Gary Muller (born 27 December 1964) is a former professional South African tennis player.

Muller turned pro in 1985. His 12-year career included wins over Andre Agassi, Jim Courier, Michael Chang and Stefan Edberg. Muller's best singles result at a Grand Slam was reaching the third round in the 1987 Australian Open in which he lost to Miloslav Mečíř of Czechoslovakia. A more successful doubles player than singles, Muller won eight doubles titles in his career with six different partners and reached a career highest ranking of 7th in November 1993. He reached the semi-final of the men's doubles at four Grand Slams (1986 US Open, 1988 Wimbledon, 1990 Australian Open and 1993 Wimbledon). Muller still holds the record for the most aces served in a three set match (54) in a 1993 Wimbledon Qualifying match against Peter Lundgren.

After his retirement in 1997 Muller worked for eight years as an ATP Tour coach during which time he worked with Jonas Björkman, Stefan Koubek, Sargis Sargsian and Thomas Johansson. He was with Dominic Thiem as his Touring Coach when he clinched the title in Rio in 2017.

Muller was on the ATP Board of Directors as a Player Representative from 2002 to 2004.

He currently resides in Ontario, Canada with his wife and four children.

Career finals

Doubles (8 wins, 12 losses)

References

External links

 "Muller Gains in Tennis" at the New York Times
Gary Muller's website: www.refusetomiss.com

1964 births
Living people
Afrikaner people
South African people of German descent
Tennis players from Durban
South African male tennis players


Zinc finger protein 41 is a protein that in humans is encoded by the ZNF41 gene.

This gene product is a likely zinc finger family transcription factor. It contains KRAB-A and KRAB-B domains that act as transcriptional repressors in related proteins, and multiple zinc finger DNA binding motifs and finger linking regions characteristic of the Kruppel family. This gene is part of a gene cluster on chromosome Xp11.23. Several alternatively spliced transcript variants have been described, however, the full-length nature of only some of them is known.

References

Further reading

External links

Transcription factors


The Barnes Ice Cap is an ice cap located in central Baffin Island, Nunavut, Canada.

Geography
It covers close to  in the area of the Baffin Mountains. It has been thinning due to regional warming. Between 2004 and 2006, the ice cap  was thinning at a rate of  per year.

The ice cap contains Canada's oldest ice, some of it being over 20,000 years old. It is a remnant of the Laurentide Ice Sheet, which covered much of Canada during the last glacial period of the Earth's current ice age. Generator Lake is located at the southeastern end of the ice cap.

See also
List of glaciers

References

Bodies of ice of Baffin Island
Arctic Cordillera
Ice caps of Canada


Peroxidasin homolog is a protein that in humans is encoded by the PXDN gene.

Peroxidasin requires ionic bromine as a co-factor, making bromine an essential element for human life.

Clinical significance

Mutations in PXDN are associated with microphthalmia.

References

Further reading


Leptin, serum levels of, also known as LSL, is a human gene.

References

Further reading

Genes on human chromosome 2


Highway 35 is a highway in south-central Israel.  It runs roughly from west to east.  It begins in Ashkelon, passes through the Lakhish region and Kiryat Gat, crosses the Green Line and terminates at a junction with Highway 60 between Hebron and Halhul.  Highway 35 is 58 km long.  The road follows the "Lachish Road", an ancient east–west trade route connecting the Via Maris and the Way of the Patriarchs.

Junctions and interchanges on the highway

References

See also

List of highways in Israel

35


As the Band Turns is the sixth album by R&B band Atlantic Starr, released in 1985. Following the departure of initial lead singer Sharon Bryant, As The Band sees the introduction of new vocalist Barbara Weathers. This proved to be one of the band's more successful releases, yielding several R&B hits, such as "Freak-A-Ristic," "If Your Heart Isn't In It" (written by former Average White Band vocalist Hamish Stuart), and the smash quiet storm anthem "Secret Lovers." This would be the band's last release for A&M Records after a memorable, although inconsistent, run of hits throughout the early 80's.

Track listing
 "Freak-A-Ristic" (David Lewis) - 4:05
 "Cool, Calm, Collected" (Joey Gallo, Pamela Phillips Oland, Wardell Potts, Jr.) - 4:04
 "One Love" (David Lewis, Wayne Lewis) - 3:52
 "In the Heat of Passion" (Wayne Lewis, Wardell Potts Jr., William Shelby) - 4:38
 "If Your Heart Isn't In It" (Hamish Stuart) - 4:02
 "Silver Shadow" (David Lewis, Wayne Lewis) - 4:53
 "Let's Start It Over" (Joey Gallo, Pamela Phillips Oland, Wardell Potts, Jr.) - 5:33
 "Secret Lovers" (David Lewis, Wayne Lewis) - 5:30
 "Thank You" (David Lewis, Wayne Lewis) - 4:29

Personnel

Atlantic Starr
 Barbara Weathers – lead vocals (5, 6, 8), backing vocals (6, 7, 8)
 David Lewis – guitars (1-4, 6-9), drum programming (1, 6, 8, 9), backing vocals (1, 2, 4-9), arrangements (1, 3, 6), lead vocals (2, 3, 4, 8, 9)
 Wayne Lewis – keyboards (1, 3-9), lead vocals (1, 5, 7), backing vocals (1, 2), arrangements (1, 3, 4, 6)
 Jonathan Lewis – keyboards, trombone
 Joseph Phillips – percussion
 Atlantic Starr – arrangements (4)

Additional Musicians
 John Barnes – keyboards (1, 3, 9)
 Bill Bottrell – keyboards (1), keyboard programming (1)
 Derek Nakamoto – keyboard programming (1, 3)
 William "Dr. Z" Zimmerman – keyboards (1, 7)
 Joey Gallo – keyboards (2, 4, 7), arrangements (2, 7)
 William Shelby – keyboards (4)
 Calvin Harris – keyboard programming (5)
 Rex Salas – keyboards (5)
 Craig Harris – synthesizer string programming (6, 8)
 David Cochrane – guitars (4, 9), saxophone solo (5)
 Barry "Sonjohn" Johnson – bass guitar (5, 9)
 Wardell Potts, Jr. – drums (2, 4, 7), percussion (2, 4, 7), arrangements (2, 4, 7)
 Derek Organ – drums (5)
 Paulinho Da Costa – percussion (1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9)
 Damon Rentie – saxophone ending (5)
 Gene Page – horn arrangements (3), string arrangements (3, 5)
 Hamish Stuart – arrangements (5)
 Clare Fischer – synthesizer string arrangements and performance (6, 8), string and horn arrangements (9)
 Dana Meyers – backing vocals (4)
 Darryl Phinnessee – backing vocals (5)
 Phyllis St. James – backing vocals (5)
 Krystal Davis – backing vocals (9)
 Fonzi Thornton – backing vocals (9)

Production
 David Lewis – producer (1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9))
 Wayne Lewis – producer (1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9)
 Jonathan Lewis – associate producer (1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9)
 Joey Gallo – producer (2, 4, 7)
 Wardell Potts Jr. – producer (2, 4, 7)
 Fred Law – engineer (1, 3, 9), mix assistant (1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9), additional engineer (5, 6, 8)
 Calvin Harris – additional engineer (1, 3, 9), producer (5), engineer (5), mixing (5)
 Kevin Reach – engineer (2, 4, 7), mixing (2, 4, 7)
 Rory Young – engineer (6, 8)
 Bill Bottrell – mixing (1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9)
 John McClain – mixing (1, 9)
 Jim Shifflett – mixing (2, 4, 7)
 Phil Walters – mix assistant (5), additional engineer (6, 8)
 Ray Bardani – additional engineer (1, 3, 5, 9)
 Bino Espinoza – assistant engineer (1, 3, 5, 9)
 Iris Cohen – assistant engineer (1, 3, 5, 9)
 Michael Dotson – assistant engineer (1, 9)
 Elmer Flores – assistant engineer (1)
 Rhys Moody – assistant engineer (1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9)
 Karen Siegel – assistant engineer (1, 3, 5, 9)
 Marcus Williams – assistant engineer (1, 3, 9)
 Ralph Sutton – assistant engineer (3, 9)
 Tyrone Williams – assistant engineer (6, 8)
 Bernie Grundman – mastering
 Chuck Beeson – art direction
 Larry Vigon – design, painting
 Mark Hanauer – photography
 Cecil Parker – stylist

Studios
 Recorded at Soundcastle (Hollywood, CA); Devonshire Sound Studios and Artisan Sound Recorders (North Hollywood, CA); Hitsville U.S.A. and Studio Masters (Los Angeles, CA); Calvin Harris Studio (Encino, CA); Minot Sound (White Plains, NY); Golden Apple Media (New York, NY).
 Mixed at Hitsville U.S.A. and Studio Masters.
 Mastered at Bernie Grundman Mastering (Hollywood, CA).

References

Atlantic Starr albums
1985 albums
A&M Records albums


ČSD Class E 458.1 is a class of electric locomotive were used for shunting and local trip working in former Czechoslovakia. Locomotives which passed to České dráhy, rail operator in the Czech Republic are now classified as Class 111. E 458.1 locomotives operate solely on the 3,000 V DC electrification system. They are fitted with thyristor control. ČSD Class S 458.0 and ČSD Class E 458.0 are similar locomotives operating on 25 kV AC and 3,000 V DC respectively.

See also
List of České dráhy locomotive classes

References

External links
Lokomotivní řada 111 ČD (E 458.1 ČSD) in Czech

Škoda locomotives
Bo′Bo′ locomotives
3000 V DC locomotives
Electric locomotives of Czechoslovakia
Electric locomotives of the Czech Republic
Railway locomotives introduced in 1979
Standard gauge locomotives of Czechoslovakia
Standard gauge locomotives of the Czech Republic

Bo′Bo′ electric locomotives of Europe
Shunting locomotives


The Sharpshooter Turret was developed by BAE Systems (FMC and later United Defense) in 1980. In  1995–1997 it was updated for production by BAE Systems and FNSS Defence Systems. The turret is a one-man stabilized turret and can be equipped with one of three configurations: dual weapon system incorporating a rapid firing M242 Bushmaster 25 mm cannon, or 40 mm grenade launcher, or 12.7 mm machine gun, along with a coaxially mounted 7.62 mm machine gun. These weapons are mechanically linked to a gunner’s day/night sighting system incorporating a Thermal Imager and Laser Rangefinder.

