaiting us in more advanced “generations” of this technology…Which he will surely take a stake in and publicly champion when the time is right presumably.

Al Gore Confesses IgnoranceWhere does he go from here?

So where’s Al going with BioFuels now that he’s seen the light? Gore was quoted saying that he instead supports so-called second generationtechnologies that do not compete with food — using farm waste or non-food sources like switchgrass to make ethanol.  “I do think second and third generation that don’t compete with food prices will play an increasing role, certainly with aviation fuels,” he added. Although he also adds that  he did not expect a U.S. clean energy or climate bill for “at least two years” following the mid-term elections that saw Republicans increase their presence.

So now that the self-appointed spokesperson for the political Green Movement has spoken out on what Science and Commons Sense has been sayign for year…We can presume to start lookign forward to the next generation of BioFuels to get Gores green stamp of approval.

Perhaps when Shell and Exxon (et al) get a good enough stranglehold on biological patents for Algae based BioFuel that they can ramp up production to a level that will force small producers out of the picture, and assure the best returns on teh large Public MArkets. Especcially for those insiders who can get in on teh ground floor, and promote via their well financed platforms…be they politically motivated or otherwise.

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