The turret is fitted with an all-electrical drive system, which incorporates a 2 axis stabilization for Firing on the Move.

The Sharpshooter’s main armament has two primary functions: defeat lightly armored threat vehicles and provide responsive fire support. Fire support not only aids dismounted infantry, but also allows pockets of enemy resistance to be suppressed quickly, permitting the infantry to remain mounted and the momentum of mechanized operations to be sustained. It is also very effective in urban operations where single shot precision firing is required to engage targets in upper floors of buildings.

Users

Sources

External links
FNSS website

Vehicle weapons
Military equipment of Turkey
FNSS Defence Systems products
Military equipment introduced in the 1980s


CHTV was a privately owned TV channel in German-speaking Switzerland. It broadcast from 2013 to 2017.

Programming

References

External links

Television stations in Switzerland
Television channels and stations established in 2013
2013 establishments in Switzerland
German-language television stations
Mass media in Lucerne


Preselection is the process by which a candidate is selected, usually by a political party, to contest an election for political office. It is also referred to as candidate selection. It is a fundamental function of political parties. The preselection process may involve the party's executive or leader selecting a candidate or be some contested process. In countries that adopt Westminster-style responsible government, preselection is also the first step on the path to a position in the executive. The selected candidate is commonly referred to as the party's endorsed candidate.

Deselection or disendorsement is the opposite procedure, when the political party withdraws its support from one of its elected office-holders. The party may then select a replacement candidate at the subsequent election, or it may decide (or be compelled by the electoral timetable) to forgo contesting that seat (for example, the Liberal Party of Australia after Pauline Hanson was disendorsed just before the 1996 House of Representatives election, and likewise the Labour candidate for Moray, Stuart Maclennan, just before the 2010 UK general election). The deselected representative is usually free to still contest the election as an Independent or as a representative of another party, though they are usually at high risk of being unseated.

Reselection is the procedure of requiring candidates to repeat the preselection process to retain the party's support.

An example of a preselection procedure that gains extensive media coverage is the selection of candidates for President of the United States, referred to by one observer as 'the wildest democratic political bazaar in the world'. These are generally known as presidential primaries, but are actually a combination of primary elections, in which voters in a jurisdiction select candidates, and caucuses, in which candidates are selected by a narrower (but still potentially large) group of party members.

In other countries, a wide variety of preselection systems exist, though the majority involve members of a political party or party executive playing a role in selecting candidates to compete in elections.

Definition
In politics, the preselection process is the process by which candidates who are members of a political party are selected by that party to contest an election for political office. It is a fundamental function of political parties, affecting 'representation, party cohesion, legislative behaviour and democratic stability.' In countries that adopt Westminster-style responsible government, preselection is also the first step on the path to a position in the executive.

In Australia, the term has been in common usage since the 1920s to describe the selection of candidates by political parties for public office. One usage of the term is in describing elected public officeholders in Westminster type party systems as being selected by the voters after being preselected by their parties. It derives from Australian Labor Party preselection practices that were widely used by that party before 1955. These involved a two step process of a preselection ballot or plebiscite of party members and affiliated trade unionists in the electorate being contested, and endorsement, which was normally a formality, by the state executive. The ALP, as well as in some states the Liberal Party, now uses a system in which votes in the plebiscite are combined with votes from delegates selected by the party organisation.

Variables in the preselection process
Preselection can occur in a wide variety of ways, but four main variables characterise the range of systems:
 Eligibility to stand
 Membership of the preselecting body
 System used by the body to make the choice
 Additional rules determining composition of candidates as a group.

In each case, it is possible to assess the variables on a scale from "open" to "closed" or from "inclusive" to "exclusive".

Eligibility to stand

Eligibility to be a candidate in preselection is frequently bound by rules set by a political party.

Preselection may also be affected by a jurisdiction's electoral system. In Indonesia, for example, there is a system of public and administrative scrutiny of draft candidate lists. This may include examination of issues such as personal character or internal party issues, and lead to candidates being eliminated.

Membership of the preselecting body

The bodies that most commonly preselect candidates for political office (the selectors or "selectorate") are party members or party organisations such as a party executive or candidate selection committee. However, the selectors may be a broader group such as all voters or registered voters (as in some United States primary elections). Alternatively, there may be a more restricted group of selectors or selection may, in rare cases, be undertaken by an individual, such as a party leader.

System used by the body to make the choice

Preselection may take place by a system of voting by the selectors (examples include United States primaries and most major Australian political party preselections), or there may be a system of appointment, such as through decision by a selection committee.

Additional rules governing preselection

Some preselections are governed by additional rules that may serve to ensure a particular composition amongst candidates as a whole, or to facilitate other party objectives such as decentralisation of decision-making. In several countries including Australia and Canada, candidate selection is normally conducted by internal party processes at the constituency or electorate level. However it can be possible for a regional or national party body or leader to intervene to ensure a particular candidate is preselected, and there may be party rules governing the composition of the body of candidates as a whole that may require modification of preselection processes or outcomes, such as to implement policies directed toward gender balance. Gender balance objectives have been set by the Australian Labor Party and the German Social Democratic Party. In Belgium, the Belgian Christian Social party set rules aimed at ensuring balanced preselection of Flemish and Francophone candidates.

In the ACT Liberal party in Australia, candidates for the 2016 election were required to pay a A$3,500 "nomination fee". There were 25 nominations for five seats. In Australia, public office-holders are required to resign those offices before nominating at a preselection. For example, the Australian Human Rights Commissioner, Tim Wilson, resigned that office in February 2016 before nominating for the Liberal Party.

Preselection controversies and scandals
Preselection within all major Australian political parties has been the subject of accounts of "branch stacking" and abuse of process. While affecting both major parties, the Australian Labor Party was most severely affected in the state of Queensland, in incidents that led to the resignation of three members of the Queensland Parliament. The resignations were related to allegations or admissions of electoral fraud resulting from attempts to "branch stack": to bring supporters into a party branch or electorate to assist a candidate in their bid to win party preselection.

Deselection

See also
Presumptive nominee
Primary election
Prospective parliamentary candidate
United States presidential primary
Candidate deselection (Labour Party)
Unseating

References

Further reading

General
 M. Gallagher and M. Marsh (eds), Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics, Sage, London, 1988.
Reuven Hazan, 'Candidate Selection', in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard Niemi and Pippa Norris (eds), Comparing Democracies 2, Sage Publications, London, 2002, pp. 108–126.
 Kenneth Janda, Adopting Party Law, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Washington, USA, 2005.
 Graeme Orr, 'Overseeing the Gatekeepers: Should the Preselection of Political Candidates be Regulated?', Public Law Review, Vol. 12, 2001, pp. 89–94.
 A. Ranney, 'Candidate Selection',in D. Butler et al. (eds), Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive national Elections, American Enterprise Institute, Washington DC, 1981, pp. 75–106.

Australia
 Lyle Allan, 'Candidate Pre-selection in Australian Politics,' Journal for Students of Year 12 Politics, Vol. 16, No. 4, April 1989, pp. 18–24.
 Gary Johns, 'Parties, probity and preselection', IPA Review, Vol. 53, No. 1, 2001, pp. 18–19.
 Marian Simms, 'Parliament and party preselection: parties and the secret garden of politics', Legislative Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1993, pp 42–47.

Canada
R.K. Carty and Lynda Erickson, 'Candidate Nomination in Canada's National Political Parties', In Herman Bakvis (ed.), Canadian Political Parties: Leaders, Candidates and Organisation, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing Research studies, Volume 13, Dundurn Press, Toronto, 1991, pp. 97–190.

New Zealand
Raymond Miller, Party Politics in New Zealand, Oxford University Press, 2005, Chapter 6: 'Selecting Candidates'.

United Kingdom
 Austin Ranney, Pathways to Parliament. Candidate Selection in Britain, Macmillan, London, 1965.
 Michael Rush, The selection of parliamentary candidates, Nelson, London, 1969.
 D. Denver, 'Britain: Centralised Parties with Decentralised Selection', in M. Gallagher and M. Marsh (eds), Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics, Sage, London, 1988, pp. 47–71.

United States
 John Haskell, 'A Quarter Century of Direct Democracy in Presidential Nomination Campaigns: What's the Verdict?', in Robert DiClerico (ed.), Political Parties, Campaigns, and Elections, Prentice Hall, NJ, 2000, pp. 31–44.

Political party elections
Political science terminology


Paper kite butterfly may refer to:
 Idea leuconoe, a butterfly species found in Asia and Northern Australia
 Idea malabarica, a butterfly species found in peninsular India


The institutional corruption in Angola refers to the pervasive and long-standing issue of corruption within the country's government and public institutions. The aftermath of the 30-year civil war and the influence of the Soviet command economy have resulted in significant institutional damage and the emergence of a centralized government with authoritarian tendencies. This has allowed the president and his associates to exert control over the nation's resources, enabling them to exploit the economy for personal gain through legal and extra-legal means.

Background
Angola's former president, José Eduardo dos Santos (1979-2017), has been accused of creating one of the most corrupt countries in Africa. He had relatively weak response to the everyday needs and concerns of citizens and has instead leveraged the country's oil wealth to accumulate a massive fortune for himself and his family. The president's children, leading government officials and military officers have become incredibly wealthy, while much of the country's people live in poverty lacking access to basic services.

In Angola's early post-independence history, most of these strategies involved the oil sector or the spending revenues legally derived from the oil sector, over time corruption evolved into a variety of schemes involving companies controlled by the party elite and their patronage networks that operate in all sectors of the economy. Systemic corruption is possible on this scale because all the vital organs of the state (military, police, judiciary, legislature, bureaucracy, and media) are operated by those who prioritize their private interests within the patronage system over the responsibilities of their public position.

Corruption indices
 The 2022 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index gave Angola a score of 33 on a scale from 0 ("highly corrupt") to 100 ("very clean").  When ranked by score, Angola ranked 116th among the 180 countries in the Index, where the country ranked first is perceived to have the most honest public sector.  For comparison, the best score was 90 (ranked 1), and the worst score was 12 (ranked 180).
 The 2009 World Bank Worldwide Governance Index, gave Angola very low scores on the six aspects of governance assessed. Political stability improved from 19.2 in 2004 to 35.8 (of 100) in 2009, but Angola scored much lower for accountability, regulatory standards, rule of law, and corruption (5.2).
 The 2010 Ibrahim Index, Angola ranked 43rd out of 53 sub-Saharan African countries.
 The 2010 Revenue Watch Institute’s Transparency Index ranked Angola 47th out of 55 countries: scoring 34 out of 100.
 The 2010 Open Budget Index gave Angola a score of 26 (of 100) on fiscal transparency, a large improvement over its 2004 score of 3, but a far lower score than those of most of the other surveyed countries.
 In 2008, The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom ranked Angola 161st out of 179 countries, making Angola the seventh least free economy in sub-Saharan Africa. The freedom from corruption score was 19 of 100.
 Angola is listed on Global Integrity's Grand Corruption Watch List, only 15 other countries have weak enough anti-corruption safeguards to be on this list.

Angola's corruption index rankings have not changed substantially in the past decades; however, that does not mean that no changes have occurred. Ranking such as those above are based on perception surveys, their utility is generally questioned because: they measure perception, not occurrences of corruption; the survey questions imprecisely define corruption and provide little guidance about what constitutes high or low levels of corruption; people in different countries answer the previous questions in different ways, limiting the comparability across countries; and the ranking and numerical scale can make countries look further away from one another on the spectrum of corruption than they really are.

Historical overview
Angola's colonial era ended with the Angolan War of Independence against Portugal which occurred between 1970 and 1975. Independence did not produce a unified Angola, however; the country plunged into years of civil war between the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the governing Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). 30 years of war would produce historical legacies that combine to allow for the persistence of a highly corrupt government system.

Civil war (1975–1991)
The Angolan civil war was fought between the pro-western UNITA and the communist MPLA and had the characteristics typical of a Cold War era proxy war combined with a resource fueled struggle for control of the state apparatus between two rival strongmen. Regional countries were involved according to their Cold war alignment, the MLPA was even supported by Cuban troops. Oil production began to grow, but it was not a significant proportion of government revenue until towards the end of the period, most funding came from Soviet support.
The Soviet influence produced a highly centralized and weakly institutionalized government system controlled by a small group of people close to the president. Angola's land, resources, and infrastructure were nationalized during this time, concentrating all of the countries wealth in the state. The war precluded economic development in most of the country, only the oil sector, military, and coastal cities were funded by the state. These consequences would have an enduring effect on Angola's political economy by centralizing the economy around the president and the military and regionalizing economic development. Appropriation of state assets is rumored to have been high during this period, although the limited connection to the international economy combined with an absence of transparency limits the knowledge of details and precision of estimates.

1991–2002
Withdrawal of foreign powers at the end of the Cold War and pressure from the international community led to the 1991 Bicesse Accord: a tentative peace process between the MLPA and UNITA. As a consequence, the Angolan government was forced to begin a process of economic liberalization and transition to democracy. Elections were held in 1992, however UNITA and their leader Jonas Savimbi refused to accept defeat and civil war ensued. The civil war that leveled what was left of the countryside and killed an estimated 1000 people per day between 1992 and 2002 - interrupted somewhat by the Lusaka Peace Protocol on 20 November 1994 - until war resumed in 1998.

While the elections did not bring peace, they did provide the MLPA with international political legitimacy. The MLPA continued to be the recognized government of Angola and maintained access to oil exports and financial markets which provided them with the resources necessary to consolidate control over the new democratic institutions and the newly opened economy. Oil revenues replaced Soviet support as Angola's main source of income during this time, growing to 1 million barrels per day in 2002.

The Cold War era had aggregated control of the Angolan State in a small group; simultaneously, nationalization during that era aggregated ownership of Angola's assets in the State. Combined with the chaos of the war, the MLPA was able to avoid a robust democratization process and instead create a system where the President has a high level of discretion and a low level of accountability with regards to government spending and appointing government positions. These factors allowed for very high levels of corruption during this period of time: direct appropriation of the government budget was common: the IMF estimates that approximately 1 billion dollars per year was appropriated from the state budget during this time. The economic liberalization process was abused to sell state assets (telecom companies, media outlets, large land concessions) to members of the presidential patronage network for a price below market value, such transactions were often funded by loans from the Angolan state or banks.

2002–2018
Peace was achieved in 2002 with the defeat of UNITA, the Luena Memorandum was signed and elections were held in 2008, and a new constitution took effect in 2010. The constitution was drafted without public consultation and implemented without a ratification referendum. The new constitution increased the powers of the president such that there is no true division of powers and he is able to rule by presidential decree.

Angola's oil production grew from 1 million to 2 million barrels per day, while the price of oil increased from the 20-30 dollar range to over $100 per barrel. Consequently, Angola became Africa's 3rd largest economy with a GDP of $120 billion in 2013. The high price of oil had a resource curse like effect: the large profits allowed for considerable appropriation to be obscured behind visible infrastructure projects.

Although oil wealth did insulate Angola from the international leverage, they did face pressure to increase public service provision, create anti-corruption legislation, and improve transparency in the oil and financial sectors. Angola did make such improvements to remain in formal accordance with international norms and maintain access to international markets. These changes were not enforced, however; so no substantial reduction in corruption occurred - it merely took on more complicated forms when international laws necessitated.

The legacies of the previous eras produced a centralized and entrenched patronage system that included all aspects of governance and the economy that have proven to be quite resilient. There are, however, some prospects for change have occurred in recent years. The Angolan government has faced mounting fiscal pressure since the collapse of the price of oil in 2014 reduced Angola's GDP to 89 billion in 2016. The reduced revenues have made debt an issue, created a foreign exchange shortage, caused a currency devaluation and 42% inflation in 2016. The reduction in income has exposed the weakness of the country and produced a growing domestic protest movement in response to deteriorating conditions and further international pressure in response to the increased risk of insolvency in the Banks and Sonangol. Political change also offers some prospect for reform: João Lourenço was elected President in 2017. He has since removed the dos Santos family and other close associates from high level positions and pledged to improve governance and reduce corruption.

Modes of corruption
Corruption occurs when an actor uses a public position to divert resources from the state to private individuals - the practice is systemic in Angola. The president places associates in positions of power in state institutions and enterprises, then they make decisions in their public capacity to allow for a variety of legal and extra-legal opportunities to extract private profit from Angola's economy. Strategies have evolved over time from direct embezzlement of oil revenues, to a variety of schemes involving companies controlled by the party elite and their patronage networks that have consistently appropriated resources from the Angolan state via: control over loans made by state capitalized financial institutions; land and resource concessions; monopolization of business and import licences; granting un-tendered contracts to their own companies; and including unnecessary joint-venture partners and overpaid consultants in the contracts of state-owned enterprises and the government. The magnitude of appropriation was possible and sustainable over such a long period of time because of the centralization of authority in the economy and the vital organs of the state . The powerful actors in these institutions receive access to patronage and govern according to the private interests of the dos Santos Regime.

Corruption of the state apparatus
Observers of Angola generally believe that corruption is endemic throughout the state system. There is much overlap, as well as intimate connections, between government officials and business figures in Angola - resulting in many conflicts of interest. While Angola technically has the institutional and legislative structures typical of a democracy, the normal logic of horizontal accountability and depersonalized decision making in the best interests of the public does not apply - rather, the system has been described as a facade for the international community, whereby the operators of all branches of government collude to allow each other opportunities for private gain.

Elections
Angola's elections are administered by two agencies: the CNE (Provincial Electoral Commission) is responsible for oversight; and the CIPE (Inter-ministerial Commission for the Preparation of the Elections) is responsible for administering the voting process. In theory there should be an element of horizontal accountability between the two institutions; however, at the federal level both institutions are operated by MLPA insiders and at the district level they are often represented by the same person.

Angola's first elections since the civil war were held in 2008. The Southern African Development Community and the European Commission described Angola's 2008 elections as generally fair, but other observers have cited irregularities and violence as factors that make the elections less than equitable. Registration was limited in rural areas due to the documentation requirements, Angolan expatriates were not able to vote at embassies (despite the Voter Registration Law), and there was an assassination attempt against the leader of the opposition in the months leading up to the election. There were also allegations that the MLPA used their influence over the media to distort public perception in their favour. Prior to the 2008 elections, the MLPA unveiled a series of major infrastructure projects with public events that had the characteristics of a campaign rally while the media simultaneously produced reports accusing UNITA of stockpiling weapons and planning a war.

In the months before the 2017 election, both State owned media outlets and those privately owned by party insiders were used to favorably portray the MLPA and criticize UNITA in a manner similar to the 2008 elections. The elections were subject to allegations of outright falsification. The CNE announced an MLPA victory with 65% of the vote; however, media reports cite anonymous inside sources and allege that this figure was released well before the local voting centers had reported their results. UNITA claimed that it had tabulated the real results based on the vote counts of the local locations and the real result was: 47.6% for the MLPA and 40.2% for UNITA.

Bureaucratic corruption
Angola's business environment has been described as “one of the most difficult in the world” because of pervasive corruption and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures. Angolan public servants routinely demand bribes, known as “gasosas.”; paying such bribes is an ordinary part of doing business in Angola. The 2018 World Bank Ease of Doing Business Index ranked Angola 175th out of 190 countries. The 2010 World Bank & IFC Enterprise survey found that 75% of firms found corruption to be an impediment to business and that they expected to pay bribes in approximately 50% of their interactions with Angolan officials.
Angolan citizens often must also pay bribes to access basic public services such as healthcare, education, vehicle registration, and business permits. Police officers often extort payments at checkpoints.

Interviews with members of the Angolan business community suggest that earning government contracts or acquiring business licences is impossible without connections. This is particularly true where Import Licences are concerned: they are tightly controlled and restricted to the upper levels of the dos Santos network, the MLPA, or the military elite. Angola imports most of its finished products because it has a small manufacturing sector and an export oriented agricultural sector. The consequence of not developing local production capacity and allowing the import of goods to be a protected monopoly is that Angolan cities are among the most expensive in the world, pricing ordinary Angolans out of being able to access products that would otherwise be significantly cheaper.

Judicial corruption
The function of a judiciary is to impartially enforce the laws of the country and investigate potential violations; however, the Angolan judiciary is known to collaborate with the regime. The President appoints judges, many of whom are or were members of the MLPA or the military. Judges have been known to ignore or creatively interpret laws in situations where they hold a conflict of interest. The system is underfunded, understaffed and inefficient. There is a large backlog of cases and rural Municipal courts are not even operational, obliging citizens to turn to informal, traditional court systems.

The courts have also been used as instruments of repression against political opponents on numerous occasions. Notable examples include: the cases against journalist Rafael Marquis de Morais; a 6-year sentence to Cabindan activist José Marcos Mavungo in 2015; and the book club raids in 2015.

Sonangol and the oil sector
Oil has been Angola's core asset since independence. It has provided the government with a reliable and steadily increasing source of funds (other than instances of oil price volatility). Production rose from 150 000 barrels per day in 1980, to 645 000 bpd in 1995, to 2 million bpd in 2008. Oil currently provides approximately 80% of government revenue, as such it is also a major vehicle for appropriation.

Sonangol, the Angolan state oil company, was created and granted a monopoly over the country's offshore oil by the MLPA in 1976. By 1980, Sonangol had divided Angola's coastal waters into exploration blocks and opened the exploration rights for bidding by international companies. Sonangol then entered into joint ventures with a consortium of companies in each block to extract the oil. Sonangol did not have any offshore oil exploration or extraction capacity, the company simply collected rents by selling the rights to the oil during this time. Sonangol leveraged these partnerships to quickly accumulated wealth and capacities. By 1991, the company had expanded to include many subsidiaries with interests in every aspect of oil production. Despite its opaque finances and relationship to the regime, Sonangol was consistent in its external relationships and had cultivated a reputation as a competent and reliable business partner among the MNCs that are active in the country.

The Angolan oil sector is an archetype of an enclave economy: it is physically removed from Angola, and not dependent on the country for labour, capital, infrastructure or demand. Sonangol and the MLPA managed it like a textbook example of a Rent-seeking Gatekeeper state that is a facade for a presidential patronage network. A proportion of Sonangol's revenue was consistently embezzled each year: rather than move from Sonangol to the Angolan government, billions of dollars simply disappeared. This was possible because: Angola's laws were ignored; the transparency of Sonangol and the government's budget was very low; and, Sonangol had many vaguely defined responsibilities beyond the oil sector that were used as an explanation. Based on a comparison of Angola's oil production against the total state budget the IMF estimates that $32 billion was appropriated in this way between 2007 and 2010.

In addition to direct embezzlement, Sonangol facilitates indirect modes of private appropriation, including: mandating joint ventures with low value added patronage companies; preferential treatment of favored companies during the awarding of exploration and extraction contracts; preferential treatment of its own subsidiaries in the awarding of ancillary service contracts; allowing companies to over charge for services; including unnecessary consultants in their contracts and paying them large fees.

Government policy also enables corruption in the oil sector. The "Angolanisation policy", which began in the 1980s, mandated the employment of Angolans in the Oil sector. In the 1990s it expanded to mandate the participation of Angolan companies in the ancillary aspects of the oil sector, namely well servicing, construction, and general procurement of goods and services. This is widely understood as a mode of rent seeking, as the Angolan companies rarely ever add value to the project or create any jobs. They are simply owned by Angolan officials close to the President that are making use of a law put in place for this purpose.

Another more subtle form of corruption related to Sonangol involves its decision not to develop local refining capacity. Only one refinery is under construction, The Lobito Refinery, and its cost has tripled during the course of the project due to corruption and mismanagement. As a country with so much oil, it is likely that a competitive refining market or an efficient State Owned refiner could provide petroleum derivatives to the Angolan economy at a lower cost than it takes to import them, while simultaneously keeping the profits from this activity in the hands of the government. Instead, Angola has no refining capacity and a joint-venture between Trafigura, a Swiss MNC, and Cochan, a company owned by Vice-President Manuel Vicente (CEO of Sonangol from 1999-2012), General Manuel Dias (“Kopelipa”) and General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento “Dino” has a monopoly on the import of petroleum derivatives. Angola spends approximately $170 million a month importing petroleum derivatives.

The 2014 collapse in oil price revealed the major problems at Sonangol. The dramatic reduction in income put the company in a position where it struggled to meet its financial obligations, and its corruption and questionable accounting practices were exposed. Since 2011 they had been showing a positive balance sheet, but only because they had been re-valuing their assets to obscure poor cash flow. In 2015, the former chairman of Sonangol's board of directors, Francisco Lemos, stated publicly that he believed Sonangol to be bankrupt. They maintained a 300 million dollar outstanding debt with Chevron throughout 2015 and in 2016, the China Development Bank suspended Sonangol's line of credit after they failed to deliver a shipment of oil.

In June 2016, President dos Santos appointed his daughter, Isabel dos Santos, as a CEO of Sonangol. This presented a tremendous conflict of interest as she was politically connected and in control of other companies that were shareholders, debtors, creditors, suppliers, and customers of Sonangol. She engaged in number of corrupt activities during her tenure. She prioritized a $1 billion loan repayment to the Trafigura-Cochane joint venture that she is party to over other obligations. She also used her position to grant an exclusive supply contract for Sonangol's food purchases to her supermarket - Candando. She also made her company a preferred supplier for most other products. The contracts awarded by Sonangol to Candando are worth several hundred million dollars a year.

Financial sector corruption
Mismanagement and appropriation are a serious problem in the Angolan banking system: by 2013, approximately $3.5 billion dollars of defaulted loans existed in Angola's banks. Angolan banks have historically operated according to similar appropriation strategies: banks capitalized by the Angolan State are operated by individuals associated with the President that then invest the funds in complicated networks of companies that are ultimately controlled by members of the presidential patronage network. The investments are either: in the form of unsecured loans to companies registered in tax havens that default on the loan and launder the money through the international financial system; or, the money goes towards a real project in Angola, but the project is operated by a patronage company that gained the contract through an un-tendered process and will appropriate the investment over the course of the project.

BNA
In the largest financial fraud in Angola at the time, the Central Bank of Angola (also known as BNA) was the location of an alleged fraud case of about $160 million transferred to overseas accounts in 2009. Several money transfers were discovered from the Angolan treasury account at Banco Espírito Santo in London to bank accounts abroad controlled by the suspects. When the bill reached the minimum values of the BNA, it was the BES London itself that warned the authorities of Angola of the successive outflows of money. The case of fraud was revealed by the Portuguese newspaper Diário de Notícias in June 2011. Several key employees of the Angolan Finance Ministry and the BNA in Luande were sentenced to up to eight years in prison in 2011. There are still investigations going on in Portugal and Angola.
In 2010, 18 low-level employees of the central bank and finance ministry were arrested for embezzling roughly US$137 million.

In 2010, a US senate corruption investigation committee reported that, "Aguinaldo Jaime, who served as the governor of the National Bank of Angola from 1999 to 2002, initiated a series of suspicious US$ 50 million transactions with US banks. For each attempt, the banks, concerned about the likelihood of fraud, ultimately rejected the transfer or returned the money shortly after receiving it. The government could not account for approximately US$ 2.4 billion over the period of Jaime’s three-year tenure as central bank governor.”

FSDEA
The Angolan sovereign wealth fund (Fundo Soberano De Angola) was created in 2011 with an initial capitalization of US$5 Billion. The President appointed his son, José Filomeno dos Santos, as chief executive, who then appointed long-time associate Jean Claude Bastos as the funds manager. The fund has since been used according to the standard appropriation strategies for financial institutions.
In 2017, the paradise papers revealed that Jean-Claude Bastos was paid $90 million in management fees between 2014 and 2015. The money went to a variety of his companies registered in the Virgin Islands and Mauritius. During his tenure, the fund also invested in several projects where Mr. Bastos had a conflict of interest, including a deep sea port in the province of Cabinda and a hotel in Luanda.

BESA
The Banco Espirito Santo Angola was created in 2002 by the Banco Espirito Santo, a Portuguese family owned bank.
In 2009 a company controlled by Manuel Vicente, General Manuel Dias Júnior (also the minister of State and President's Security Chief), and General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento acquired 24% ownership of the bank for $375 million. The transaction was financed by a loan of 400 million from the Angola Development Bank (BAI), the purpose of the additional 25 million was not stated and its eventual use is unclear. Manuel Vicente was Vice President of the board of directors of the BAI at the time, presenting a conflict of interest. Isabella dos Santos has also owned 19% of the bank since 2006.
Audits of BESA by KPMG and Deloitte show that between 2009 and 2013 the BESA lost over $5 billion to unsecured loans made to asset-less internationally registered companies. These revelations prompted corruption investigations in Portugal against the Santo family, BES employees, and members of the Angolan Elite. BESA collapsed in 2014.

BDA
The Angolan Development Bank (Banco de Desenvolvimento de Angola) was created in 2006. In 2016, the BDA revealed that it had $400 million of losses due to unsecured loans that had not been repaid, and that approximately 70% of the loans ever issued by the BDA were without collateral. Paixão Franco Júnior was the bank's chairman between 2006 and 2013, by 2010 he had inexplicably become one of Angola's 50 wealthiest people. Reports emerged in 2013 linking him to corruption.

Infrastructure corruption
There has been a high level of infrastructure corruption in Angola since the early 2000s. High oil prices provided the funds and access to credit necessary to rebuild the country's infrastructure after the civil war, and a major construction boom ensued. Many major infrastructure contracts were issued to firms owned by regime insiders without competitive bidding processes. The magnitude of corruption was such that, according to the Portuguese newspaper Expresso, President Dos Santos awarded over $14 billion of public contracts to his children's companies between 2006 and 2016.

The general process of appropriation from infrastructure projects involves pricing the project above what it should cost, then sub-contracting the construction to a foreign firm for less money. Additionally, the Angolan government and Angolan Banks often ultimately assume most of the financial costs, while allowing the patronage company to retain a disproportionate share of ownership.

The construction of the deep water port of Cabinda illustrates the details of the above strategy. In 2011, Caioporto S.A., a newly created company owned by Mr. Bastos de Morais, was granted the contract through an un-tendered process. The initially stated plan was for the $500 million project to be entirely funded by private sector loans to Caioporto, however: such investment was not forthcoming. In an effort to attract investment, the President amended the contract such that the Angolan government would guarantee all loans made to Caioporto, and also guarantee the company a minimum profit - effectively assuming all the risk while allowing Caioporto to retain full ownership of the port. Four years later the project had still not received any private investment, so President dos Santos changed the deal again. The cost increased to $890 million: the government would use a loan from China to cover 85% of the cost and the Angolan Sovereign Wealth Fund (FSDEA) would pay the remaining 15% in exchange for 50% ownership of the port. Construction was to be done by the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC). The result is effectively that Mr. Bastos de Morais acquired 50% ownership of the port without contributing any of the necessary investment or doing any of the work. Additionally, José Filomeno dos Santos collected consulting fees from the China Road and Bridge Corporation for helping them secure the deal.

Other notable cases of corruption related to the ownership and construction of infrastructure include: the 2015 Caculo Cabaça Hydroelectric Project; the 2013 Luachimo Dam renovation; the IMOB business tower in Luanda; and the Lobito refinery.

Media corruption
The State and MLPA insiders have a near monopoly on Angola's media: it is used for propaganda and competitors are repressed. Although a press law passed in 2006 ended the government's monopoly on television, it still owns the principal TV station, as well as the nation's only daily newspaper and radio station; and the first purportedly private TV station, established in 2008, is owned by a company with close ties to the president. Corruption is present in the government's formation and use of law against critical journalists and opposition media. Angola's State security and government secrecy laws create the threat of imprisonment for journalists and have been used to prosecute investigative journalists.

Costa case

In April 1999 Gustavo Costa, a journalist for Expresso, wrote an article entitled Corruption Makes Victims, accusing José Leitāo, the chief presidential advisor, of embezzling government revenue. Police arrested Costa and charged him with difamação and injúria. The Angolan Supreme Court found him guilty, sentencing him to eight-months imprisonment, suspended for two years, and fined him $2,000.

Rafael Marques de Morais
Rafael Marques de Morias, a journalist and human rights activist, wrote "The Lipstick of the Dictatorship", an article criticizing corruption in the Angolan government and President dos Santos, on July 3, 1999. The National Criminal Investigation Division (NCID) questioned him on October 13 for several hours before releasing him. Later that day Morais gave an interview with  and repeated his criticism of the dos Santos government. Twenty armed members of the Rapid Intervention Police arrested him along with Aguiar dos Santos, the publisher of Agora, and Antonio José Freitas, Agora staff reporter, on charges of defamation on October 16, 1999. Marques said dos Santos bore responsibility for the "destruction of the country... for the promotion of incompetence, embezzlement and corruption as political and social values."

In 2015, Rafael Marques de Morais received a 6-month suspended sentence for slander and defamation for publishing a report about human rights abuses in Angolan diamond mines. The accusation was that two senior Army Generals that held mining concession had been using the police and private security forces to violently displace competing diamond miners.

Rafael Marques de Morais stood trial again in April 2016 for "insulting a public authority" under Angola's State Security Law. He had published a report that accused the attorney general, General João Maria de Sousa, of changing the designation of a 3-acre beachfront property to "rural land" so that he could buy it from the state for $3500 and then re-designate it and build a condominium development. There was also a second charge for "committing an outrage against a body of sovereignty" because the report included an accusation that president dos Santos protects corrupt actors. Mariano Brás, the director of the weekly newspaper O Crime was also charged with the same crimes for publishing the report

Domestic anti-corruption
Despite the fact that President dos Santos began to publicly advocate a “zero tolerance” approach to corruption in 2009, domestic enforcement of existing law is minimal and the investigative capacity of control agencies is weak. Domestic anti-corruption policy in Angola remained a facade throughout dos Santos' presidency because he was the main source of government policy as well as the operator and primary beneficiary of corruption in Angola.

There are some prospects for future reform, however. João Lourenço became leader of the MLPA and was elected President on August 23, 2017. He has pledged to combat corruption and improve governance; however, the pervasive culture of corruption and the entrenched interests in the legislature, bureaucracy, Judiciary, military, and business community create a significant barrier. Although it is not unprecedented for an otherwise highly corrupt regime to pursue corruption reform in specific sectors of the economy if it is in the interest of the regime (such as in the Philippines and Indonesia) . The continuation of low oil prices and international pressure could prompt reform in core areas like banking oversight, tax collection, or infrastructure contracts. Doing so would require the creation of anti-corruption agencies that are sufficiently funded and empowered to investigate and persecute corruption in an efficient and independent way.

If the political will were to become present, Angola would require improvement to its transparency and oversight mechanisms such that the existing institutions that are meant to combat corruption have the capabilities to perform that function. Doing so would require a dramatic increase in funding and re-design of their powers. Given Angola's starting position, doing so would amount to a comprehensive reform of the civil service.

Political change
João Lourenço was elected President on August 23, 2017. He has been a member of the MLPA since he joined as a teenager during the colonial war. He followed a typical MLPA career trajectory: he received military training and education in the Soviet Union; then was a member of the military through the 1980s; then he served as secretary-general from 1998–2002; a member of the national assembly from 2002-2014 until he became the minister of defense. Despite his long history with the MLPA, his corruption record is surprisingly clean and his wealth and business interests - although significant - are not nearly on the same level as those closest to president dos Santos.

President Lourenço has presented himself as a reformer. Since his election he has stated that he intends to: improve government probity and increase transparency and accountability; diversify the economy; nurture and autonomous civil society; and reduce censorship of the media.
João Lourenço's opposition to the status quo is uncertain, however; there is a rumor that there was a deal between Lourenço and dos Santos prior to the transfer of power whereby Lourenço agreed to protect the legal, economic and political interests of dos Santos' inner circle. In contradiction to this reported agreement, however: President Lourenço did remove the inner circle of corrupt actors (Manuel Vicente, General Helder ‘Kopelipa’ Vieira Dias, Isabel dos Santos, Eduardo dos Santos, Jean Claude Bastos de Morais) from their appointed positions; specifically targeted their economic interests; and has initiated legal proceedings.

He has also targeted their economic interests and sources of appropriation. In his inaugural address, he specifically mentioned the monopolies on Angolan cement and telecommunications, both controlled by Isabel dos Santos. He then shut down GRECIMA, the propaganda bureau of the President's office, in late 2017. GRECIMA had been accused of diverting hundreds of millions of dollars to a company, Semba Comunicação, owned by Isabel and Jose Filomeno dos Santos over the past decade. In 2011, this amount totaled 110 million.

In March 2018, the Attorney General's office indicted Jose Filomeno dos Santos and Valter Filipe for their role in an attempt to send $500 million from the National Bank of Angola (BNA) to an account in London. British authorities detected the fraud and froze the funds. These actions suggest that President Lourenço has the political will to take real action against corruption, but the case is ongoing (at the time of writing) so it is too early to tell if it will yield results or if the new president will continue persecuting corruption beyond dos Santos' inner circle.

In November 2017, President Lourenço's invited IMF staff to Angola to make preparations for a formal Article IV consultation mission that was completed in March 2018. The preliminary IMF report on the mission portrays the Lourenço government favorably and implies that they may be inclined to pursue reform at SOEs, the banks and governance (and that they might have to if oil prices remain low). The full report on the consultation mission will be released in May 2018.

President Lourenço's decisions have been generally praised, even by those traditionally critical of the government. He has maintained the support of the MLPA and the military so far; but it remains unclear whether or not he is a true reformer, or if he is merely seeking to remove the network of his predecessor, consolidate his own power, and garner some much needed domestic and international legitimacy by presenting himself as acting against corruption. Even if President Lourenço would like to be a reformer, it seems unlikely that the MLPA will allow significant change to the status quo. Although he has removed dos Santos' inner circle, the remaining party elite have entrenched interests throughout the economy and it is unlikely that they would accept major reform that affects their privileged position in Angola's political economy. Although it is possible that the entrance of a new president - in the context of an economic crisis and growing protests, international reform pressure, and assistance from foreign legal entities - could create some space for progress. The need for credibility and efficient government finances could lead to a compromise between the entrenched interests and the new regime, whereby control agencies are empowered to deal with lower level corruption or with specific components of the economy whose integrity is deemed essential to the long run viability of the regime.

There is also some evidence against the probity of President Lourenço. In February 2018, he was accused of being involved in a transaction where he had a conflict of interest and gained personal benefit. 5 passenger aircraft were sold by the Angolan state to three companies connected to the president: SJL-Aeronautica, owned by his brother; Sociedade Agropecuária de Angola, owned by General Higino Carneiro, the Deputy Chairman of the parliament; and, Air Jet, owned by a former Air Force officer, António de Jesus Janota Bete. The planes were sold for an undisclosed sum and without any bidding process.

Legislation
Angola does have a reasonably comprehensive set of anti-corruption laws, however, they are rarely enforced. The laws below are the main anti-corruption laws in Angola, their combination technically prohibits most corrupt actions, however; violations are dealt with through the normal judiciary and there are no dedicated agencies that have the capacity to investigate and persecute violations.

Public Contracting Law (2006)
The Public Contracting Law governs the government contracting process and contains provision that affect both public and private actors. Its provisions effectively prohibit corrupt actions; however, it also lacks enforcement mechanisms beyond a clause stipulating that any contract made in violation of the law is automatically nullified.

Public Probity Law (2010)
The public probity law governs the behavior of public actors in Angola. It provides decent coverage for prohibiting corrupt actions, but there are some notable omissions and it does not include mechanisms for investigation and enforcement. It allows individuals to report violations to the courts, who then decide whether or not to pursue an investigation. The process is not transparent and leaves complainants with no further recourse if the case is ignored by the underfunded and politically influenced judiciary. The law also contains an anti-libel clause that has been used to sue journalists for making corruption allegations. In the context of low trust in institutions and a history of violence these factors make it unlikely that complaints will be made and progress to trial.

The Public Probity Law contains some potential loopholes. The law allows for exceptions when public officials can accept gifts (i) goods that can be transferred to the State or public entities; (ii) gifts that conform to normal protocols and are not detrimental to the good image of the State; (iii) gifts on festive occasions, such as birthdays, weddings and New Year. The public probity law prohibits a substantial list of items that cannot be given to a public official, but there are some notable exceptions such as jewelry and shares of stocks.

The public probity law also states that all government officials must declare their wealth every two years, but the information is not made public and can only be access by a court order if it is relevant to an investigation. There is no real audit mechanism so the reporting requirements can easily satisfied dishonestly

Money laundering laws
Angola's anti-money laundering legislation includes: the Law on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism; and, the Law on Designation and Enforcement of International Legal Acts. The law makes the expected prohibitions, including reporting requirements for financial institutions.

There is also the 2015 Law on the Criminalization of Infractions related to Money Laundering contains many more provisions than its name implies. It contains prohibits against a variety of criminal activities and was produced so that Angola could conform to the international treaties that the country has ratified. The law has been criticized for having relatively light penalties that can be further reduced if the money is returned.

Control agencies
An effective control agency has: autonomy from political interference; full jurisdiction (no immunity for positions in government); the power and capacity to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption; a court system that is also autonomous and equipped to handle cases in an efficient manner (ideally as a court separate from the main court system that is specialized for corruption); competent staff and decentralized leadership; procedures to have its performance evaluated.

While Angola does have some anti-corruption agencies, they are generally lacking in the above characteristics. Although, the core legislative and institutional structures of typical control agencies do at least exist. Angola's anti-corruption institutions are:

 There is a specialized corruption bureau within the office of the Attorney General, but this position is appointed by the president and cases are prosecuted in the mainstream court system, so the effectiveness of the bureau is dependent on top-down political will and the competence of the courts.
 The Office of the Ombudsman was formed in 2005. Its purpose is to receive human rights complaints from citizens and produce reports that make recommendations. It submits bi-annual reports to the Commission of the National Assembly; the reports receive superficial attention but have not produced any actions. The Ombudsman is chosen by 2/3 vote in the legislature; the political independence of the office has been questioned.
 The Court of Accounts, whose director is appointed by the President, is responsible for auditing government spending. The institution has the power to investigate, but then must refer their report to the judiciary, where a decision to prosecute or investigate further is made. The audits are not publicly disclosed.
 The Financial Information Unit was created in 2011 and is responsible for auditing Angolan banks. They receive legally mandated reports and are responsible for collaborating with law enforcement and the financial control agencies of other countries. In 2013 the Financial Action Task Force (FATP) criticized Angola's Anti-money laundering laws (AML) and FIU for not sufficiently: criminalizing money laundering and terrorist financing; establishing and implementing an adequate legal framework for the confiscation of funds related to money laundering and the identification and freezing of terrorist assets without delay; ensuring an effectively functioning Financial Intelligence Unit; and ensuring that appropriate laws and procedures are in place to provide mutual legal assistance. In 2016, however, the FATP stated that Angola had made sufficient progress to no longer require monitoring - although they continue to work with the State to improve AML policy and institutions.

Media, civil society and resistance
A critical media, active civil society and the presence of protests can contribute to the likelihood that reform will occur. It can gradually spread awareness, change culture, and keep reform on the government's agenda. In the case of Angola, these factors have been consistently been repressed such that their size and effect have been limited. The existence of protests and need for repression could have some consequences for regime stability if excessive repression and further deterioration of the economic situation prompts enduring large scale protest that disrupt the status quo (a similar logic to the Arab Spring).

A Protest movement emerged in 2011 following a call for demonstrations by Angolan musician and anti-corruption advocate Luaty Beirao; however, only a few small protests occurred that year and they were quickly shut down by police. The scale of protest increased somewhat in the months before the election, but un-uniformed men would arrive to assault the protesters. The scale of protests has been limited such that no unified organization has emerged from the protest movement, although they refer to themselves as the Revoluciona´ria (Revolutionary Youth) and have some social media presence. Members also commonly engage with opposition groups as individuals.

Protests continued to occur sporadically through 2017 in response to political and economic grievances, and against instances of repression. Notably in response to the arrest and hunger strike of Luaty Beirao in 2015, a 2013 leak regarding the extrajudicial killing of two former presidential guards in 2012, and the subsequent revelations of extrajudicial killings under the dos Santos regime through 2016. The scale of the protests has increased, although not to a mass scale; it remains to be seen whether the protest movement will influence the policies of President Lourenco, or if they will be met with continued repression.

International anti-corruption
Angola has faced mounting pressure to conform to international governance norms. Treaties have played an important role in mandating the creation of laws and institutions in Angola. Among others, Angola has signed and ratified the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, in 2004 the African Peer Review Mechanism and the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. In 2010, Angola ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) - the most comprehensive international corruption treaty. In order to comply with these treaties, Angola has implemented reasonably comprehensive anti-corruption legislation. Domestic enforcement has been minimal so far, but international treaties continue to mandate further reform that will at least provide Angola with a framework of anti-corruption legislation.

International institutions and foreign legal institutions can also mitigate Angolan corruption to some extent. Their policies focus on ensuring that their loans are not appropriated, and ensuring that multi-national corporations are not involved in bribery. Legal action is limited to cases where individuals, companies, and the money involved in corruption leaves Angola and violates foreign law, then the actors involved could face legal consequences in foreign courts. There have been cases where the regulatory agencies of foreign countries have detected the money laundering of Angolan actors and initiated their own legal proceedings, such as the BESA case and the related bribery and judicial interference case against Manuel Vicente. Further suspicion of Angolan transactions could increase scrutiny and create a barrier to their ability to use their illicit profits, prompt asset recovery attempts or potentially even the sanction of specific individuals. Aggressive international intervention has not occurred thus far, as major nations have thus far remained strategically indifferent to support their interests in stability, continued access to oil and the interests of their MNCs in Angola.

Intervention by international actors generally requires that the country in question invite the intervention. For specific cases, assistance with regard to the costs involved, investigation, human capital, asset recovery, extradition, and collaboration with foreign legal systems is theoretically available. Similarly for institution building, the knowledge, logistics, and training required to establish effective control agencies could be provided, but again this is dependent on Angola's political will.

Cases of foreign institutions affecting Angolan corruption
In 2017, Manuel Vicente incurred numerous charges related to his bribery of a Portuguese prosecutor during the BESA investigation in 2013. The investigation uncovered that BESA (partially owned by Mr. Vicente) had lost $6.8 billion in a pattern of unsecured loans, however; inexplicably, the prosecutor Orlando Figueira, decided that there was not enough evidence to proceed. Portugal's Judicial Police investigated this suspicious decision: they found that Figueira had received 400,000 Euros from a company linked to Sonangol, and had also breached court confidentiality by providing Vicente's lawyer with all of the relevant documents during the investigation. Mr Vicente remains under investigation.

The March 2018, indictment of Jose Filomeno dos Santos and Valter Filipe was made possible by British oversight agencies that recognized the transaction as suspicious, froze the funds and referred the information to Angolan authorities.

As of 2013 there are three Angolan money laundering cases being investigated in Portugal. Two of which involve funds of suspicious origin that seem to have passed through multiple jurisdictions and from businesses to 3rd party individuals before being used to buy real estate in Portugal. In these cases the investigations have stalled because Angola did not provide financial information. The third case was incidentally discovered during a tax crime investigation of a Swiss company. The company was also the recipient of funds from an offshore account controlled by a Portuguese company that exports food products to an Angolan supermarket chain owned by a high ranking Angolan military officer. Funds flow from the Angolan company to the offshore account, then most of the funds proceeded to the Portuguese company, but a portion was diverted to the Swiss company and then distributed to accounts controlled by other Angolan officials. $2 million was distributed in this way between 2006 and 2010.

In 2017, the United States also launched an investigation regarding collaboration between Angolan actors and American corporations to launder money and conceal bribe payments.

The limits of international money laundering and bribery law
The idea that international law can constrict the financial flows of corrupt actors and provide opportunities for them to be charged in foreign courts is dependent on the participation of the countries involved. In practice these laws are avoidable: Angolan actors have been known to use tax havens where financial oversight is weak and such laws are not robustly enforced. International financial oversight is dependent upon collaboration between domestic financial oversight agencies; if the trail of money passes through an uncooperative jurisdiction (such as Angola), it can become impossible to get the information necessary to satisfy the evidence requirements of a court case.

The preferred investment destination of wealthy Angolans is Portugal, surprisingly there have not been any bribery or money laundering convictions related to these transactions. A recent OECD report has accused Portugal of neglecting to investigate money laundering and bribery according to its treaty obligations. Only 15 foreign bribery cases have occurred in Portugal since 2001, 8 were closed before trial and the other 7 remain in the investigative phase. The report raises the possibility that Portugal's economic interests in Angola influence the country to neglect the issue and that Angola has influenced the Portuguese judicial system to ignore specific cases of corruption.

The influence of China
China has become Angola's largest trading partner. The relationship began with growing purchases of oil (63% of Angolan output in 2016) and expanded with Chinese loans and direct investment in oil exploration and infrastructure construction (totaling over $20 billion since 2003). China has completed projects in every sector of the Angolan economy and their projects tend to be completed on time and on budget, and at a much lower cost than Angolan firms would have been able to provide. This has been criticized as providing insulation from international pressure for reform, as the Chinese are known for being willing to ignore the corruption and human rights issues of its international partners. While the details of the relationship between Angola and China are not transparent, there is no evidence to suggest that China behaves any differently than Western countries or MNCs have in the past.

It is possible that Angola's relationship with China could have a negative effect on the appropriation of state resources and a positive effect on Angola's development. Since 2014, China has become more cautious with their investments due to corruption complaints from Chinese construction firms and revelations that SINOPEC was losing money on its Angolan operations, and the decline in the price of oil and the consequent growth of Angola's national debt. China's method of investment makes it difficult for Angolan actors to mismanage or appropriate capital: lines of credit are secured by oil; and the investments are used for specific projects that are operated mostly by Chinese firms and workers, so there are fewer points of contact with rent seeking Angolan firms or bureaucrats.
China could be a barrier to corruption if it is diligent with its investment and continues to buy the majority of Angolan output and provide the majority of foreign investment to Angola; although if this not the case, then an indifferent dominant trading partner could provide insulation from the international pressure and financial constraints that might otherwise prompt reform.

See also
 International Anti-Corruption Academy
 Group of States Against Corruption
 International Anti-Corruption Day
 ISO 37001 Anti-bribery management systems
 United Nations Convention against Corruption
 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
 Transparency International

References

Economy of Angola
Angola
Crime in Angola by type
Angola
Politics of Angola
Society of Angola
Law of Angola
Government of Angola


The  is a geographical area that centers on the valley of the upper portions of the Kiso River in the southwestern part of Nagano Prefecture in Japan. It is a v-shaped valley with length of approximately 60 km (36 mi) that follows the river as it flows from north by northwest to south by southwest into Gifu Prefecture.

Access

Through much of Japan's history, the Kiso Valley was used to connect the former Mino and Shinano provinces. However, it came to be known as a difficult route because of its steep climbs. The Shoku Nihongi recorded that the Kiso no Yamamichi (岐蘇山道) was opened in 702. The same route was again mentioned in a 713 article, but it was then called the Kisoji no Michi (吉蘇路). The Kisoji (木曽路) would eventually follow the same path. However the official Tōsandō did not run through the Kiso Valley; instead, it ran from Mino Province towards the Kamisaka Pass and into the Ina Valley. During Japan's Middle Ages, the Nakasendō, an old trade route, ran through the valley, which led to the creation of eleven post stations along the route. Since the Meiji period, the Chūō Main Line (for trains) and Route 19 (for vehicles) have been cutting through the valley.

Forestry
Most of the land consists of steep mountains, so there is little cultivated land. The land that is cultivated can be seen on the narrow flatland along the Kiso River. The area has abundant rainfall with annual precipitation of 3000mm. Forest Industry used to be common throughout the region but since the 1980s has declined.

During Edo Shogunate period, forestry development rapidly expanded. In addition, the Kiso River excavation business was promoted, making it possible to transport large amounts of timber. In the early modern times, the use of forest materials became significant and the depletion of forest resources became a concern, so the Owari-Tokugawa clan started to use forest conservation and deforestation control policies, resulting in the formation of vast cypress forests.
After the Meiji (era), the forest became a state-owned forest, and in 1889, it became a royal estate as a royal forest. It was designated as a national forest in 1947, after World War II and went under the jurisdiction of the Forestry Agency. After that, there was a large amount of destruction of trees by the Isewan Typhoon in 1959. At the time the forest industry used to be large, but price competition with imported foreign timber in the latter half of the 1980s, and the amount of timber harvested decreased.

Communities

The following communities are part of the Kiso Valley:
Nagano Prefecture
Kiso District (including Tsumago-juku, a former post town, )
Shiojiri ()
Gifu Prefecture
Nakatsugawa (), including Magome-juku, another former post town

References

Rivers of Gifu Prefecture
Rivers of Nagano Prefecture
River valleys of Japan
Rivers of Japan


Phoenix Airport may refer to:

Phoenix, Arizona#Air, for airports within the metro area of Phoenix, Arizona, United States:
Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport
Phoenix Deer Valley Airport
Phoenix Goodyear Airport
Phoenix-Mesa Gateway Airport
Sanya Phoenix International Airport in Sanya, Hainan, China


Clyde Ellsworth "Buzzy" Wares (March 23, 1886 – May 26, 1964) was an American Major League Baseball shortstop during the second decade of the 20th century and a longtime coach in the Majors. Born in Newberg Township, Michigan, Wares attended Kalamazoo College. He stood  (178 cm), weighed 160 pounds (72.6 kg), and threw and batted right-handed.

Wares played only one month and one full season of Major League ball. He came to the St. Louis Browns of the American League late in the 1913 campaign, and stayed through 1914. He appeared in 90 games, and batted .220 in 250 at bats, with 55 hits, no home runs and 24 runs batted in. His manager, however, was Branch Rickey, and when Rickey was the general manager of the St. Louis Cardinals of the National League, he hired Wares as a coach in 1930. Wares would remain on the Redbirds' staff through 1952, a string of 23 consecutive seasons, during which time St. Louis won seven NL pennants and five World Series. Wares worked under eight different Cardinal managers in that span.

During his minor league playing career (1905–20), Wares twice led his league in fielding percentage, although he did commit a league-leading 107 errors in 224 games played for Oakland of the Pacific Coast League in 1910. That season, however, Wares led the PCL with 790 assists, and had 1,287 total chances, for a fielding percentage of .917.

Buzzy Wares died at age 78 in South Bend, Indiana.

See also
 List of St. Louis Cardinals coaches

References
Spink, J.G. Taylor, ed., The Baseball Register. St. Louis: The Sporting News, 1949.

External links

1886 births
1964 deaths
Baseball coaches from Michigan
Baseball players from Michigan
Hancock Infants players
Houghton Giants players
Little Rock Travelers players
Major League Baseball shortstops
Minor league baseball managers
Montgomery Rebels players
Oakland Oaks (baseball) players
People from Cass County, Michigan
St. Louis Browns players
St. Louis Cardinals coaches
Seattle Rainiers players
Toronto Maple Leafs (International League) players
Wichita Witches players
Zanesville (minor league baseball) players
Zanesville Infants players


The Șapte Izvoare is a right tributary of the river Bâsca Mică in Romania. It flows into the Bâsca Mică in the village Secuiu. Its length is  and its basin size is .

References

Rivers of Romania
Rivers of Buzău County


A Mad Couple Well-Match'd is a Caroline era stage play, a comedy written by Richard Brome. It was first published in the 1653 Brome collection Five New Plays, issued by the booksellers Humphrey Moseley, Richard Marriot, and Thomas Dring.

Date and performance
Hard evidence on the play's date of authorship and first stage production is lacking. The 1639 list of plays belonging to the Beeston's Boys company includes an otherwise-unknown play titled A Mad Couple Well Met, which some scholars have taken as a mistake for Brome's play. (Matthew Steggle observes that "the two phrases are variants of the same proverb.") Brome is known to have written for William Beeston's company at the Cockpit Theatre during the final phase of his career; they staged his last play A Jovial Crew  in 1641. Most critics accept the later 1630s as the likeliest time for the authorship of A Mad Couple Well-Match'd.

Genre
Like most of Brome's comedies, A Mad Couple shows strong influences from the works of Ben Jonson and from earlier works in the genre of city comedy. The resemblance between Brome's complaisant cuckold Saleware in A Mad Couple and the character Candido in Thomas Dekker's The Honest Whore, Part 1 has drawn notice.

A special debt to Jonson's comedy has been noted in Brome's portrayal of the widow character, Mistress Crostill. She is a "humours" character of the type made famous by Jonson, most notably in his Every Man In and Every Man Out of His Humour; and her characterisation as lustful and lubricious is typical of Jonson's comedy specifically, and more generally of city comedy as a whole.

Place realism
Brome's plays regularly participate in the trend toward "place realism" that was fashionable in the drama of the 1630s; his The Sparagus Garden, The Weeding of Covent Garden, and The New Academy refer to actual, socially significant locations in contemporary London, as do other plays of the period like Shirley's Hyde Park (1632) and Nabbes's Covent Garden (1633) and Tottenham Court (1634). A Mad Couple shows this same tendency toward place realism: in Act II, the protagonist Careless says,

"I need no more insconsing in Ram Alley, nor the sanctuary of Whitefriars, the forts of Fullers Rents and Milford Lane, whose walls are daily batter'd with the curses of bawling creditors."

All of these were locations in the London of Brome's day: Fuller's or Fulwood's Rents and the others were places where debtors could find sanctuary from creditors and bailiffs and the threat of debtors' prison.

Sex and morals
Traditional critics objected to the sexual themes in this play. Algernon Charles Swinburne called the work both "very clever" and "very coarse;" Clarence Andrews complained that "the bad characters all end happily; no one suffers for his flagrant immorality; the hero is faithless, a rake, a scoundrel, and a liar."

Modern commentators tend to approach the play with less moral high dudgeon, and have recognised that the play's rough-and-tumble morality, and its treatment of the contrasting roles of men and women in the Caroline double standard, have some overlooked subtlety and power. The play's element of latent lesbianism has also attracted attention. [See The Antipodes and The Queen's Exchange for other Brome allusions to lesbianism.]

Synopsis
George Careless is a debauched young gentleman, the type of character who often appears in Caroline drama. Since rescuing his rich uncle Sir Anthony Thrivewell from an attempted robbery, Careless has enjoyed his uncle's patronage and financial support – though lately Sir Anthony has grown weary of rescuing his nephew from his "surfeits, wants, wounds, and imprisonments," as is threatening to cut the young man off. The matter is complicated by the fact that the elderly Sir Anthony married a young wife two years previously, but has yet to father a child with her, leaving his nephew Careless as the heir to his estates.

This backstory is delivered in the play's opening dialogue, between Careless and his servant Wat. Their conversation also touches upon the subject of Careless's mistress Phebe, a young woman whom Careless has seduced and maintained as his lover. Phebe had grown increasingly unhappy with her disreputable state, and longs for marriage; Careless does not. Phebe has appealed for help to a relative of hers, a London merchant named Tom Saleware. Saleware has a notorious reputation as a "wittol" — a complaisant cuckold: his wife Alicia Saleware sleeps with prominent men for social and financial advantage.

Among those men is Sir Anthony Thrivewell; the guilt-ridden old knight admits to his Lady that he had one sexual experience with Mistress Saleware, which cost him £100. Lady Thrivewell, a worldly woman, forgives her husband — but extracts a little revenge from Mistress Saleware: she buys goods at the Salewares' shop worth a hundred pounds and change, but pays only the change. Alicia Saleware is resentful over the trick, but has other matters to attend to: she is being courted by a licentious nobleman called Lord Lovely, who sends his follower, a young man called Bellamy, as his go-between. Their conversations reveal a noticeable measure of sexual tension, the suggestion being that young Bellamy, though naive and inexperienced, is interested in Alicia Saleware for himself. Alicia Saleware is shown conducting her flirtations under her husband's nose, while he refuses to acknowledge the facts before him.

Through the intervention of Sir Anthony's friend Mr. Saveall, Careless is welcomed back into Sir Anthony's graces, and the Thrivewell house, once again. As a way of reforming the nephew and restoring his fortune, Thrivewell and Saveall promote an arranged marriage between Careless and a wealthy young widow, Mistress Crostill. Careless sends her a letter to advance his suit, and at the same time writes a dismissive and insulting letter to Phebe; true to his name, however, he misdirects the two letters, so that Phebe receives the marriage proposal and Mrs. Crostil the insults. The widow, however, has a "humorous" and contrary personality (hence her name: she is always contrary, "cross still"):

"she has a violent humour to do, and not to do things oftentimes wilfully against all good counsel or persuasion; she has the spirit of contradiction in her, and an unalterable resolution upon sudden intentions, a most incorrigible will she has, that will not bow nor break"

— as Mr. Saveall puts it. The rudeness and sexual bravado of Careless's "cross abusive letter" only attract the widow to him.

Careless is incorrigible himself: drunk, he makes sexual advances to Lady Thrivewell, offering to impregnate her with the heir that his uncle apparently cannot conceive. When his servant Wat protests Careless's callous treatment of Phebe and his general bad behaviour, Careless beats him and fires him. Even when he's sober, Careless continues his pursuit of the Lady for sex, and the widow for marriage. Mrs. Crostil is a handful for him, however; Lord Lovely has proposed a marriage between her and young Bellamy, and in one comic scene Crostil merely repeats Careless's wooing to Bellamy verbatim, and repeats Bellamy's words back to Careless. Careless quickly develops a resentment toward Bellamy, and a suspicion of the young man's friendship with Lady Thrivewell.

Meanwhile, Alicia Saleware finds that Bellamy evades and frustrates her attempts to have sex with him. Offended, she decides to accuse him of trying to seduce her away from Lord Lovely. The play's entanglements come to a head in the final Act: Careless believes that he has seduced Lady Thrivewell and then been dismissed by her, and he exposes her to her husband. Lord Thrivewell is deeply distressed by the accusation, but Lady Thrivewell assures him that she can resolve him of her innocence. She reveals that she has played a version of the bed trick (so common in English Renaissance drama), and that the woman Careless mistook for Lady Thrivewell in the dark was actually his mistress Phebe. By this, the Lady has managed to teach a lesson to Careless, and also to her husband and his double standard of sexual behaviour.

The accusations against young Bellamy, and all appearances of sexual misbehavior on his part (with Alicia Saleware or Lady Thrivewell or Mrs. Crostil), are negated when it is revealed that "he" is actually a young woman, disguised to safeguard her against sexual predators like Lord Lovely. Careless, exposed and disgraced, states that he will marry Phebe and sell tobacco for a living – but Lady Thrivewell has other ideas: she and other friends provide a dowry on which Phebe and Wat can marry and establish themselves. Lord Lovely promises to reform; Alicia Saleware is sent back to her husband to make something of her marriage, if she can. With all his other plots exposed, Careless admits that the robbery from which he once rescued Sir Anthony was a con-game, a trick arranged to earn the knight's gratitude. Yet despite all of his faults, Careless still attracts Mrs. Crostil; they decide to marry — two incorrigibles who deserve each other, a mad couple well matched.

Adaptation
During the Restoration era, Aphra Behn adapted Brome's play into The Debauchee, or the Credulous Cuckold (printed 1677). Behn retained much of Brome's work in her version, even keeping the original characters' names — though she expanded the crucial bedroom scene in Act IV.

References

External links
Richard Brome Online   contains a scholarly edition of this play, including textual and critical introductions.
 The play text online.

English Renaissance plays
Plays by Richard Brome
1630s plays


Beit Guvrin (, lit. House of Men in Aramaic) is a kibbutz in the Lakhish region, west of the ancient city of Beit Guvrin, for which it is named. Located 14 kilometres east of Kiryat Gat, it falls under the jurisdiction of Yoav Regional Council. In  it had a population of .

History

Kibbutz Beit Guvrin was founded in 1949, on the eve of Shavuot, by former Palmach members after the Palestinian Arab residents of Bayt Jibrin fled the military assault by Jewish forces during the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. The first residents were members of the "Yetzivim" youth group, which immigrated from Turkey in 1945, and the "Bnei Horin" youth group, which immigrated from Romania in 1946.

The kibbutz was established on the fields to the north of the Arab village of Bayt Jibrin, which sat atop what was once a Hebrew town known as Beit Guvrin that was later renamed Eleutheropolis, "the city of free men" by the Romans in 200 CE. It was later the site of a Frankish colony, "Bethgibelin", before becoming better known by its Arabic moniker "Bayt Jibrin" following the Muslim conquest.

Economy
The economy was formerly based on chicken coops, cowsheds and field crops. BG Technologies is located on the kibbutz. Other kibbutz-run businesses are a banquet hall, a clothing and gift store, a jewelry store, a dental clinic and a public swimming pool.

Landmarks

The kibbutz is surrounded by antiquities from the 1st century BC – 2nd-century CE town of Beit Guvrin. the Beit Guvrin-Maresha National Park is a popular tourist destination which includes Hellenistic-period caves with wall paintings, columbaria, a Roman city and ruins of a Crusader castle.

The area is surrounded by many Islamic shrines (maqam)  like Nabi Jibrin, Sheikh Mahmoud, etc., but the holiest of them is Maqam Tamim al-Dari dedicated to a companion of Muhammad who had control over the Hebron district which included the Cave of the Patriarchs.
Today all the Muslim shrines are abandoned.

Jesus Christ Superstar (1973) was filmed here.

References

Kibbutzim
Kibbutz Movement
Yoav Regional Council
Populated places established in 1949
Archaeological sites in Israel
Populated places in Southern District (Israel)
1949 establishments in Israel


AfterLife is a 2003 drama film set in Scotland directed by Alison Peebles and written by Andrea Gibb. It stars Lindsay Duncan, Kevin McKidd, Paula Sage, and James Laurenson. Afterlife won the Audience Award at The Edinburgh Film Festival 2003. Sage's role won her a BAFTA Scotland award for best first time performance and Best Actress in the Bratislava International Film Festival, 2004.

Plot
An ambitious Scottish journalist is forced to choose between his high-flying career or caring for his younger sister who has Down syndrome.

Cast

Lindsay Duncan	as May Brogan
Kevin McKidd as Kenny Brogan
Paula Sage as Roberta Brogan
James Laurenson as Professor Wilkinshaw
Shirley Henderson as Ruby
Fiona Bell as Lucy
Anthony Strachan as Mike
Emma D'Inverno as Rosa Mendoza
Eddie Marsan as Walters Jez
Isla Blair as Jackson, Dr
Stuart Davids as Big Tony
Julie Austin as Foghorn Heather
Martin Carroll as Bingo manager
Maureen Carr as Cissie
Molly Innes as Social worker
Isabelle Joss as Care home nurse
Julie Wilson Nimmo as Hospital nurse
Alison Peebles as Radiographer

External links
Film4 Search results for AfterLife

2003 films
Down syndrome in film
Scottish drama films
English-language Scottish films
2000s English-language films
Films about disability in the United Kingdom


Water-penny beetles are a family (the Psephenidae) of 272 species (in 35 genera) of aquatic beetles found on all continents except Antarctica, in both tropical and temperate areas. The young, which live in water, resemble tiny pennies. The larvae feed – usually nocturnally – on algae on rock surfaces. The presence of water-penny larvae in a stream can be used as a test for the quality of the water, as they are pollution-sensitive. They cannot live in habitats where rocks acquire a thick layer of algae, fungi, or inorganic sediment. Therefore, their presence along with other diverse phyla signifies good-quality water. They are around 6 to 10 millimeters in length.

A water-penny larva's shell is oval-shaped to almost circular and is commonly a copper color, hence the name, 'water-penny'. Water-pennies obtain oxygen through their membrane and through feathery gills located at the base of the abdomen. They are typically found in riffles in streams with a moderate to fast current, clinging to the underside of logs or rocks. Occasionally, they can be found on rocks along the shores of lakes. Attached to the legs are scrapers, which are used to scrape the algae from the surface of a log or rock.

In North America, they are usually found in the Northeast, and occasionally discovered in the Southwest. Some genera in the US:
 Psephenus: the Northeast and the west coast (from Oregon to California; usually below 4,000 feet elevation in California).
 Eubrianax: California, up to 6,000 feet elevation.
 Ectopria: the northeastern and Central U.S.
 Acneus: California and Oregon up to 4,000 feet.

As adults, water-pennies become terrestrial. Adults are relatively short lived and eat little to nothing.

Fossil genera

 Subfamily Eubrianacinae Jacobson 1913
 †Succinumanax Bao et al. 2018 Burmese amber, Myanmar, Cenomanian
 †Vetujinbrianax Cai and Huang 2018 Burmese amber, Myanmar, Cenomanian
 †Protacnaeus Wickham 1914 Florissant Formation, Colorado, Eocene
 †Psephenella Martins-Neto 1998 Tremembé Formation, Brazil, Oligocene

References

External links

 Video of a water-penny from Thailand

Byrrhoidea
Aquatic insects